上海合作组织扩员后的地区定位与合作格局

作为新地区主义的一种实践形式,上海合作组织成立后不断发展。上海合作组织坚持以“不干涉内政”原则为核心的主权规范,遵循“国家主义”发展路径。扩员之前,在应对安集延事件、吉尔吉斯斯坦政局动荡等地区安全与政治挑战的过程中,上海合作组织确立了以中亚为地缘安全中心的地区定位。在开展各领域合作的进程中,上海合作组织秉持协商一致的原则,其内部形成了“大国引领、中小国家平等参与”的合作格局。扩员之后,上海合作组织继续遵循“国家主义”发展路径,但其地区定位与内部合作格局出现了新变化。印度和巴基斯坦的加入,使中亚的地缘安全中心地位相对下降,以中亚为重心、南亚为重要延伸成为上海合作组织新的地区定位。印度和巴基斯坦两国的加入,还增加了上海合作组织内部合作格局的复杂性,使“大国引领”的合作格局面临深刻转型,“中小国家平等参与”的合作格局也在发生演变。目前,上海合作组织处于发展转型的十字路口,其发展面临的不确定性需要给予更多关注。     

新区域主义视角下的市际重复博弈:问题与路向

在重复博弈过程中,通过约束博弈主体的背叛行为能够促进合作的有效产生。新区域主义认为影响城市群内城市政府间合作的因素包括:合作的共同收益、偏好的多样性、博弈者的地位和实力以及博弈结构和参数的稳定性。根据我国的实际情况可以看出,博弈地位以及贴现因子是导致博弈主体选择背叛策略的主要原因。因此,可以通过约束博弈地位和构建利益激励制度来促进合作的产生。     

The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: China's Initiative in Regional Institutional Building

China's initiative in establishing and promoting the development of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) is an interesting case study of China's attempt at regional institution building. China's increasing interest in Central Asia coincided with its gradual acceptance and rising enthusiasm regarding participation in regional organisations. The “Shanghai Five” mechanism and the SCO were seen as appropriate mechanisms for pursuing China's multiple interests in the region; their development was also in line with the improvement in Sino-Russian relations. Chinese leaders have skilfully developed the SCO's institutional framework, and they seem intent on getting good value for the resources spent. The leaders have also demonstrated considerable patience when the SCO's development encountered setbacks.     

African modernities and the critical reappropriation of indigenous knowledges: Towards a polycentric global epistemology

ABSTRACT

While the African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (AU/NEPAD) strives for both plurilateralism and regionalism, there are ideological and practical conditions that challenge the feasibility of a fully fledged regional integration institution in Africa. This article examines the AU/NEPAD in relation to Africa's ideological back-loading, while it explores how the programme reconciles Western-dominated economic plurilateralism with Africa's developmental regionalism. It highlights the ideological changes that helped with the modernisation of Western countries and how these developments become a challenge to Africa's economic development efforts. Africa has always been an ideological back-loader and a delayed integrator into global interdependence. During the mid-20^th century, at the time Western countries (in particular Western European countries) were adopting regionalism, Africa was engaged in the same phenomenon for political and economic independence. While the economic crisis of the mid-20^th century following the Second World War (WW2) enabled the industrialised countries to adopt embedded liberalism for socioeconomic development, at decolonisation Africa sought to espouse what turned out to be the dependency paradigm as the economic development strategy for Africa. In the 21st century, developed regions are transcending regionalism and gearing towards plurilateralism while most African leaders remain fixated in traditional regional integration on the continent. As the neoliberal ideology dominates the contemporary international political economy of the 21^st century, albeit questionably, Africa's politico-socioeconomic realities are also premised on the same embedded liberalism. However, economic plurilateralism by industrialised countries with Africa challenges efforts towards regional integration on the continent. It would seem that the AU/NEPAD provides a viable compromise between developmental regionalism and economic plurilateralism on the continent.     

Lesotho's interactions with South Africa and regional organisations in Southern Africa

Media reports alleged in late 2012 that South Africa was treating Lesotho ‘worse than … under apartheid’. To test that premise, this article contrasts Lesotho's regional and bilateral interactions during the colonial and apartheid eras with present relationships. It reviews bilateral and regional factors that impact Lesotho, emphasising Lesotho's roles in the Southern African Customs Union, the Common Monetary Area, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as diverse bilateral transactions with South Africa. Lesotho's experiences with SADC economic, political and security operations are evaluated. Whether a mutually beneficial relationship with South Africa is replacing the prior hegemonic pattern is questioned, especially after the peaceful transfer of power in 2012 to Lesotho's opposition parties. Dual citizenship, open borders, an economic union and even the remote possibility of political fusion are discussed. Finally, the article addresses how Basotho view border issues, why they have reservations about regionalism and political amalgamation, and why commitment to separate Lesotho statehood persists.     

From the ASEAN People's Assembly to the ASEAN Civil Society Conference: the boundaries of civil society advocacy

Civil society organisations (CSOs) have asserted their claim for participation in regional governance in Southeast Asia through multiple forums held since the late-1990s. The two most enduring are the ASEAN People's Assembly (APA), organised by ASEAN-ISIS and held seven times from 2000 to 2009, and the ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC), organised by the Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy network and held nine times from 2005 to the present. Through comparative analysis of the boundaries of CSO participation in these two events, this article explains why the APA was superseded by the ACSC, and it highlights states' growing intrusions into the ACSC. It argues that states' expanding repertoire of tactics to direct the ACSC has seen the structure of CSO participation in this event recast, challenging the view of the ACSC as an independent space for advocacy and indicating the hollowness of ASEAN's commitments to creating a ‘people-oriented’ Association.     

What is a region? Towards a statehood theory of regions

This article presents the outline of a statehood theory of regions with the aim of contributing to a better understanding of what regions are, how they function and how they emerge. First, a definition of region is introduced that starts from the use of the concept of region in everyday language. It is argued that ‘region’ is a discursive tool used to refer to governance units that are not states but have some statehood properties. Second, a comparative framework is developed that allows to present theories of regions in a systematic way. Third, this framework is used to outline a general theory of regions at the supra-national, sub-national or cross-border level. This theory can be labelled as a ‘statehood theory of regions’ as it underlines the statehood properties of regions as well as the complex relationships between states and regions. According to this theory, regions are in a double relation to states: they are to some extent supportive to the state(s) that created them, and they have a tendency to gain autonomy from their creators. The whole paper can also be regarded as an exercise in interdisciplinarity as it brings in perspectives from psychology and personality theory in order to transpose the Hobbesian metaphor of states acting as persons to the understanding of regions.     

Ideas,identity, and institution‐building: From the ‘ASEAN way’ to the ‘Asia‐Pacific way'?

Abstract

This article examines the extent to which the development of multilateral institutions in the Asia‐Pacific region may be viewed as an exercise in identity‐building. It argues that institution‐building in this region is more of a ‘process‐orientated’ phenomenon, rather than simply being an outcome of structural changes in the international system (such as the decline of American hegemony). The process combines universal principles of multilateralism with some of the relatively distinct modes of socialization prevailing in the region. Crucial to the process have been the adaptation of four ideas: ‘cooperative security’, ‘open regionalism’, ‘soft regionalism’, and ‘flexible consensus’. The construction of a regional identity, which may be termed the ‘Asia‐Pacific Way’ has also been facilitated by the avoidance of institutional grand designs and the adoption of a consensual and cautious approach extrapolated from the ‘ASEAN Way’. The final section of the article examines the limitations and dangers of the Asia‐Pacific Way. It concludes with the assertion that while the Asia‐Pacific Way is an over‐generalised, instrumental, and pragmatic approach to regional cooperation, and there remain significant barriers to the development of a collective regional identity that is constitutive of the interests of the actors, it has helped introduce the concept and practice of multilateralism into a previously sceptical region and might have ‘bought’ enough time and space for regional actors to adapt to the demands of multilateralism.     

Between bilateralism and regionalism in East Asia: the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Abstract

This paper examines economic regionalism in East Asia with a focus on the key issues in harmonizing bilateral free trade agreements. The ASEAN+1 free trade agreements with China, South Korea and Japan represent the first attempts to structure cooperation in trade across Southeast and Northeast Asia. It is therefore important to examine the coverage of these agreements and the extent to which they actually liberalize trade. This study focuses on major choices made in the negotiation of the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and the ways in which these choices help or hinder the consolidation of economic regionalism. The results achieved in the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement are limited at best. The agreement does establish some new areas of cooperation among the signatories but fails to address important issues for regionalism such as labor mobility. It also makes limited progress in harmonizing and liberalizing rules of origin. The ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement applies product-specific rules to fewer categories of goods than most of Japan's bilateral agreements with ASEAN members but those rules in place are still very restrictive. Moreover, the parties to the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement have the option of applying the rules of their bilateral agreement if it provides more favorable treatment. Thus, there is no guarantee the more liberal terms of the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement will be applied.