后西方世界秩序下的核武器与核威慑

全球国际社会正处于一个关键的变化时期。长期以来占主导地位的西方秩序在如下几个方面面临包围:霸权分散、全球资本主义危机日益加重、全球共同面临恐怖主义、大规模移民以及环境变化等带来的各种威胁。英国脱欧、特朗普当选美国总统这些事件表明,作为世界秩序核心的英语世界,已失去其主导力量。目前的发展格局将朝着多元化的后西方世界秩序发展。在此秩序下,没有超级大国,只有大国,并且这些大国大多比较自我封闭,因此,并不存在真正意义上的争夺全球霸权的现象。文化差异将比意识形态差异更为重要。文章首先将这一秩序的轮廓做一大致勾勒,然后探讨这一秩序对未来几十年核武器与核威慑所要扮演的角色来说将意味着什么。最为关注的着眼点是,全球格局从全球层面向区域层面的转变以及复杂的核扩散与核威慑态势。     

美国实战威慑核战略：理论、历史与现实

以《不扩散核武器条约》为基础的国际防扩散制度已经走过了半个世纪,如今却面临日益严峻的挑战。对于全球防扩散与核裁军进程出现的倒退,美国负有特殊的责任。这突出表现在三个相互关联的理论、历史和现实问题上。首先,经典核威慑理论并不能充分解释美国矛盾的核战略和防扩散政策。以实战威慑和延伸威慑构成的绝对自由核战略才是长期指导美国核政策实践的根本。其次,通过对20世纪50～60年代的冷战史进行再挖掘可以得知,一般认为的美国核战略在主张核武器用于实战的保守派和主张核武器仅用于威慑的自由派之间摇摆,实际上夸大了自由派对美国核战略的影响。美国在大多数总统任期内将绝对自由核战略作为拱卫其构建战后国际秩序和获得对苏联战略优势的关键。最后,核武器与非核武器的互动是当前核时代的一个显著特征。随着新技术革命的兴起,传统的核威慑和战略稳定正面临极为复杂的挑战。然而,美国依旧以核常融合、攻防兼备构筑绝对优势,并以新兴技术、跨域威慑确保全面制胜。其结果持续引发由核武器与常规武器互动、谋求技术先发优势以及追求绝对自由所导致的"三元悖论",从而对全球战略稳定和国际防扩散制度产生进一步冲击。     

印支难民与香港“第一收容港”政策

1979年日内瓦国际印支难民会议上,英国代表香港承诺作为印支难民的"第一收容港",给予出逃的印支难民以临时的庇护,等待西方国家的再安置。港英政府不折不扣地将这一政策执行了近20年。直到特区政府成立后,才于1998年1月正式取消这一政策。造成越南难民和船民问题滞留香港多年的原因是多方面的,既有国际社会层面的因素,也有英国及港英政府方面的原因。越南难民和船民问题,带给香港的最大启示是怎样在人道主义与内部利益冲突中找到一个平衡点。     

THE MISSING LINK IN GENERAL DETERRENCE RESEARCH*

Research on the deterrent effects of punishment falls into two categories: macro‐level studies of the impact of aggregate punishment levels on crime rates, and individual‐level studies of the impact of perceived punishment levels on self‐reported criminal behavior. For policy purposes, however, the missing link—ignored in previous research—is that between aggregate punishment levels and individual perceptions of punishment. This paper addresses whether higher actual punishment levels increase the perceived certainty, severity, or swiftness of punishment. Telephone interviews with 1,500 residents of fifty‐four large urban counties were used to measure perceptions of punishment levels, which were then linked to actual punishment levels as measured in official statistics. Hierarchical linear model estimates of multivariate models generally found no detectable impact of actual punishment levels on perceptions of punishment. The findings raise serious questions about deterrence‐based rationales for more punitive crime control policies.     

美国退出《反导条约》的动因及潜藏的战略意图

《反弹道导弹条约》曾经是美苏(俄)双方承认的维持战略稳定的基石。布什政府单方面宣布退出《反导条约》是具政治主张驱使的结果,是为了在国际上谋求军事霸主地位和绝对自身安全,在国内谋取党派利益,必将对未来国际安全与军备控制进程产生极坏的影响。     

依法行政受传统文化因素制约的对策分析

随着依法治国方略的实施,我国政府的管理活动已开始走上逐步向依法行政转变的正轨,但在具体的行政实践中却受到人治主义的法律文化、虚无主义的法治观念、法治价值取向上的伦理化倾向等诸多因素的制约,因而应通过长期有效的普法教育以确立法律至上、以法律为本位的法治精神,最终实现依法行政的现代发展。     

Serious tax fraud and noncompliance

Research Summary This article reviews what international evidence exists on the impact of civil and criminal sanctions upon serious tax noncompliance by individuals. This construct lacks sharp definitional boundaries but includes large tax fraud and large-scale evasion that are not dealt with as fraud. Although substantial research and theory have been developed on general tax evasion and compliance, their conclusions might not apply to large-scale intentional fraudsters. No scientifically defensible studies directly compared civil and criminal sanctions for tax fraud, although one U.S. study reported that significantly enhanced criminal sanctions have more effects than enhanced audit levels. Prosecution is public, whereas administrative penalties are confidential, and this fact encourages those caught to pay heavy penalties to avoid publicity, a criminal record, and imprisonment. Policy Implications Although it has yet to be proven that prosecution has a greater or lesser impact on these offenders, increased prosecution might be justified for purposes of moral retribution as well as perceived social fairness.     

DETERRENCE AND DETERRABILITY*

The first forays into Western criminological theory came in the language of deterrence (Beccaria, 1963 [1764]). The paradigm itself is simple and straightforward, offering an explanation for crime that doubles as a solution (Pratt et al., 2006). Crime occurs when the expected rewards outweigh the anticipated risks, so increasing the risks, at least theoretically, will prevent most crimes in most circumstances. If deterrence describes the perceptual process by which would-be offenders calculate risks and rewards prior to offending, then deterrability refers to the offender's capacity and/or willingness to perform this calculation. The distinction between deterrence and deterrability is critical to understanding criminality from a utilitarian perspective. However, by attempting to answer “big picture” questions about the likelihood of offending relative to sanction threats, precious little scholarship has attended to the situated meaning of deterrability. This article draws attention to this lacuna in hopes of sensitizing criminology to an area of inquiry that, at present, remains only loosely developed.     

知识产权惩罚性赔偿的类型化适用与风险避免——基于国际知识产权规则的视角

惩罚性赔偿制度的目的在于通过惩罚既往侵权行为而威慑未来侵权行为,其前提包括权利的确定性、侵权判断可行和过度威慑的消极影响小。知识产权的不确定性决定了它与惩罚性赔偿有着根本冲突,难以全面适用惩罚性赔偿制度。从惩罚性赔偿制度的前提和侵权行为的道德可责性出发,可对知识产权惩罚性赔偿进行类型化适用,恶意知识产权侵权行为或可适用惩罚性赔偿,一般知识产权侵权行为则难以适用。在国际知识产权规则下,既要保护知识产权,又要为正当竞争保留合理空间,知识产权与竞争的平衡才可产生最优的创新激励效果。知识产权惩罚性赔偿可能造成过度威慑,打破知识产权与竞争的平衡,妨碍知识产权法基本目标的实现。类型化适用有利于降低或避免知识产权惩罚性赔偿的制度风险。     

算法时代的垄断协议规制:挑战与应对

算法具备自主学习和大数据处理的能力,有助于达成、实施垄断协议,形成算法驱动的合谋现象。算法合谋并无明显的意思联络,缺乏明确的合意证据,因而对传统的垄断协议概念带来挑战。算法决策存在黑箱,导致经营者排除、限制竞争的主观意图无法得到验证。人—机联系弱化,进而导致宽恕政策和法律制裁失灵。面对算法技术的进步,反垄断法亟待建立因应时代变化的垄断协议检测、认定和制裁规则体系。为此,垄断协议的检测应当保持前摄性,借助大数据和经济分析手段筛选市场异质信号,进而在垄断协议认定方面适当降低证明标准,发挥算法作为间接证据的证明功能,最后,通过续造法律责任督促算法设计者、提供者履行竞争义务,保持算法的可问责性。