The impact of economic theories on the law in market relations

The impact of economic theories on legal development, thinking and practice is undeniable. This is particularly true for neo-classical and institutional economics. Neo-classical economics are based on model assumptions of human behaviour such as pursuit of personal advantage, individualistic goals, complete information and at the same time law obedience which are the foundations of the functioning of the market mechanisms. The assumption leads to an almost mystical belief in the self-regulatory power of the market and a strong disdain and disapproval of the State. The concepts of a minimal State and de-regulation of all social relations follow from there. This article argues that model assumptions are valid scientific tools, as long as they are not taken to reflect the real world which is populated by real people that are not necessarily behaving like homines oeconomici. Preaching de-regulation and the dismissal of the State can prove simplistic and even dangerous and may lead to financial and economic crises like the ones witnessed in recent years. Institutional economics part from these empirical findings. They do not question individualism and the pursuit of egoistic objectives of market-participants, but they insist on inherent risks of this mechanism which stems from opportunistic behaviour, lack of information and transparency and the limits of trust. Property economists deduct from there that sustainable and dynamic economic development is unthinkable without well defined property title, the distinction of property and possession and credit securities. These institutions cannot be self-regulatory but need a clear legal frame, in other words rules established by a State. Transaction costs economists understand the danger of opportunistic behaviour and a corresponding systemic lack of trust in the negotiation, conclusion and execution of contracts. They underline the necessity of institutions which are capable of limiting these dangers and thus reducing transaction costs. Institutions may be customs, informal arrangements and formal law. At the end two examples are presented-real estate transactions and post-patriarchal family relations-to test the utility of these considerations.     

股权优先购买权研究：交易成本视角

结合民法的基本理论和现实的股权交易实际存在的问题,从法经济学尤其是交易成本的角度,对现行《公司法》的有关立法规定进行检讨,股权优先购买权现行立法中存在制度缺陷和操作难度,从便利股权流转和保护交易、降低交易成本的目的出发,应完善现行的股权优先购买权制度。     

浅议流通费用与交易费用的关系

马克思提出了以流通费用为核心的流通费用理论,而科斯提出了以交易费用为核心的交易费用理论。这两种理论的产生虽然都与流通领域有关,但它们之间却存在着不同。一方面,由于各自立足点的不同,这两种费用的内容存在着不同;另一方面,由于这两种费用的性质不同,它们对经济主体的经济效益有着不同的影响。     

交易费用理论的发展——兼评威廉姆森《资本主义经济制度》

交易费用的思想源于科斯,经过威廉姆森在《资本主义经济制度》中构筑了较为完整的交易费用理论体系。但是,通过对交易费用理论的重新梳理,我们不难发现其存在的逻辑悖论,对这一问题更深地研究将有利于增强其对现实社会中经济组织和经济现象的解释力。     

SQL server 2000事务日志文件深入剖析

在对大型数据库进行管理和维护操作时,经常会遇到操作速度缓慢、磁盘空间不足以及数据恢复等问题,这些问题的关键常常和事务日志有关。正确维护和处理好事务日志可确保数据库系统安全及高效运转。     

The failure of market failure

The concept of market failure was originally presented by economists as a normative explanation of why the need for government expenditures might arise. Gradually, the concept has taken on the form of a full‐scale diagnostic tool frequently employed by policy analysts to determine the exact scope and nature of government intervention. For some time, economists have known that the market failure idea is conceptually flawed. The authors of this article demonstrate why this is so, employing concepts drawn from the perspective of transaction costs. In a review of empirical studies, they further show how the market failure diagnostic leads analysts to make generalizations that are not supported by facts. Transaction cost analysis helps to explain the underlying processes involved. © 1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

发展公私伙伴关系对中国政府管理的挑战及对策研究

公私伙伴关系是政府提供公共服务的重要方式。本文根据合作博弈与交易成本理论建立公私伙伴关系的分析框架,从提高政府讨价还价能力、减少公共部门和私人部门双方交易成本的角度,分析了发展公私伙伴关系在政府能力、制度建设、政府诚信、监管能力、危机管理和廉政建设方面给政府管理带来的挑战,并提出相应对策。     

有关财产刑的几点误识分析

自由刑和财产刑虽然都是被告人实现刑事责任的方式,但是二者有着不同的功效、目的和作用,两者不是简单的加减关系,也不是此消彼长的关系,因此二者之间不能易科;为弥补行政“追缴”、“没收”而适用财产刑的做法,无论是在实体上还是程序上都违背了法治原则;在司法实践中我们不应排斥对未成年被告人适用财产刑,应该具体情况具体分析。     

公司担保无效责任的复位——基于责任性质、主体与效果的区分视角

在实践中,即使公司担保行为无效,公司仍然普遍须承担实质上类似有效担保的责任。这一不合理现象的原因在于法院对过错的不当界定乃至强加。以过错为线索,可以区分担保无效责任在性质和主体上的不同层次。在性质上,当担保合同自身无效时,公司承担缔约过失责任;在担保合同因主合同无效而无效时,公司只承担故意侵权责任。在主体上,行为归属要先于过错判断,当代表人行为可约束公司时,公司承担责任;否则由代表人自行承担责任,公司无须承担替代责任。责任主体的区分会进一步导致担保行为"无效"和"不生效力"的区分。性质和主体的区分会相应校正担保无效责任的范围,并排除追偿权。唯有使公司担保无效责任回归一般体系,才能避免过度强调或者不当忽略公司担保的特殊性。     

增信措施担保化的反思与重构——基于我国司法裁判的实证研究

我国司法实践中关于差额补足、流动性支持等增信措施有保证合同说、无名合同说、债务加入说和对赌协议说四种学说构造。从《民法典担保制度解释》第36条的上下文看,该条文的内容有可能导致司法实践中将增信措施解释为保证合同。但增信措施的运用领域复杂多样,应根据其交易结构、交易习惯和行为目的进行意思表示解释。在结构化金融和信托管理计划中使用增信措施,并不存在被担保的主债权,不需要按照保证合同解释。资产管理业务中的增信措施起到合法的保底作用,也不宜解释为保证合同。即使在一般的金融交易领域,增信措施有避免担保被计入企业财务报告、上市公司信息披露、保证合同各项限制性规则等意义,于此应尊重当事人的意思自治,将增信措施解释为独立的无名合同。如果增信措施的保证意思表示明显,则当然要适用保证的规则。如果增信措施被解释为无名合同而非保证,也可以考虑类推适用保证合同的规则,包括保证合同主体资格的限制、保证合同的书面形式、公司对外担保的决议,以及保证中的债权转让或债务人变更的后果等规则。但是,关于保证的从属性、保证责任范围、一般保证推定、保证期间、保证人援引主债务人抗辩事由等规则,不宜类推适用。