Attitudes towards highly skilled and low‐skilled immigration in Europe: A survey experiment in 15 European countries

To what extent do economic concerns drive anti‐migrant attitudes? Key theoretical arguments extract two central motives: increased labour market competition and the fiscal burden linked to the influx of migrants. This article provides new evidence regarding the impact of material self‐interest on attitudes towards immigrants. It reports the results of a survey experiment embedded in representative surveys in 15 European countries before and after the European refugee crisis in 2014. As anticipated by the fiscal burden argument, it is found that rich natives prefer highly skilled over low‐skilled migration more than low‐income respondents do. Moreover, the study shows that these tax concerns among the wealthy are stronger if fiscal exposure to migration is high. No support is found for the labour market competition argument predicting that natives will be most opposed to migrants with similar skills. The results suggest that highly skilled migrants are preferred over low‐skilled migrants irrespective of natives’ skill levels.     

The Investment Approach to Public Service Provision

The investment approach to public service provision is now receiving considerable attention worldwide. By promoting data‐intensive assessments of baseline conditions and how government action can improve on them, the approach holds the potential to transform policy development, service implementation, and program evaluation. Recently, variations on the investment approach have been applied in Australia to explore the effectiveness of specific programs in employment training, criminal justice, and infrastructure development. This article reviews the investment approach, presents a Public Investment Checklist to guide such work, and discusses three examples. It concludes by considering the implications of investment thinking for the work of policy designers and public managers.     

Violent attacks on education in the tribal areas of Pakistan and the role of NGOs in providing educational services

Education is no longer safe from attacks during times of armed conflict. In many regions of the world, armed groups intentionally target schools, teachers and students and violate the right of children to get an education. Such is the case in Pakistan, where militant violence and continued armed conflict has disrupted the education of hundreds of thousands of children, particularly girls. The present study addresses a call for a better understanding of how non-governmental organisations (NGOs) function and contribute to peace-building and development through the provision of educational services in conflict zones. Based on field research, the study finds that in spite of challenges, NGOs have been playing a vital role in providing educational services to the conflict-affected communities. Disseminating information, solutions for resuming education, improving school enrolment, psychosocial support and promoting quality education lies at the forefront of NGOs’ battle in the tribal areas of Pakistan. However, the state needs a comprehensive policy to protect education from violent attacks.     

Fostering Constructive Action by Peers and Bystanders in Organizations and Communities

Peers and bystanders play important roles in organizational and community conflict management. Bystanders often learn relevant information and have opportunities to act in ways that can affect three of the basic functions of a conflict management system (CMS.) They can help (or not help) to identify, assess, and manage behaviors that the organization or community deems to be “unacceptable.” Examples in which bystanders play important roles include sexual and racial harassment, safety violations, unethical research, national security violations and insider threats, cyber‐bullying and cyber‐sabotage, violence, fraud, theft, intimidation and retaliation, and gross negligence. Bystanders often are a missing link in conflict systems. For the purposes of this article, I define peers and bystanders as people who observe or learn about unacceptable behavior by others, but who are not the relevant supervisors, or who knowingly engage in planning or executing that behavior. I define CMS managers as all those people, including line managers, who have responsibility for managing conflicts. Conflict managers face many challenges in fostering constructive behavior from bystanders. The interests of bystanders may or may not coincide with the interests of conflict systems managers in an organization or community. Bystanders often have multiple, idiosyncratic, and conflicting interests, and experience painful dilemmas. In addition, peers and bystanders, and their contexts – often differ greatly from each other. Blanket rules about how all bystanders should behave, such as requirements for mandatory reporting, are often ineffective or lead to perverse results. Bystanders are regularly equated with “do‐nothings,” in the popular press. In real life, however, helpful bystander actions are common. Many bystanders report a wide variety of constructive initiatives, including private, informal interventions. In this article, I report on forty‐five years of observations on bystanders in many milieus. I present what bystanders have said are the reasons that they did not – or did – take action, and what can be learned to help organizations and communities to support bystanders to be more effective when faced with unacceptable behavior.     

Bodo ethnic self-rule and persistent violence in Assam: A failed case of multinational federalism in India

Indian federalism has been credited in the literature on comparative federalism for having successfully resolved many of its ethnic conflicts (in a country of immense ethnic diversity) since 1956 by conceding varied forms of statehood. In most cases, the resolution of ethnic conflict has entailed self-determination for ethno-nationalist groups. There are however cases when the experiment has failed and the institutional arrangements for recognition of ethnic self-determination have given birth to more conflicts and persistent violence. In this article, we argue that the Bodoland Territorial Authority (created in 2003) in Assam is a failed case of multinational federalism in India. We argue that the case of Bodoland illustrates the limits of territorial management when groups are intermixed and highlight the need for power sharing in government and/or non-territorial representation as a better method for managing ethnic conflict in such cases.     

Projecting the Arena of Inclusion: The Case of South Korea in Pursuing a Phased Inclusive Growth Process

South Korea created a mechanism that fuels inclusive growth, a process that coevolves economic growth and social well‐being. This study attempts to elaborate on the context and preconditions for development that would manifest salience policy implications for moving up the industrial value chain and attain inclusive growth. We contend against the view of simplified growth cum equity that is used to elucidate the success of Korea's socioeconomic development (economic miracles). Our findings informed us that there were intense measures taken throughout different phases of Korea's industrial development. In addition, we observed in many occasions intense negotiations between the state, firms, and civil society for social welfare and a better working environment. This led to a pursuit for inclusive growth in the post catching‐up phase that blended together many inclusive agendas, realizing growth that coevolved industrial upgrading and social welfare. This article seeks to explain how Korea populated its arena of inclusion in the process of pursuing rapid industrialization. The overview of different phases of development provides normative principles that are useful as a guide for other economies which aspire to attain similar development.     

Old (Molotov) cocktails in new bottles? “Price-tag” and settler violence in Israel and the West Bank

In the early morning of July 31, 2015, masked attackers threw firebombs into two Palestinian homes in the West Bank village of Duma, south of Nablus, killing three Palestinian civilians. Contrary to claims by Israeli and Palestinian politicians, this attack was neither an isolated anomaly nor just another incident of settler violence. Instead, it was the latest attack in an important but largely unknown phenomenon called “price-tag,” in which a loosely connected group of young Israelis called “hilltop youth” burn Palestinian mosques and destroy property in hundreds of attacks accompanied by threatening graffiti that references Israeli settlers, outposts, and anti-Arab slogans. Using an original dataset of price-tag incidents and interviews with key actors, we demonstrate that the perpetrators, targets, and strategies of price-tag are different than previous patterns of settler violence. Whereas previous settlers saw the Israeli state as legitimate and largely decided to cooperate with it, the hilltop youth have decided to confront it by using price-tag attacks to deter settlement withdrawals and chain-gang the state into a conflict with the Palestinians. This analysis of the strategic logic of price-tag reveals its potential to shift the political landscape within and between Israelis and Palestinians.     

Secrecy and Self-Interest: When Mediators Act Deceitfully

3rd party intervention in interstate conflict is a common strategy for mitigating conflict and obtaining a final agreement. However, not all mediations are successful, leading to the development of a rich literature on the mechanisms which decrease the probability of failure in a 3rd-party intervention. Within this literature, some studies examine how a mediator’ behavior and incentives affect the result of the mediation. Virtually all these studies assume that the mediator is virtuous such that peace is the most desired outcome of a conflict for her. However, this study challenges this assumption and contends that a mediator can gain benefit from the conflict between disputants. If this benefit is adequately large to overcome the benefits of peace, then the mediator has enough incentive not to conduct the mediation toward a peaceful outcome. We develop a signaling game model to study this issue formally and test the proposed hypothesis empirically.     

Delegating Terror: Principal–Agent Based Decision Making in State Sponsorship of Terrorism

State sponsorship of terrorism, where a government deliberately provides resources and material support to a terrorist organization, is common in the international system. Sponsorship can provide significant strategic and political benefits for a state, but there are inherent international and domestic risks associated with delegating foreign policy to these actors. Using principal–agent analysis, I develop a model that evaluates the impact of potential costs and benefits on a state’s decision to sponsor terrorism. I test my model by using a novel dataset on sponsorship behaviors that ranges from 1970 to 2008. The results of my analysis support the validity of the principal–agent model in explaining sponsorship, as states will be more likely to engage in sponsorship when the strategic benefits of weakening the targeted state are high and the risks of international reputation loss and domestic dissatisfaction are low.