A Dutch revolt? The salience of the nonstrategic nuclear weapons issue in Dutch politics

Transparency, international credibility, democratic accountability, a new realism in defense expenditures – these basic policy goals fit awkwardly with the current deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) on Dutch territory. Most parties in the Netherlands want the NSNW removed. Some are even willing to challenge the idea that only consensus among all 28 NATO Allies can lead to the removal of the NSNW. The new Dutch minister of foreign affairs for example, Frans Timmermans, has a long track record of calling for an end to the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Dutch territory. Without NATO consent if necessary. His appointment fits with the political shift that we have seen over the past few years in Dutch politics. This article looks at the political rationale behind that shift: who are the main political actors involved? How have domestic and international pressures influenced party positions? The article also looks at the possibilities a new Dutch Government has were it to challenge the NATO consensus on NSNW. Would the USA refuse to take the NSNW away? How would NATO react and what could mitigate Allied concerns?     

Transatlantic cooperation,alliance politics and extended deterrence: European perceptions of nuclear weapons

This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliance's nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which reaffirmed the purpose of the alliance's nuclear weapons. However, these divisive debates point to more fundamental issues in alliance management, namely the credibility of American commitments, the sustainability of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the inevitable political tensions these questions provoke at the domestic level for NATO allies.     

Trade,export controls,and non‐proliferation in the Asia‐Pacific region

Abstract

Stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — nuclear, biological, and chemical — and the missiles to deliver them comprises a crucial element in contemporary security policies. Many observers believe the utility of export controls in this effort is diminishing. While the authors believe that controls on the transfer of military and dual‐use items remain relatively effective and efficient compared to the alternative policy tools, they argue for the development of a more compelling rationale for export controls than restraining proliferation. The authors suggest that an emphasis on the links between non‐proliferation, regional stability, and economic prosperity could help policymakers transcend the more traditional view that such controls sacrifice economic gain for military security. Specifically, the authors argue that proliferation is bad for regional stability and regional economic growth, and that a prudent multilateral system of controls on dual‐use items establishes a foundation for both greater economic and security benefits.     

Governing insecurity: contingency planning,protection, resilience

Abstract

How should we understand the politics of security today? This article addresses this question from one particular perspective, that of ‘biosecurity’. It examines contemporary strategies for managing biorisks in three European states: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. We suggest that the framing of threat and response differs, even within Europe, and that one can identify three different configurations: contingency planning, protection and resilience. Each of these embodies a significantly different way of reconciling fundamental imperatives for those who would govern a liberal society today – the imperative of freedom and the imperative of security.     

Anti-American,pro-Chinese sentiment in South Korea

Anti-American, pro-Chinese sentiment is spreading widely in South Korea. This phenomenon is caused by extreme US-ROK policy dissension over matters related to North Korea, especially the nuclear questions, and South Korea's emotional attachment for China based on historical and geopolitical factors. In order to prevent this irrational situation from damaging the mutual interests of both Washington and Seoul, the two capitals should come up with mutually acceptable options for nuclear issues—placing more gravity and priority on dialogue over sanctions as a matter of strategy. Coercive measures can be employed only as a last resort. In order to maintain peace, to fulfill the political responsibility as a great power in East Asia, and to reciprocate to South Korea's positive expectation, Beijing should play a more constructive role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issues and in inducing Pyongyang to open up and reform more aggressively.     

人民警察配备、使用警械和武器问题研究

在公安工作实践中,人民警察配备、使用警械和武器既是一项法定权力,又是其履行职责、维护社会治安的需要。但是,实践中由于在配备使用警械和武器方面存在这样或那样的问题,严重影响了人民警察执法的效果。为了有效解决这些问题,必须研制、开发新型警械,加大依法配备、使用警械的力度,严格依法配备武器;进行严格的实战训练,并注意对警察心理素质的调适;完善人民警察配备、使用警械和武器的相关法律制度。     

Nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula: strategic adaptation,the Abe administration and extended deterrence in the face of uncertainty

Abstract

In the wake of two nuclear tests in 2016, an additional test in 2017 and a series of missile launches by North Korea in 2016–17, Japan's government is facing a critical set of security challenges. These require adaptation and careful planning by the Abe administration and raise important questions about the future of Japanese defence policy, alliance relations with the United States, and cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The following article considers both the history and current state of relations between Tokyo, Washington and Seoul, the relationship between elite and public opinion within Japan, and the character of Prime Minister Abe's leadership at a time of acute strategic risk. While the danger of conflict in northeast Asia should not be minimized, the gravity of the current crisis potentially offers an important opportunity for policy innovation for the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).     

北约核政策与核态势的回顾及展望

北大西洋公约组织作为军事同盟,自建立之初就以美国核武器的"延伸威慑"为安全保障。冷战时期,欧洲曾是美苏争夺霸权的重要战场,双方进行了疯狂的核军备竞赛,欧洲长时间笼罩在核阴云之中。冷战结束后,欧洲各国从核阴霾中成功走出,在美国的主导下,北约实力逐步走向全盛时期。出于对后冷战时期国际安全形势的乐观判断,北约的关注重点从单纯的传统军事防御向更加广泛的非传统安全领域扩展,核武器在北约防卫中的作用不断减弱,核武器规模不断裁减。然而,2014年的乌克兰危机给欧洲的战略格局带来巨大冲击,俄与美欧关系降至冰点,双方开始轮番展示核力量,核阴影再次重现欧洲上空。从北约核态势的历史演变轨迹和乌克兰危机对北约核态势的冲击中,人们能够窥见北约未来安全发展态势。当前北约与俄罗斯核态势的变化,预示着未来核竞赛模式与风险都会与冷战时期有所不同,意味着核门槛的降低以及核武器使用风险的增加,这对全球核不扩散机制、全球核裁军进程与全球军事竞争模式都将产生深远影响。     

谈如何控制与制服持凶器的犯罪嫌疑人

文章分析了持凶器的犯罪嫌疑人的心理因素,探讨了控制和制服持凶器的犯罪嫌疑人战术的组织与实施方法,并针对当前公安民警在对持凶器的犯罪嫌疑人的执法战斗中应注意的问题,提出了相应的对策与建议,以期为公安民警在执法战斗中能更有效地控制与制服持凶器的犯罪嫌疑人。     

The Syrian chemical weapons disarmament process in context: narratives of coercion,consent, and everything in between

This article explores the successful Syrian chemical weapons disarmament process (2013–2014) within the context of post-Cold War coercive arms control policy and scholarship, particularly related to the Middle East. Based on extensive interviews with individuals involved in the process, we explore the coexistence of two rival, apparently contradictory narratives: one (backed by Western states) claimed coercion was the main contributor to disarmament, while the other (defended by Syrian authorities and Russia) insisted on the process’s consensual features. Our study suggests that the hybrid disarmament framework, embodied in a unique joint mission between the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, conveniently accommodated both narratives, which in turn contributed to the mission’s success. We then ask whether, with the apparent US retreat in the Middle East, the Syrian case (as well as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal) signals a possible turn in international non-conventional arms control processes that would leave more room for consent and diplomacy.