Islamism and the state after the Arab uprisings: Between people power and state power

This paper examines the trajectories of different Islamist trends in the light of the Arab uprisings. It proposes a distinction between statist and non-statist Islamism to help understand the multiplicity of interactions between Islamists and the state, particularly after 2011. It is outlined how statist Islamists (Islamist parties principally) can contribute to the stabilization and democratization of the state when their interactions with other social and political actors facilitate consensus building in national politics. By contrast when these interactions are conflictual, it has a detrimental impact on both the statist Islamists, and the possibility of democratic politics at the national level. Non statist-Islamists (from quietist salafi to armed jihadi) who prioritize the religious community over national politics are directly impacted by the interactions between statist Islamists and the state, and generally tend to benefit from the failure to build a consensus over democratic national politics. Far more than nationally-grounded statist Islamists, non-statist Islamists shape and are shaped by the regional dynamics on the Arab uprisings and the international and transnational relations between the different countries and conflict areas of the Middle East. The Arab uprisings and their aftermath reshaped pre-existing national and international dynamics of confrontation and collaboration between Islamists and the state, and between statist and non-statists Islamists, for better (Tunisia) and for worse (Egypt).     

Ideological dimensions of the “Balkan Family Pattern” in the first half of the 20th century

This article deals with family ideology and family ritual processes in the Central part of the Balkans, in the mountainous part of the Bulgarian–Serbian border areas, during the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. Celebration rituals, dedicated to the patron saints of family-kin households (Serbian slava and Bulgarian sluzhba), have been described as an “ideology of patriarchalism” in ethnological and historical literature, based on the cult of predecessors. Ethnographical research in this region has shown the prominent social functions of the ritual cycle that built cohesion in the family-kin community, rather than archaism. Based on historical and ethnological data, and on ethnographic fieldwork in Western Bulgaria and Eastern Serbia, this contribution shows how the Orthodox cycle of celebrations and rituals was practiced in a family-kin environment during the first half of the twentieth century. The analysis focuses on how family rituals built family ideology, which kept its integrative functions even during the decades of socialism.     

习近平宣传教育思想浅析

宣传教育工作事关党和国家工作全局。十八大以来习近平总书记围绕宣传教育发表了一系列重要讲话,特别是2013年8月19日在全国宣传思想工作会议上的重要讲话,深刻阐述了事关宣传思想工作长远发展的一系列重大理论和现实问题,成为新时期指导宣传教育工作的纲领性文件。新时期做好宣传教育工作应认真落实习近平系列讲话精神,树立大局观念,牢牢巩固马克思主义主流意识形态的根本地位;与时俱进,推进中华民族伟大复兴中国梦的宣传教育;不断改革创新,实现宣传教育工作的新突破;全党动手、做好表率,凝聚起推动宣传教育工作的强大合力。     

网络暴力视角下意识形态的法治建设

网络暴力最深层次的原因在于我国网民的意识形态混乱扭曲,要认清网络暴力的本质并有效预防和治理网络暴力问题,必须厘清网络暴力与公民意识形态的关系。当前,互联网已经成为意识形态斗争的主战场,加强意识形态的法治建设对于治理网络暴力问题显得尤为重要。     

从社会主义核心价值体系到中国梦的内在逻辑

社会主义核心价值体系以中国特色社会主义共同理想为核心,其他三者为共同理想的实现提供指导思想、精神动力和实践人格作用。社会主义核心价值观的三个层次中,以第一层次为核心,第二和第三层次分别提供了科学性和理想人格保证。中国梦是对社会主义核心价值体系、社会主义核心价值观的继承与深化,它将前两者隐含的主题凸显出来,发挥强大的动员作用。     

意识形态范畴的嬗变以及中国共产党人的独特诠释

中国共产党成立90年来的历史,就是对意识形态问题不断求解的历史,也是对意识形态范畴不断进行诠释和建构的历史。中国共产党人为代表的马克思主义者,在漫长的革命和建设的历史过程中,结合本国具体实际,逐步建立了一套适合自身发展的意识形态理论,使得意识形态范畴在新时期具有了更加丰富的内涵。     

新中国成立以来道德榜样叙事的嬗变与审思

道德榜样叙事作为中国共产党榜样文化的核心与灵魂,在中国共产党带领人民从站起来、富起来到强起来的总体历史进程中持续展开并不断进阶.新中国成立以来,道德榜样叙事发生了整体性嬗变,表现为:主体从主客二分转向主体间性;本体从单层面转向多层面与耦合化;媒介从传统媒体转向新媒体和全媒体;环境从现实性转向“虚”“实”交融;思维从单向...     

Do Citizens Judge Health Experts Through a Partisan Lens? Evidence from a Factorial Survey Experiment

Scholars have claimed that right-wing citizens are more skeptical about experts than left-wing citizens. This article, however, argues that depending on their party affiliation, citizens prefer certain kinds of expertise over others. I confronted Swiss adults (N = 2,465) with individual risk advice on either flu vaccination or colorectal cancer screening. The quote varied regarding the expert providing the advice (e.g., academic, administration, or corporation) and the degree of policy advocacy. The citizens then assessed the experts' credibility and their own behavioral intention (e.g., get a flu shot). Citizens across the political spectrum are more likely to positively evaluate experts who represent institutions aligned with their beliefs. Moreover, right-wing citizens are more skeptical about experts who advocate for specific policies than their left-wing counterparts. This study underscores the need for a better understanding of how partisanship affects expert perceptions to manage health policy problems and other science-based issues.