社区治理框架中的居民参与问题：一项反思性的考察

本文以治理模式与公民社会的依存性作为分析的理论依据,提出考察中国城市社区居民参与的另一路径。一方面,居民参与意愿和参与程度制约着社区选择何种治理模式;另一方面,选择何种社区治理模式对于促进或制约居民参与程度具有重要影响。通过对二者互动过程的考察,从中国城市社区建设的基本哲学假设、居民—社区关系的理念预设、动员居民参与的理想目标等方面对中国城市社区居民参与动员的策略做了若干反思。     

Hedge Funds, the Deutsche Börse Affair and Predatory Anglo-American Capitalism

Boardroom trouble at Deutsche Börse, the company that operates Germany's main stock market, has recently provoked an important debate about competing capitalist models. Werner Seifert, Deutsche Börse's ousted Chief Executive, was eager to portray himself as the innocent victim of aggressive Anglo-American investors who had bought into his company but failed to understand its traditional operating ethos. In this, he was ably supported by key figures within the ruling Social Democratic Party, who, in order to shore up the party's core support, had increasingly come to blame overseas hedge funds for the development of German corporate governance models which prioritised profits over jobs. I review the SPD's structural reading of the Deutsche Börse affair, whilst comparing it to an alternative interest-based reading. The latter allows me to focus more closely on the issue which, more than any other, led to Seifert's downfall: his refusal to bow to the expressed interests of his own shareholders by pressing ahead, against their wishes, with a hostile bid for the London Stock Exchange. Seifert's eventual removal foreclosed the possibility of an integrated London-Frankfurt stock market and, somewhat ironically given the SPD's response to the affair, as a consequence it also prevented the entry of London's highly capitalised institutional investors into the German market for corporate control. The actions of Deutsche Börse's overseas shareholders might still be seen as evidence of a predatory Anglo-American capitalism. However, their successful removal of Werner Seifert may well have been responsible for temporarily keeping other financial predators at bay.     

剥夺政治权利执行难问题探讨

在社区矫正工作中,剥夺政治权利执行难问题反映突出.本文主要从社区矫正制度和剥夺政治权利这一刑罚制度两方面检视剥夺政治权利执行难的原因,同时就剥夺政治权利执行难问题的解决提出了一些建议.     

党务公开：发展党内民主的理论和制度创新

党的十六届四中全会《决定》首次明确提出逐步推进党务公开,这是党的执政理念的新突破和提高党的执政能力的新举措。党务公开是发展党内民主的内在要求,贯穿于党内民主建设的各个方面和环节。推进党务公开,进一步扩大了党员和群众对党内事务的知情权、参与权、选择权和监督权,成为新时期发展党内民主的理论和制度创新。     

科技企业融资模式及风险融资制度刍议

通过对我国科技企业在融资领域发展中面临的现实问题,分析科技企业风险投资模式,提出科技企业的融资模式应当与证券市场相结合的改革措施,通过对我国证券市场二板市场的完善,建立一个以科技企业为核心的融资平台的制度创新模式,提出我国证券市场二板市场应当以科技企业的发展为核心,应当与风险投资制度相结合,在二板的基础上实现科技企业融资模式市场化,通过提高法人治理结构促进企业发展,协调投资者、政府、科技企业与第三人之间的关系。     

我国公司治理模式的选择——以股东中心主义为目标

对实践中的英美公司治理模式和德日公司治理模式进行详尽的对比,指出它们的理论基础分别是股东中心主义和利益相关者利益平衡主义,有其各自的经济、文化背景;对照我国新兴加转型的社会现实,主张我国公司治理应以股东中心主义为理论基础,并以此对新公司法的创新与不足进行评议。     

"小产权"房法律分析

"小产权"房交易违反了国家的强制性法规,却成为社会上通行的做法。处理此类纠纷既要兼顾国家法规的立法旨趣与保护私人利益二者的要求,又要兼顾各方当事人之间的利益衡平。根据法令违反行为效力理论发展了传统的解决方案,提出最大限度尊重民事主体选择的办法。     

乡村振兴背景下农村留守群体的困境、风险与治理

近几年,中国农村留守群体总量在下降,但庞大的留守群体基数及其背后所彰显的乡村治理价值仍具有研究意义。作为乡村传统主体的留守人口在城乡关系的治理博弈中存在资本动力、人际情感、伦理精神、主体理性和价值认同的风险,并在集体行动中得以呈现。而化解留守群体集体行动的风险在于打造全县域治理共同体、完善社会支持帮扶机制、建立村级生态治理体系、锻造基层党组织组织力、重构乡村现代文化体认。     

Old and New Labour Narratives of Whitehall: Radicals,Reactionaries and Defenders of the Westminster Model

This article argues that throughout its history, the leadership of the Labour Party has chosen to embrace a benign view of the Civil Service, as part of a wider acceptance of the constitutional status quo reflected in the Westminster model. There has nevertheless been a long tradition in the wider Labour movement that has questioned whether Whitehall is capable of working for a government with radical aspirations. This article examines Labour's historical approach towards Whitehall, before reflecting on the extent to which the present Administration, while appealing to radical and reforming rhetoric has, like its predecessors, continued to embrace the status quo. It concludes by arguing that a contemporary and credible narrative capable of challenging the Westminster model has yet to emerge from the broader movement.     

Eyes wide shut? Reforming and defusing checks and balances in Argentina

How effective are autonomous audit agencies (AAAs) in curbing corruption and improving fiscal governance in emerging economies? AAAs are autonomous oversight agencies tasked with scrutinising government finances. However, they are not as effective as they could or should be, partly because of the political constraints they face and the political economy context in which they are embedded. This article assesses the performance and trajectory of the Argentine AAA. It suggests that AAAs can have only a limited impact when formal fiscal institutions are undermined by informal practices and undercut by adverse political incentives. It further highlights the limits of radical reform strategies based on the import of exogenous institutional models. This research has important research and policy implications for the reform and strengthening of AAAs in developing countries. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.