Does Country-Level Social Disorganization Increase Terrorist Attacks?

This study examines the effects of a measure of country-level social disorganization on levels of terrorist attacks and fatalities in 101 countries from 1981 to 2010. We measure social disorganization as the presence of state instability: revolutionary and ethnic war, adverse regime change, and genocide. The classic social disorganization perspective posits that individuals experiencing these types of rapid social change will be freed from the institutional and informal restraints that bind them to society, and keep them conforming to social norms and laws. We examine the extent to which this reasoning applies to the number of terrorist attacks and fatalities from terrorist attacks occurring in countries. To control for the possibility that better functioning states are better able to prevent terrorist attacks, we include two measures of state capacity. We find that controlling for state capacity and a wide variety of other variables, social disorganization is consistently associated with increases in terrorist attacks and fatalities. We consider implications of the results for future research and policy.     

自然人民事责任能力理论的重新检讨--兼论被监护人致人损害民事责任归属的立法选择

一切自然人都具有民事权利能力和民事责任能力。民事责任能力与民事行为能力无关,而取决于民事权利能力。被监护人致人损害的,应适用过错责任的归责原则。无民事行为能力人因为不存在过错,不承担民事责任。限制民事行为能力人致人损害时,被监护人自己如果有过错,应当承担民事责任。监护人在其履行监护义务时有过错的,应对被监护人致人的损害承担民事责任。我国关于被监护人致人损害民事责任归属的立法有修改的必要。     

对新《刑法》第18条的理解与运用

本文就我国新刑法第18条中精神病的涵义,精神病患者刑事责任能力评定,精神病的医学鉴定以及对精神病人的监护治疗问题谈个人看法。供执法者和鉴定工作者在处理有关精神疾病案件时参考。     

全球化与中国政府能力

较为系统地考察了中国政府在挑战全球化方面所取得的成绩,分析了中国政府驾驭全球化的能力及其存在的问题,着重阐述了中国政府在面临全球化的压力下为提高政府公共服务的质量和加强政府的公共责任所进行的改革。并且针对建立服务政府和责任政府提出了若干政策性建议。     

改进思想政治工作 加强执政能力建设

执政能力建设是党执政后的一项根本建设。思想政治工作作为党的全部工作的重要组成部分,是提高党的执政能力的必然要求和重要途径。新形势下思想政治工作必须从内容、方法以及机制等方面实现创新,服从服务于党的执政能力建设,其工作成效最终应体现到提高党的执政能力上来。     

法人侵权责任能力的理论预设与制度设计——以法人本质理论为线索

我国民法学界以法人实在说承认法人的独立意志为理由,论证了法人承担侵权责任能力的合理基础,继而对拟制说进行批判,而事实上法人承担侵权责任完全是基于特定利益衡量的立法构造,与其意志的有无没有必然的关联。法人的侵权责任是法人机关的侵权责任,从形式逻辑的角度而言,它与法人的工作人员的侵权责任是有本质区别的,但就立法构造而言二者区分并无实际价值,在法人侵权责任具体承担方式上应该采取让法人机关与法人承担连带责任的方式。     

提高执政能力的关键在于遏制腐败

提起腐败,广人民群众无不切齿痛恨,义愤填膺。腐败影响到国家的政治、精神甚至物质等各项文明的发展。因此,腐败程度如何,是一个综合性的执政绩效指标。如果不能成功遏制腐败,就肯定不能说执政绩效是好的,就意味着执政能力存在缺陷,也就谈不上如何加强和提高执政能力。     

我国刑事责任年龄之检视

刑事责任年龄在中外刑事立法中均有明文规定,由于各国的刑事政策和少年儿童的生长发育情况不同,故刑事责任的起始年龄也有较大差异。我国刑法规定该年龄的起点为14周岁,为了适应犯罪低龄化及未成年人身心发育成熟提前等客观形势,有必要将该年龄适当下调至13周岁。     

Tertiary institutions and capacity building in Ghana: challenges and the way forward

The last two decades have seen tremendous growth in tertiary education in Ghana. The prevailing consensus is that universities play a crucial role in development by making it possible to generate human capital in key areas such as health, agriculture, and engineering, also contributing to the attainment self-sufficiency. Whilst contributing to capacity building, this paper argues that universities in Ghana have had to contend with a number of challenges: low female access to universities, especially in science and technology-related courses; inadequate funds; poor research activity; and large class sizes. Making research a priority, designating strategic planning teams with appropriate institutional and financial support, developing cooperation with private universities, expanding access through the use of external degree centres and distance learning, and deepening universities’ relevance to societal needs, are identified as central to the enhancement of capacity building in Ghana.     

“Bad enough governance”: state capacity and quality of institutions in post-Soviet autocracies

This article contributes to current discussions on state capacity, quality of institutions, and political regimes. Our analysis demonstrates that the J-curve argument (“good institutions” in autocracies as compared to hybrid and transitional regimes) may not be generic and is not well supported by empirical evidence from the sample of post-Soviet countries. An explanatory model of the “King of the Mountain” is instead provided. Its focus is on the monopoly of political rent as a precondition for extraction of economic rent. It demonstrates an inverse correlation between the quality of institutions and the extraction of political and economic rent, and explains why an autocrat may not have an incentive to improve institutions that may make his/her monopoly vulnerable, and rather would prefer to preserve a low quality of institutions and “bad enough governance.” An analysis of a variety of external and domestic factors that may endanger this monopoly is provided. Finally, the autocrat's alternative strategic choices are analyzed. It is argued that better payoffs for the autocrat – paradoxically – may result from partial reforms and improvement of the quality of institutions. However, for various reasons, this is not occurring in post-Soviet autocracies.