我党加强执政能力建设的现实取向

执政能力建设是中国共产党执政后的一项根本建设,是对党的执政经验的总结和建党思想的升华。加强执政能力建设是维护中国共产党执政合法性的本质要求,是加强中国共产党自身建设的重要保障,是推进中国共产党执政现代化的内在要求。     

Forensic Informativity of ~3000 bp of Coding Sequence of Domestic Dog mtDNA

The discriminatory power of the noncoding control region (CR) of domestic dog mitochondrial DNA alone is relatively low. The extent to which the discriminatory power could be increased by analyzing additional highly variable coding regions of the mitochondrial genome (mtGenome) was therefore investigated. Genetic variability across the mtGenome was evaluated by phylogenetic analysis, and the three most variable ~1 kb coding regions identified. We then sampled 100 Swedish dogs to represent breeds in accordance with their frequency in the Swedish population. A previously published dataset of 59 dog mtGenomes collected in the United States was also analyzed. Inclusion of the three coding regions increased the exclusion capacity considerably for the Swedish sample, from 0.920 for the CR alone to 0.964 for all four regions. The number of mtDNA types among all 159 dogs increased from 41 to 72, the four most frequent CR haplotypes being resolved into 22 different haplotypes.     

论被告人庭前供述的证据能力

被告人翻供是我国刑事司法实践的一大难题,由于被告人庭前供述缺乏证据能力规则的约束,法官普遍以被告人庭前供述定案,这是导致我国冤假错案的一项重要原因。为此,有必要建立完善的被告人庭前供述的证据能力规则。国外在被告人庭前供述准入制度的设置上,存在传闻例外模式与直接言词模式;在庭前供述排除制度的设置上,存在正当程序模式与任意性模式。我国宜借鉴直接言词模式与任意性模式,在庭前供述与当庭供述一致时,庭前供述不具备证据能力;在庭前供述与当庭供述不一致时,庭前供述如果具备自愿性要件可以作为弹劾证据,只有同时具备自愿性与真实性要件时才可作为实质证据。     

论贵州领导干部治理能力的现代化

领导干部是生产关系和生产力中的重要因素,其治理能力的现代化是国家治理体系现代化的重要组成部分,对于全面深化改革具有重大而深远的影响。贵州当前面临巨大发展机遇,公共领域面临思想意识多元、行为方式多变、利益诉求多样、矛盾纠纷多发等动态复杂性问题。领导干部作为实现治理总目标的关键变量和核心要素,治理能力的现代化对贵州优化资源配置、化解社会矛盾、推动全面深化改革及实现战略发展目标等意义重大。     

The role of infrastructural and coercive state capacity in explaining different types of electoral fraud

While effective state capacity can reasonably be considered a necessary condition for democratization, strong states do not automatically produce democratic regimes, nor do they guarantee their survival. Far from being sufficient conditions for democracy, strong or capable states are also thought to be indispensable for the maintenance of autocratic rule. The present article puts to the test the hypothesis that a certain level of state capacity is needed to engage in effective electoral malpractice, using general and more specific indicators of electoral fraud. This article proposes two opposing mechanisms through which state capacity can influence the quality of elections: through infrastructural state capacity and coercive state capacity. The article demonstrates that electoral fraud is more likely in countries where infrastructural state capacity is weak and that coercive state capacity plays a more ambiguous role than previously thought. The analyses also reveal that different factors are at work when looking at precise types of electoral malpractice rather than general measures: voter and candidate intimidation, fraudulent tabulation of votes, unfair media coverage of campaigns and vote buying seem to engage different sets of facilitating structures.     

Capacity-testing as a means of increasing political inclusion

Some competent political actors, primarily young people and the cognitively impaired, are excluded from political participation by modern liberal democratic states. This exclusion occurs because the means utilized by states to distinguish between competent citizens (who must be included) and incompetent ones (who may be excluded) are imperfect. They include age restrictions on enfranchisement and, commonly, legal restrictions on enfranchisement for those with cognitive disabilities. Capacity-testing provides a means to improve on these existing mechanisms for exclusion. It is not, however, often suggested, nor seen as viable. Here, I argue that we should utilize capacity-testing to more effectively include capable citizens in our democratic practice. I defend a particular scope and kind of capacity-testing against common objections.     

Party “capacity” in new democracies: how executive format affects the recruitment of presidents and prime ministers

Scholars and practitioners express concern that parties in “third wave” democracies are poorly developed, compared to parties in older democracies. We suggest that parties vary in their organizational “capacity”, focusing on parties' ability to select trustworthy executive agents. Capacity is higher where parties can vet potential executive talent by observing future leaders over time in the legislature – an increasingly available option as democracy matures. The key distinction in parties' use of this option lies in the delegation structure between a party and the executive. Parliamentary systems offer a clear line of delegation, which parties control. In presidential systems, parties must recruit executive candidates who can win a popular election, requiring characteristics that may not be well correlated with those that make them good party agents. As parliamentary democracy matures, we find a steady increase in prime ministers' average length of prior legislative service. For presidents, there is significantly weaker growth in prior legislative service. We also theorize about and investigate patterns in semi-presidential democracies. Our findings suggest that the institutional format of the executive is more important for party capacity in new democracies than the era in which a democracy was born.     

Adapting violence for state survival and legitimacy: the resilience and dynamism of political repression in a democratizing South Korea*

Capacity in violence and its utilization is generally understood to be a first-order condition of the state-building process. As capacity increases and a state gains supremacy over would-be competitors, the use of violence by the state is hypothesized to decline, especially in polities that have made the democratic transition. However, we here demonstrate theoretically and empirically that the conventional wisdom is inadequate. We argue that political violence ubiquitously evolves according to the changing socio-political environment and varying tasks of the state.

Using the case of South Korea, a high-capacity, consolidated democracy, as a prism for theory building and corroboration, this study chronicles the evolution of political violence from the state’s explicit mobilization of thugs to suppress opposition at the early stage of state building through its collaboration with criminal organizations for developmental projects to the manipulation of quasi-governmental organizations after democratization in the late 1980s, coeval with the traditional use of public sources of force. We specifically look at how political development, that is, democratization, has produced new demands for – and constraints on – political violence and how post-authoritarian governments have responded.     

On the Success of AmeriCorps Programs in Strengthening Communities: Evidence from Florida

In 1993 President Clinton signed into law the National and Community Service Trust Act, the centerpiece of which was a new national service initiative—AmeriCorps. The overall purpose of AmeriCorps was to promote community building through volunteer service. AmeriCorps was one high-profile program established in part to highlight government-nonprofit partnerships and their capacity to improve communities and service delivery to the most vulnerable in communities—poor children, frail elderly, and teenagers who are at risk of dropping out of school or getting into serious juvenile delinquency problems. AmeriCorps' programs nationally work to achieve three goals—Getting Things Done, Member Development, and Strengthening Communities. Few of the studies on AmeriCorps have explicitly studied their impact on community strengthening. This article reports on a two-year study of twenty two AmeriCorps programs in Florida from 1997–2000, emphasizing their objectives and success in community strengthening. Program results are limited. The programs increased the number of volunteers delivering their services and developed one or more community partner organizations at each site. Nearly all of the program staff and community partners believed that the AmeriCorps programs positively influenced the community's self-help capacity to some extent. However, data indicating broader community strengthening impacts were hard to find and difficult to track. Reasons for this relatively modest impact on broader community strengthening goals are articulated based on surveys, interviews, and site visits.     

Suggested Capacities for Minister's Success: An Empirical Approach Based on Saaty's AHP

The roles of ministers are complicated, multiple, and demanding. They need to perform both as a leader of public organization and as a political actor in the Cabinet as appointed by the president or prime minister. This research empirically examines which capacities and types of ministers account for their success. It concludes that a policy capacity is the most desirable ministerial capacity. In addition, this study concludes that a political type minister is the most appropriate ministerial type for ministerial success. However, there is not one best ministerial model, or one required capacity for ministerial success. That is, this study intends to better understand the virtue and the responsibility of ministers.