村民自治的立法缺失及完善

随着我国村民自治实践的逐步深入,村民自治立法中存在的问题也逐渐凸显出来,主要 表现为对“两委”关系、乡村关系、村民会议制度、村民自治权的救济等方面的规定不够完善,过于 原则化,缺乏可操作性,因此,要确保我国基层民主政治建设健康发展,必须尽快完善村民自治的法 律制度。     

生态环境保护利益补偿机制法律研究

探讨了生态环境保护利益补偿机制的概念、分析了补偿机制的受偿主体、补偿主体和补偿范围,同时还阐述了生态环境保护利益补偿机制的补偿途径和方法。     

印度宪法中的环境保护原则

印度宪法中的环境保护原则属于第四编“国家政策的指导原则” ,它是 1976年第 42修正案增设的内容。在对环境保护原则的性质、缘起和内容进行介绍的基础上 ,着重分析它的法律效力 ,并谈了个人看法。     

论个人秘密的刑法保护

侵犯通信自由罪的法益是通信自由和通信秘密。利用职务上的便利,不是私自开拆、隐匿、毁弃邮件、电报罪的构成要件。刑法第235条第2款是属于注意规定,不是法律拟制。侵犯通信自由罪,宜设置为亲告罪。为有效保护个人秘密,应当增设一些新罪名。     

完善我国性犯罪立法的思考

我国的性犯罪立法存在着滞后性 ,借鉴英国性犯罪立法 ,我国的性犯罪立法应着力于完善罪名 ,补充刑法条款的具体规定———扩展强奸罪内涵或将强奸罪一分为二 ;设立奸淫幼女罪 ;增加婚内强奸罪的条款 ;对同性恋中的犯罪问题作出明确规定 ;性贿赂要有专门立法 ;对网络色情进行专门立法。     

Institutional interplay and effectiveness: assessing efforts to conserve western hemisphere shorebirds

Bird conservation agencies and organizations can take credit for a long list of transnational policy accomplishments. This article examines one set, a constellation of arrangements developed over the past three decades by those seeking to conserve western hemisphere shorebirds. At the center of this constellation are the US and Canadian national shorebird conservation plans and a cross-border initiative, the Western Hemisphere Shorebird Conservation Reserve Network. We treat these and associated plans, programs, and initiatives as a nested set of institutions, noting that these are operated by a wide assortment of state and societal actors. Exploring the potential of a framework based on Oran Young’s concept of interplay, we analyze the construction of these institutions and efforts to establish effectiveness. Examining activity in three zones of issue proximity, we conclude that shorebird conservationists have responded well to formative interplay challenges. They have made least progress in engaging remote institutions responsible for threats to shorebird habitat. We note, though, that it is important to distinguish between scientific and political levels of interplay work. On a substantive level we conclude that the shorebird community is well-positioned to move beyond generative and programmatic tasks to focus on establishing policy capability. On a theoretical level, we conclude that a framework based on interplay provides a strong foundation for analysis of the forces shaping the effectiveness of informal conservation institutions such as the ones examined.

The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities

We construct a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with utility transfers to model the formation process of an international environmental agreement. Our results show that in the first stage of low degree of consensus, engaging in utility transfers by asymmetric countries will accomplish little. In contrast, in the second stage of higher degree of consensus, it is more likely for asymmetric countries to engage in monetary transfers to form the grand coalition, particularly if a small stable coalition has already been formed in the first stage. This article therefore provides a theoretical perspective to explain why it is more likely for some developed countries to initiate an IEA formation process by forming a small stable coalition first before engaging in monetary transfers to form the grand coalition with all the other countries. Such a perspective is consistent with the historical development of the Montreal Protocol and may also explain the difficulty for asymmetric countries to form the grand coalition at the beginning of the IEA formation process of the Kyoto Protocol.

Institutional Collective Action on Drugs: Functional and Vertical Dilemmas of Unused Pharmaceuticals

The authors use the Institutional Collective Action Framework to analyze the barriers, opposition, and opportunities for residential pharmaceutical disposal programs in the United States via a case study on a series of take‐back programs pioneered in the state of Washington by local and state governments, as well as the corresponding backlash from federal agencies. While successful in some ways, these innovative solutions directly challenged the competing federal policy regimes controlled by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and, to a lesser extent, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Findings from case studies suggest that functional dilemmas created by existing institutions with entrenched regulatory regimes are a key challenge to finding efficient solutions to vertical ICA dilemmas. Conclusions, then, connect to the broader ICA research agenda, and implications for multi‐level governance issues.     

Get in line: Do part-time legislatures use sunset laws to keep executive agencies in check

Sunset provisions are clauses embedded in legislation that cause a piece of legislation or a regulatory board to expire on a certain date unless the legislature takes affirmative action to renew the legislation or board. Supporters and legislators offer several reasons why sunset laws are valuable and useful. An article by Baugus and Bose (2015), reported on the king-and-council model of Congleton (2001), suggests that sunset laws are a key tool legislatures use in asserting themselves against an executive branch that often dominates state government. We investigate this possibility using empirical analysis, which suggests that part-time legislatures, specifically, a form of part-time legislature referred to as hybrid legislatures, are more prone to use sunset legislation as a tool to keep the executive preferences in check.     

Tariff liberalization and product standards: Regulatory chill and race to the bottom?

Does tariff liberalization cause regulatory chill by putting downward pressure on health, safety, and environmental standards? Or does it cause a race to the top as governments seek to use standards as nontariff barriers to trade? There remains remarkably little empirical evidence to answer these long-debated questions. We seek to address this lack by analyzing annual country-by-industry data on notifications of changes in sanitary and phytosanitary standards by world trade organization members. Our results suggest that the impact of increased trade pressure depends on whether domestic producers are likely to gain or lose from a change in standards. Regulatory chill is the dominant response in most countries, but countries in which producers can adapt to standards relatively cheaply appear to race to the top. Consequently, tariff liberalization encourages divergence in standards across countries.