中国与新加坡个人所得税制度的比较与借鉴

文章在纳税人居民与非居民身份的判定标准、税制模式、征税对象、费用扣除、税率的比较等方面对中国与新加坡个人所得税制度进行比较和分析,指出新加坡个人所得税制度的优点对我国的借鉴和启示。     

论垄断对我国职业群体收入的影响及对策

垄断是市场经济的产物,在我国经济转轨过程中,垄断又呈现出其特殊形态,即行政性垄断。行政性垄断行业存在职工工资及其他收入的不合理性现象,又会造成职业群体收入差距过大。行政性垄断已对职业群体利益均衡产生了消极影响,破坏了社会分配秩序。必须通过深化改革、强化竞争机制等措施限制行政性垄断,调整职业群体收入的差距,从而实现社会分配的公平和效益。     

当前我国居民收入分配不公的原因透视及治理对策

透视中国的四次收入分配过程 ,可见 ,市场竞争的初始条件的差异、政府的再分配政策、以及各种违法犯罪活动是形成收入分配不公的主要原因。为此 ,应建立城乡居民最低生活保障制度、完善个人所得税制、扩大就业机会、增加农民收入、支持中西部发展以及加强权力监督和整顿市场秩序等切实可行的对策 ,来解决收入分配不公 ,缩小收入差距 ,确保社会主义市场经济的效率与公平协调统一 ,促进国民经济的健康发展。     

Broken Promises or Selective Memory Planning? A National Picture of HOPE VI Plans and Realities

Government efforts to redevelop public housing often face a contentious gap between plans and realities. This paper compares 2014 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administrative data on housing unit counts and unit mixes for all 260 developments receiving Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) revitalization grants with data provided in the original HOPE VI grant award announcements. We find that HUD records undercount approximately 11,500 once-proposed units. The biggest changes were a 29% decline in the number of market-rate units and a 40% decline in homeownership units. The chief shortfall during implementation, therefore, was not with public housing units (although the HOPE VI program as a whole did trigger an overall decline of such units). To help elucidate the dynamics at play when the unit allocation shifts between initial grant award and implemented project, we include a series of five brief case studies that illustrate several types of unit change. Interviews with HUD staff confirm the baseline for record-keeping shifted during implementation once project economic feasibility became clearer; adherence to original unit mix proposals remained secondary. HUD prioritized its accountability to Congress and developers over its public law accountability to build the projects initially proposed to local community residents. Although these changes have sometimes been interpreted as broken promises, it is even clearer that HUD’s monitoring system exemplifies what we call Selective Memory Planning: when planners and policy makers, willfully or not, selectively ignore elements of previous plans in favor of new plans that are easier to achieve.     

The Case for a Participation Income: Acknowledging and Valuing the Diversity of Social Participation

Anthony Atkinson's idea of a participation income draws attention to the various ways in which people contribute to society. Current discussions on social participation go beyond paid work to include volunteering, education, and caregiving to kin. With the idea of the participation income, various forms of contribution can be highlighted and acknowledged. This article investigates how the idea of a participation income is reflected in Danish, Finnish, German and Dutch social policies. It shows that different elements of a participation income are incorporated in active labour market policies: Denmark adopted a narrow focus on paid work; Finland seeks tailor‐made solutions for the long‐term unemployed; Germany reformed many policy areas to achieve a better activation; and the Netherlands acknowledges a wide range of social participation forms. These country differences highlight that governments can adapt the idea of a participation income to achieve the focus they desire.     

Participation Income and the Provision of Socially Valuable Activities

In this article, I argue that a participatory income (PI)—the proposal originally presented by Anthony Atkinson in 1996—can potentially perform better than an unconditional basic income (UBI) in terms of addressing unmet social needs. I explain why we should expect that unmet social needs can be better alleviated by the recipients of a PI rather than by the voluntary actions of UBI recipients. In particular, the argument presented here seeks to develop a particularly forgotten point in the PI debate—namely, the importance of using income transfer programmes as a policy tool to motivate people to engage in socially valuable activities.     

When Basic Income Meets Professor Pangloss: Ignoring Public Administration and Its Perils

Basic income advocates propose a model that they believe will dramatically improve on current welfare programmes by alleviating poverty, reducing involuntary unemployment and social exclusion, redistributing care work, achieving a better work–life balance, and so on. Whether these expected social effects materialise in practice critically depends on how the model is implemented, but on this topic the basic income debate remains largely silent. Few advocates explicitly consider questions of implementation, and those that do are typically dismissive of the administrative challenges of implementing a basic income and critical (even overtly hostile) towards bureaucracy. In this contribution we briefly examine (and rebut) several reasons that have led basic income advocates to ignore administration. The main peril of such neglect, we argue, is that it misleads basic income advocates into a form of Panglossian optimism that risks causing basic income advocacy to become self‐defeating.     

Class War in the Voting Booth: Bias Against High-Income Congressional Candidates

Do Americans care how much money congressional candidates earn? We conducted three experiments to examine how candidates' incomes affect voters' perceptions of the candidates' traits and ultimately their vote intention. Subjects evaluated otherwise identical candidates with annual incomes randomly varying between $75,000, $3 million, and a candidate with no income information provided. Results from the three experiments are remarkably similar. Subjects viewed the $3 million earner as significantly more intelligent than the candidate with no income information provided, but this benefit of high income was overshadowed by significant biases against the $3 million candidate. Subjects consistently viewed the $3 million earner as less honest, less caring, and less representative of them than the other candidates. Ultimately, subjects were less likely to say they would vote for the $3 million candidate. These findings demonstrate that the campaign advantages that high-income candidates enjoy are somewhat offset by voters' initial bias against them.     

Housing prices and wealth inequality in Western Europe

Abstract

Comparative political economy (CPE) has robustly examined the political and institutional determinants of income inequality. However, the study of wealth, which is more unequally distributed than income, has been largely understudied within CPE. Using new data from the World Income Database (WID), this article examines how economic, political and institutional dynamics shape wealth-to-income ratios within Western European and OECD countries. It is found that the political and institutional determinants that affect income inequality have no short- or long-run effects on the wealth-to-income ratio. Rather, the rise in wealth-to-income ratios is driven by rising housing prices, as well as price changes in other financial assets, not home ownership or national saving rates. The article concludes by examining how the changing dynamics of housing prices and wealth inequality will increasingly shape intergenerational – and associated class-based – political conflict in Western Europe.     

"十一五"扬州城市居民可支配收入增长目标及路径初探

2010年扬州市城市居民人均可支配收入要达16000元以上,就必须认真分析影响城市居民人均可支配收入的多种因素,采取相应措施,不断提高城市居民收入,保证广大人民群众共享改革发展成果。