The Future of Northern Ireland: the Role of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement Institutions

Since the 2016 Brexit referendum a series of crises has gripped Northern Ireland's politics. This has had a destabilising effect across society, which has arguably been felt most acutely by political unionism. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA) of 1998 created a series of institutions to deal with political conflict in Northern Ireland, manage cross-border cooperation and normalise relations between the UK and Ireland. However, many aspects of it have been sparingly and ineffectually deployed, most notably the second and third strands dealing with north/south and east/west relations respectively. In this article, the authors argue that regular use of the institutional arrangements created by the Agreement would help to deal with the challenges currently facing Northern Ireland and help address unionist anxieties over the Protocol. Use of the North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC), the British Irish Council (BIC) and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC) should be prioritised. The unresolved issues arising from Brexit require a recommitment to the intergovernmental logic at the heart of the 1998 Agreement, despite the obstacles.     

Towards a New Ireland

Despite all the contemporary difficulties that we face on the island of Ireland, twenty-four years on from the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, there is a clear sense of hope for a better future. We should be optimistic for our shared future, even if we do not agree on what form that should take. We cannot discuss Northern Ireland or its future without acknowledging that Brexit has significantly shifted the conversation. Not only has it brought Anglo-Irish relations to a low not seen in the past twenty-five years, but it has also damaged the reputation of the UK internationally and brought the topic of Irish unity back to the fore of our political discourse.     

Predictors of Initial Court Agreement and 1‐Year Relitigation in Title IV‐D Contested Paternity Cases

We examined potential predictors of initial court agreement and 1‐year relitigation in a sample of contested paternity cases involving unmarried parents coming to court to establish paternity, child support, and other issues. Cases participated in an RCT of a parent program and of a waiting period between establishment of paternity and court hearing. We controlled for RCT study factors and used baseline assessment data to predict likelihood of reaching full agreement in the initial court hearing and relitigation in the following year. Findings suggest that cases in which parents get along better outside of court are more likely to reach agreement and less likely to return to court. Additionally, particular parent demographics predict lower likelihood of reaching initial agreement (e.g., parents are non‐White, father earns below $10,000 yearly), more relitigation (e.g., parents are non‐White, mother earns above $10,000 yearly, father has children with others), and less relitigation (e.g., father earns above $10,000 yearly). Child demographics and most parent relationship characteristics did not predict outcomes. We discuss findings and offer suggestions for court interventions.     

论申根协定对国际移民的影响

《申根协定》是欧洲若干国家通过政府问的合作而对跨国移民进行统一管理的国际条约,它集中体现了欧盟的移民政策。该协定基本实现了欧盟国家内部的个人自由流动,促进了欧盟一体化的进程,但其实施对国际移民也带来一些负面问题,笔者拟从《申根协定》出台的历史背景及其条款内容出发,深入探究欧盟的移民法律与政策,并就该协定对未来国际移民的影响趋势进行分析和研讨。     

论《服务贸易总协定》的投资协定性质

《服务贸易总协定》在性质上是各国签订的国际投资协定,并非贸易协定,这是由服务本身的性质造成的。从《服务贸易总协定》的性质和宗旨看,发达国家有意搭多边贸易体制的便车,以服务贸易之名行对外投资之实;从《服务贸易总协定》对服务的分类看,商业存在和自然人流动无疑要伴随着跨国投资;从《服务贸易总协定》对最惠国待遇和国民待遇的规定看,这里的待遇实际上是给予服务的提供者而不仅仅是给予作为商品的服务;从《服务贸易总协定》对市场准入的规定看,市场准入允许服务提供者在他国进行投资设业,这涉及东道国对外资的审批。《服务贸易总协定》的签订,不仅丰富了世界贸易组织的议题,也为世界贸易组织的运行带来了新的挑战。     

Buying treaties with cigarettes: Internal side‐payments in two level games

Two‐level games models predict that domestic division within a state can alter the extent to which that state is able to reach agreements with other states, and also alter the content of any agreement that is reached. I extend the model by introducing internal side‐payments composed of unrelated domestic issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation most when the executive and median legislators are in relative agreement about other salient domestic political issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation least when the executive and median legislators are in relative disagreement about other salient domestic political issues. U.S. ratifications of the NAFTA and the Chemical Weapons Convention illustrate that not all types of domestic division inhibit international cooperation—some can facilitate it     

The ASEAN-China Investment Agreement: A regionalization of China��s BITs

This paper analyzes the provisions of the Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (the “ASEAN”), especially those on the scope of application, national treatment, Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment, expropriation, and investor-state dispute resolution. The paper then compares the new agreement with other international investment agreements concluded by China or ASEAN. In comparison with existing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) between China and individual ASEAN member states, there are significant changes in the Investment Agreement which provides a higher standard of investment protection. Such an investment protection is common in the new generation of Chinese BITs, which were signed by China since 2000. However, unlike some other investment agreements in free trade arrangements, the Investment Agreement rarely touches upon the investment liberalization, although the Framework Agreement of ASEAN-China FTA provides for creating a liberal investment regime. This paper concludes that negotiating an investment agreement in China’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) is regarded as an opportunity to update its old BITs, but China is not yet prepared to undertake investment liberalization in its FTAs. The ASEAN-China Investment Agreement is, rather, an extension of China’s BITs at the regional level, which is a demonstration of China’s growing influence at this level.     

South Africa's financial and economic prospects for the next five years

South African dominance of trade in Africa as well as its position as a regional hegemon was entrenched by the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the European Union in 1999. South Africa's full-blown integration into the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) formation since 2011 has brought new dynamics, however, as South Africa now has a marked BRICS orientation. Although the European Union (EU) as a bloc is still South Africa's largest trading partner, China has become South Africa's largest single-country trading partner. The question arises as to whether this new found loyalty makes sense in terms of South Africa's regional position and its trade prospects. Against the background of more intra-industry trade with the EU and the new and growing inter-industry trade with the other BRICS economies, South Africa's trade share of African trade has been in relative decline. This study uses an international political economy framework to analyse South African trade hegemony based on the TDCA and the possible effects of a shift towards BRICS. The conclusion is that, although the shift towards BRICS can politically be justified, economically it should not be at the expense of the benefits of the more advantageous relationship with the EU.     

Outsourcing a partnership? Assessing ACP–EU cooperation under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement

Since 2000 the cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states has been governed through the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This article complements existing research that focuses on Brussels-based stakeholders with an analysis drawing on the existing literature and on stakeholders' perceptions of ACP–EU cooperation and ACP institutions gathered via interviews in nine ACP countries. The findings presented observe a social disconnect between, on the one hand, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement's institutions and Brussels-based representatives, and, on the other hand, the broad-based and multistakeholder partnership they are tasked to promote. The article points to low levels of support in ACP countries, particularly in Africa, to continued ACP–EU cooperation in its present form, and stresses the need for an open and participatory process of reviewing and reshaping ACP–EU relations.     

台湾当局自由贸易协议实践的亚太转向及其前景

自20世纪90年代以来,为因应全球区域一体化的浪潮,台湾当局力推自由贸易协议（FTA）战略,但成效不佳。2008年马英九执政后,两岸关系在“九二共识”的基础上得以缓和并稳步发展,台湾参与区域经济一体化的问题被重新提上议事日程。当前,台湾当局的FTA战略目标逐渐从传统的中南美洲“友邦”逐渐转向亚太地区,从单纯的“政治驱动型”向“政治经济平衡型”特征转变。未来,台湾当局FTA实践的进展,并不单纯取决于台湾当局作为世界贸易组织成员的身份,更取决于两岸经济整合的深度和两岸政治互信的程度。台湾当局FTA实践的经验,对于未来参与TPP同样具有借鉴意义。