政府形象建设:提高政策执行效率的重要途径

政府政策的有效执行是以政策执行主体的认同和接受为前提条件 ,而这种认同在很大程度上又取决于政府的形象。要提高政策执行效率 ,首先要通过提高政府行政绩效和搞好政府公共关系来改进政府形象 ,以此增强公众对政策的认同。     

关于新时期加强政府管理体制有效运行的几点思考

新时期加强政府管理体制有效运行不仅是政治体制改革的重要内容,也是加强党的执政能力的重要内容之一。加强政府管理体制有效运行应树立现代科学的管理理念;完善各项相关法律规章制度及其执行;强化权力的协调、制约、监督机制和行为的激励机制。     

The impact of motivational and contextual factors on turnout in first- and second-order elections

Based on voter survey from European election study 2009, we examine the impact of one individual-level motivational factor, i.e. interest in politics, and its interactions with institutional and contextual factors such as compulsory voting, electoral competition and the number of parties on participation in 2009 EP elections and previous national elections. The results show that political interest is more closely connected to turnout in second-order elections which are usually considered less salient. Correspondingly, also the contingent effect of compulsory voting and competition is more evident in EP elections. While compulsory voting substantially decreases the turnout gap between the most and least politically attentive voters in both types of elections, the moderating effect of competitiveness is found only in EP elections.     

论美国律师帮助不力制度——兼议我国律师帮助不力制度的构建

律师的有效帮助应当是律师帮助权的应有之义,然而事实却是获得律师并不等于获得了律师的有效帮助。借鉴美国律师帮助不力制度建立我国的律师帮助不力制度,对于完善我国的辩护制度具有重大意义。     

谈建立铁路上海站地区的长效管理机制

铁路上海站地区经多年大力整治,仍存在一些“老大难”问题,故此,必须继续开展专项整治;调整充实各级领导机构,完善管理指挥系统;健全政策法规,扩大管理涵盖面;规范各项运作机制,强化综合管理效率;加强基础设施建设,开发站区综合功能。     

马歇尔-勒纳条件对中国适用吗？——基于2000年中国社会核算矩阵的实证分析

马歇尔勒纳条件认为,若一国的出口弹性与进口弹性的绝对值之和大于1,则本币贬值可改善本国国际收支。自1995年以来,无论是按照CPI还是EPI计算的人民币实际有效汇率,人民币币值一直被低估,升值压力确实存在;中国出口和进口弹性的绝对值之和大于1,满足马歇尔勒纳条件的前提条件。但对2000年SAM冲击分析的计算结果表明,不能得到按照实际有效汇率计算的人民币贬值有助于中国贸易平衡项得到改善的结论,即马歇尔勒纳条件在中国不适用。研究结论:第一,应该慎重对待人民币升值问题,通过温和、缓慢的升值对社会、经济的影响较小;第二,人民币升值将有利于改善中国贸易平衡项;最后,人民币升值所产生的国内就业压力将有可能对资本形成、个人所得税和政府对企业的转移支付产生一定的消极影响。     

强化对社区境外人员有效管理的思考

随着我国改革开放的不断深入和对外交往的日趋频繁,来华外国人人数逐年递增,现行“二级机构、三级管理”的属地管理模式不足的方面显现出来。公安机关对境外人员管理上出现了一些漏洞,甚至构成安全隐患。要构建和谐社会,应强化对社区境外人员的有效管理。要善用社会资源,强化指导性功能,完善法律和体制,依托科学技术,探索境外人员管理新模式。     

The Seat Product Model of the effective number of parties: A case for applied political science

This paper extends Taagepera's (2007) Seat Product Model and shows that the effective number of seat-wining parties and vote winning parties can both be predicted with institutional variables alone, namely district magnitude, assembly size, and upper-tier seat share. The expected coefficients are remarkably stable across different samples. Including the further information of ethnic diversity in the models hardly improves the estimate of the effective number of parties, and thus the institutions-only models are preferable on the grounds of parsimony and the applicability to electoral-system design or “engineering”.     

Executive-Led Governance or Executive Power ‘Hollowed-Out’—The Political Quagmire of Hong Kong

New Zealand has long enjoyed a reputation as a country with a corruption‐free state sector. However, social change and the state sector reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, have rendered that status less secure. While hard‐core corruption does not yet appear to be a major problem, what constitutes corruption can be a function of changing public perceptions and attitudes. Four main types of behaviour of public officials are identified, all of which have a bearing on how corruption is perceived. In New Zealand, there is casual evidence that hard‐core corruption might be more common today than in the past, but the official attitude to the possibility of it increasing seems to be overly sanguine, partly as a result of a very narrow definition of corruption. Vigilance could be enhanced by a stronger role for Parliament's agency, the Office of the Controller and Auditor‐General.     

Compelled without direction: Compulsory voting and party system spreading

Much of the current literature on compulsory voting (CV) examines its effects by simulating complete turnout. We argue that these studies do not capture the full effects of CV, as there is something qualitatively different about compulsory voting rules as compared to only increasing turnout. Furthermore, CV and turnout have important, yet unexplored, interactive effects. To test this argument, we look at governments in 43 countries over the 1990–2006 period. Nine of these countries have some form of CV. We examine the effect of CV on the ideological position and range of governments, left party seat share, and the effective number of parties. We find that high turnout in the presence of CV laws spreads out the distribution of voters and leads to an increase in the effective number of parliamentary parties and a larger ideological range of governments. These results have important implications for how we study CV and its consequences for party strategy.