中国与印度国际竞争力的比较与解释

本文首先对中印两国经济社会总体发展状况进行了比较,认为无论从经济指标还是从社会指标考察,中国均比印度处于更高的发展阶段。对两国制造业国际竞争力的分析比较表明,中国制造业的国际竞争力总体上强于印度。对两国服务业国际竞争力的研究表明:其一,在大多数年份,印度服务业的综合国际竞争力强于中国;其二,中国服务业国际竞争力的提升主要来源于竞争优势。虽然中国服务业综合竞争力弱于印度,但实际中国服务业的竞争优势始终强于印度,只是由于中国制造业发展速度更快,才使得中国服务业的比较优势弱于印度。文章最后从劳动力素质、基础设施、政府作用、社会异质性、宗教文化、海外侨民六个方面分析了中印之间竞争力存在差异的原因。     

“参与式政府”的构筑——韩国卢武铉政府行政改革综述

行政改革曾经是卢武铉政府执政伊始即推出的众多雄心勃勃的施政目标之一。早在2003年2月25日的总统就职演说中,卢武铉即提出了建立"参与式政府"的愿望,为此新政府将严格奉行"原则与信任、公正与透明、对话与妥协、分权和自律"四大原则进行施政。为了将"参与式政府"的愿景转化为现实,卢武铉政府设立了五大行政改革目标,即效率的行政、服务的行政、透明的行政、清廉的行政和参与的行政。构筑参与式政府实质是卢武铉政府在新世纪初通过对国内政治、经济、社会环境的通盘考量,将民众要求完善民主、参与国家政治、获得更多优质公共服务的要求与政府提高自身能力、增强国家综合实力的目标相结合的一次创新尝试。     

地方政府创新的驱动模式——地方政府干部视角的考察

由地方政府推动的创新是一个国家政治体制改革的风向标,地方政府创新的发展特征可以展现出这个国家的政治文化和政治发展活力.以"中国地方政府创新奖2007-2008"年度20个地方政府创新获奖项目为研究单位,通过问卷调查收集和分析地方政府干部对本地政府创新项目的认知和态度,从创新动因、创新动力和阻力、创新价值取向、创新的参与性和可持续性五个方面出发,得出研究结论:由地方政府推动的改革创新具有突出的"低风险取向",创新过程中公共参与不足,地方领导的"精英作用"和基层政策空间是推动地方政府创新的主体力量,创新的可持续性也主要取决于能否获得体制内的认可和支持.本文的研究方法和研究结论为观察和判断中国政府改革和政治发展提供了新的视角和信息.     

美国职务发明权属规则之演变及其启示

美国职务发明权利归属经历了从归属发明人向“发明前转让协议”支配的演变,且在政府资助领域完成了从“约定”到“法定”的转移。其中揭示的一般性规律在于：职务发明权利归属是取决于人力资源稀缺性还是更取决于物资资源稀缺性的社会条件。同时还表明企业主导和政府资助发明是现代国家科技创新的两种方式,且因政府资助发明领域涉及多元主体和多元利益,关于其发明成果权利归属的法律制度安排应有所不同。受此启示,在我国职务发明人与单位契约地位不平等及利益失衡的情况下,专利法应为职务发明人提供兜底性保障;为促进我国科技成果转化利用,应完善政府资助领域职务发明人利益分享机制和相关配套制度立法,并宜在专利法之外通过特别法的方式予以推进。     

公共服务供给不足的政治经济分析

二十多年的改革开放使我国经济社会进入了新的发展阶段,在这个阶段中,日益增长的公共需求与公共服务供给不足之间的矛盾愈益突出。公共服务的供给不足很大程度是缘于公共组织的制衡设计原则和公共服务的交叉特征所导致的“反公地悲剧”。基于已有研究的成果,从水平层面和垂直链条两个方面可以构建出公共服务供给中的反公地悲剧模型,而在实践中主要表现为部门多头管理、回应公共需求变化的能力弱以及以部门利益阻挠公共利益的实现。要治理这种反公地,必须从理念转变、制度建设以及财政政策转型等方面创新公共服务体制。     

关于服务相对人公共服务程序参与权研究

建设服务型政府必须考虑保障服务相对人能够有效参与到程序之中。服务相对人公共服务程序参与权具有重要功能,在确定服务相对人公共服务程序参与权时,准确把握服务相对人的范围以及程序参与权的内容具有重要意义。当前,应该通过多种途径为服务相对人实现公共服务程序参与权提供法律保障。     

Bureaucratic discretion,social equity,and the administrative legitimacy dilemma: Complications of New Public Service

Bureaucratic discretion continues to be one of a public administrator's primary powers while at the same time being one of their most controversial. Used in a positive way, bureaucratic discretion can enhance social equity; however, this practice can create administrative legitimacy dilemmas. As such, this paper conceptually discusses the theoretical position of public administrators that contributes to their engagement in legitimacy dilemmas, which is further complicated by the tenets of New Public Service. We argue that if public administrators are engaged in authentic interactions with the public and use their discretion to reflect the interests of the public, then they are engaged in truly democratic governance. We place this argument in the context of achieving social equity and highlight an avoided question in public administration. Finally, recommendations for future research are offered as a means progressing the social equity agenda in public administration.     

Municipal Service Delivery: The Role of Transaction Costs in the Choice between Alternative Governance Mechanisms

Service provision by local governments can be delivered using in-house bureaucracies, private firms, and partnerships with other governments or the not-for-profit sector. This production decision has been a major focus of discussion among scholars, practitioners and political agents for the last quarter of a century. The transaction costs framework is an important tool to analyse decisions regarding the production of local services. In this paper, the authors employ this framework to analyse service delivery in Portugal and find that service characteristics and the local political environment play a key role in local officials' choice among the three governance mechanisms to deliver public services.     

Bureau Bashing and Public Service Motivation: A Case for the Civil Service of Bangladesh

This paper explains the negative impacts of bureau-bashing on the Public Service Motivation (PSM) of civil servants. It differentiates between policy bashing and rhetoric bashing and argues that while policy bashing may be constructive in nature, rhetoric bashing often de‐motivates bureaucrats in terms of their rational, normative and affective motives (Perry and Wise, 1990 Perry, J.L. and Wise, L.R. 1990. The motivational bases of public service. Public Administration Review, 50(3): 367–373. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] Perry, 1996 Perry, J.L. 1996. Measuring public service motivation: An assessment of construct reliability and validity. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 6(1): 5–22. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) In Bangladesh context, in critiquing public service, the previous attempts aimed to analyze the structural problems and recent attacks are directed towards the bureaucrats themselves. However, there are few empirical studies to measure the performance of bureaucrats by analyzing the initiatives they take and the problems they face in carrying out their responsibilities. Based on Perry &; Wise's (1990 Perry, J.L. and Wise, L.R. 1990. The motivational bases of public service. Public Administration Review, 50(3): 367–373. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) PSM model, we argue that in Bangladesh, bureau bashing is mostly rhetoric and thus it might have created a negative impact on PSM amongst bureaucrats, contributing to the poor state of governance.     

This Time,it's for Real: The Health and Social Care Act 2012

This article examines the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and associated reforms to the National Health Service in England. It focuses on the Act's policy of making the NHS market more ‘real’, by both encouraging and compelling NHS bodies to act as ‘market players’. The article considers whether the reforms are compatible with the constitutional requirements of accountability for the provision of a public service such as the NHS. It argues that the reforms threaten accountability for three reasons: they make the Secretary of State for Health's relationship with the NHS more complex, they create opaque networks of non‐statutory bodies which may influence NHS decision‐making, and (especially in relation to competition) they ‘juridify’ policy choices as matters of law. Taken together, these arguments suggest that there is force in the claim that the reforms will contribute to ‘creeping’ – and thus unaccountable – privatisation of the NHS.