论篡夺公司机会的禁止

禁止篡夺公司机会是英美公司法的一个重要理论 ,我国公司法在此方面尚有缺失。确立我国的禁止篡夺公司机会规则 ,应比较、分析、吸收美国两大最具代表性的理论的有关观点     

市场经济与法治伦理的契合:商法伦理机制论纲

法治和伦理是共同承托和推动市场经济发展的两个互相依存、彼此渗透的巨轮.作为调整市场经济关系中商人及其商事活动法律规范总和的商法.不但具有强烈的技术性特点,而且同时也体现出浓厚的伦理性特质.频繁发生的商业欺诈行为和愈演愈烈的商业失信行为,促使我们不得不对既往的商事立法模式进行认真的反思,由此可以得出的结论是:过分偏重技术性规范并非是完善我国商法制度的唯一途径.我国未来商法制度的构建,不但要考虑通过强化法律规范设计的合理性从而提高商法制度的竞争力,而且还必须充分关注商法制度所赖以建构和运行的伦理基础.只有将商法的技术性规范和商法伦理机制有机结合起来,才能真正奠定市场经济健康有序发展的良好基石.     

入世后的人才竞争战略与人本管理

人才竞争是入世带来的首要挑战。入世后国际人才竞争将更加激烈,并且具有高起点、高层次、多方位的特点。跨国集团立足我国国内进行人才竞争,将对我国造成更大的压力。我国长期面临人才缺乏、人才流失等问题,应按照扬长避短的原则设计我国的人才竞争战略,突出人本管理理念,具体表现为对个性价值的充分尊重,从“卡堵”策略到“磁石”策略的转变,充分利用现有人才资源。     

To What Extent are Cost Savings Passed on to Consumers? An Oligopoly Approach

Competition policy often asks whether a “fair share” of the benefits from cost savings obtained through mergers or agreements is passed on to the consumers. We assess the factorsthat determine cost pass-on in some partial-equilibrium oligopoly models, and show that, although the strength of the pass-on varies from one situation to another, there are some rules of thumb that give a first approximation of the pass-on rate. We also show that, contrary to common belief and to what is written about the subject in the European Commission's guidelines on the application of Article 81(3), in most circumstances cost pass-on does not depend on the price elasticity of demand nor on the market share of the cost saver, and that with competition the pass-on of firm-specific cost savings is weaker than without. JEL Classification: C72 (non-cooperative games), D43 (oligopoly), L40 (antitrust policy)     

论对比广告的利弊及其法律规范

对比广告指直接或间接指明某广告产品的其它竞争者,对产品进行对比而无需征得其事先许可的广告,它有助于国家繁荣经济。但也存在三个问题贬低其他竞争者;用指出虚构的“一般”产品品牌的方式误导消费者;夸大广告中产品的一个或一些特点的重要性。通过合理完善的法律规定,可以控制对比广告潜在的弊端。     

Competition and interaction: Party ties to interest groups in a multidimensional policy space

Political parties and interest groups play a vital role in incorporating societal interests into democratic decision-making. Therefore, explaining the nature and variation in the relationship between them will advance our understanding of democratic governance. Existing research has primarily drawn attention to how exchange of resources shapes these relationships largely neglecting the role of contextual conditions. Our contribution is to examine whether parties’ structured interactions with different categories of interest groups vary systematically with the pattern of party competition at the level of policy dimensions. First, we argue that higher party fragmentation in a policy space makes organisational ties to interest groups more likely, due to fears of voter loss and splinter groups. Second, we expect higher polarisation between parties on a policy dimension to make ties to relevant groups less likely due to increased electoral costs. We find support for both expectations when analysing new data on 116 party units in 13 mature democracies along nine different policy dimensions. Our findings underline the value of considering the strategic context in which parties and interest groups interact to understand their relationship. The study sheds new light on parties and interest groups as intermediaries in democracy and contributes to a new research agenda connecting interest group research with studies of parties’ policy positions and responsiveness.     

论构建WTO框架下竞争法协调机制

从竞争法法律冲突产生的原因和国际上现有的处理竞争法法律冲突的协调模式展开论述,分析了在WTO框架下建立国际竞争规则协调机制的必然性和可能性,并对WTO框架下竞争法协调机制在实体和程序方面的构成提出了建议。     

论竞争法的调整对象

竞争法调整竞争关系的观点违背了民商法与经济法的基本原理。竞争法调整的是竞争规制关系 ;竞争关系作为一种市场关系 ,一般是通过交易关系直接或间接表现出来 ,它是形成竞争规制关系的基础关系 ;竞争规制关系是一种独立的经济关系 ,由竞争法专门调整     

From rule-taker to rule-promoting regulatory state: South Korea in the nearly-global competition regime

When rapid economic growth catapults a country within a few years from the margins of the global economy to middle power status, does global regulatory governance need to brace for a challenge to the status quo? To answer this question, we extend the power transition theory of global economic governance to middle powers: A rising middle power should be expected to challenge the international regulatory status quo only if increasing issue-specific strength of its regulatory state coincides with preferences that diverge from the preferences of the established powers, which are enshrined in the status quo. We examine this argument empirically, focusing on South Korea in the realm of competition law and policy. We find that South Korea, a non-participant in the international competition regime until the 1980s, developed in the 1990s substantial regulatory capacity and capability and thus “spoiler potential.” At the same time, however, its policy preferences converged upon the norms and practices established by the United States and the European Union, albeit with some distinct elements. Under these conditions, we expect a transition from rule-taker to rule-promoter. We find that South Korea has indeed in recent years begun to actively promote well-established competition law and policy norms and practices – supplemented by its distinct elements – through technical assistance programs, as well as various bilateral channels and multilateral institutions. The findings suggest that the power transition theory of global economic governance is usefully applicable to middle powers, too.     

劳动竞赛聚力集智筑牢能源安全之堤——渤海油田职工劳动和技能竞赛实践探索

中国海洋石油渤海油田通过开展职工劳动和技能竞赛活动,在广泛凝聚力量、弘扬劳动精神的同时,有力发挥了工人阶级的主力军作用,进一步锻造了敢打能胜的海油铁军队伍。通过完善组织领导体系,构建了环渤海“三省一市”总工会竞赛工作协调机制,并遵循统一领导、分类竞赛、分级开展的原则进行;竞赛目标明确,领域划分科学,项目重点得到推动;竞赛载体多样,内容丰富立体,突出了群众性特点;展现了竞赛活动在中心任务、队伍建设、提质增效、企业活力等方面的阶段性硕果。