作为公众投资工具的投资合同之法律适用研究

本文主要研究虽然名称上不是股票或企业债券,但实质上以给予回报而募集公众资金的投资合同是否应该由证券法监管,或者说是否构成证券法下的证券。为此,在考察美国证券法(制定法)和普通法(判例法)的基础上,总结出投资合同构成证券法下的证券之要件,并据此分析了目前社会上较有影响的造林投资合同,得出该类投资合同构成证券,应该由证券法对其加以调整的结论。     

我国主要农产品国际竞争力的实证分析

考虑到我国各种主要农产品国际竞争力上的差距,本文选用了国际市场占有率、显示比较优势法、净出口指数法等方法测算、比较了我国21种主要农产品的国际竞争力,并提出相应的结论与政策建议。     

企业长青的路径：企业家精神的有效供给与企业持久竞争优势的动态构建

在市场经济中,很多企业在经历短暂的辉煌后迅速走向消亡。于社会而言,企业的淘汰与死亡有利于资源的优化配置,但如果企业的死亡率过高,其负面影响也不可忽视,因此,探讨企业长青的内在机理就显得尤为必要。文章从经济学和管理学的视角出发,在吸收了企业生命周期理论、资源基础论和核心竞争力理论研究成果的基础上,提出企业家精神的有效供给和企业持久竞争优势的动态构建是企业长寿的关键所在。     

论用人单位与劳务派遣工之间的关系

劳务派遣工、劳务派遣单位与用人单位法律关系是一种劳动契约关系,劳务派遣单位与劳务派遣工之间的关系,是劳动合同关系,而用人单位与劳务派遣工之间的关系,则是一种特别权力关系。在后者的特别权力关系中,如果用人单位不按法定或约定的规定履行义务,给劳务派遣工造成实体权益的损害,须承担相应的违约责任。     

房贷险存废论

住房金融巨大风险对强化房贷保险作用的现实需要,与旷日已久的所谓"强制保险"的法律困惑,形成了房贷险存与废的博弈。保险金物上代位机制使抵押物保险具有了双重保障机理,决定了抵押权人干预抵押物保险合同的法理依据及其权利界限,银行放弃房贷险只是一种弃权行为;房贷履约保证保险本质上具有人身保险属性,其设定的目的是取代住房抵押担保,应与住房财产险分离而免于银行的强制;房贷险本身的设计缺陷和业务不规范行为必须全面矫正;须尽快加强我国的消费信贷立法。     

建设工程施工合同纠纷案件审理中存在的诸问题——兼评最高法院《关于审理建设工程施工合同纠纷案件适用法律问题的解释》的不足

建设工程合同纠纷争议内容和案件事实错综复杂,涉及法律适用的新情况和新问题较多,审判实践中因司法理念和对法律精神的理解差异,往往造成审判中的司法标准不统一,案件处理各异,影响了人民法院公正与效率这一世纪主题的实现和良好的形象.文章通过对全区法院审理此类案件的深入调研,认真总结分析了目前法院审理此类案件的情况、特点和存在问题,并在此基础上,结合审判实践并结合最高法院最近司法解释,对影响今后审判实践的法律问题和司法实务提出了自已的意见.     

乳牛肝MTP基因mRNA定量检测模板的构建

应用RT-PCR方法,克隆394 bp的MTP片段,连接到pMD 18-T载体上构建pMD-MTP394重组质粒;应用限制性内切酶ApaⅠ消化重组质粒pMD-MTP394,切下一194 bp的小片段,回收大的线性片段,T4 DNA连接酶连接,成功构建了一个重组的竞争模板质粒pMD-MTP200,为建立竞争性RT-PCR法检测乳牛肝MTP基因mRNA奠定了基础。     

海峡两岸省域电子信息产业竞争力评价及分析

近年来,海峡两岸电子信息产业已由最初的互补转为互补与竞争共存,且省域间产业竞争力差距较大。本文根据新贸易竞争优势理论,通过构建两岸省域电子信息产业竞争力评价体系,运用因子分析法对2008—2012年间台湾与大陆31个省、区、市（统称＂省域＂）的电子信息产业竞争力进行测算和分析,结果表明：在时间维度,台湾与大陆电子信息产业竞争力强省的差距在逐渐缩小,与电子信息产业竞争力水平低下省份的差距在逐渐扩大;在地域分布上,两岸电子信息产业竞争力呈现台湾地区向大陆东部沿海地区再向中西部内陆地区递减规律;效益因子、技术投入因子对竞争力影响最大,社会环境因子和经济环境因子次之。针对两岸省域竞争力得分因子差异,本文提出促进两岸电子信息产业合作的建议：大陆高水平区域可利用巨大市场优势与台湾共建技术标准,研发设计符合大陆市场的产品;大陆中高水平区域依托良好的基础设施条件和经济基础可与台湾在电子信息产业高技术、高智力密集度的领域深入合作;大陆中低水平区域凭借劳动力和土地成本优势拓宽与台湾合作区域以承接东部沿海的生产基地;大陆低水平区域应发挥资源优势完善基础设施吸引台商投资。     

Actions by Political Officials Have Weakened the Federal Government Workplace: Downsizing Has Cut Lower Level Workers the Most and Replacing Federal Employees with Private Corporations Costs Much More,Creating the Need for Immediate Reform

Abstract

The authors of this paper are four practitioners each of whom has many years of experience working in the Federal government and also has pursued doctoral studies in public or business administration. Three ideas developed in this paper are that: (1) the Federal civil service has been changed from being a model workplace to a much less desirable one; (2) although downsizing has been touted as an efficiency and economy measure, lower level employees experienced the most cuts and (3) the current practice of replacing Federal employees with private corporations costs much more. Over the past two decades private sector workplaces in the United States, and now the Federal government workplace, have experienced so much change that previous theories, concepts, models, and expectations no longer hold. Just as private industry workplaces have been changed by downsizing, reorganizations, mergers, elimination of middle management, and outsourcing, so, too, has the Federal government workplace been fundamentally altered. Reducing the number of government workers, replacing Federal employees with private firms, increasing the number of officials with political agendas, and using harsh personnel management practices have transfigured the Federal workplace. Examples of factors that have contributed to a changed workplace include: the Civil Service Reform Act which replaced the Civil Service Commission with the Office of Personnel Management; importing private sector approaches into the government, e.g., the Grace Commission; replacing the Civil Service Retirement System with the Federal Employees Retirement System; pressure to downsize and privatize; and many elements of the National Performance Review and Government Performance and Results Act. Now that the metamorphosis away from the traditional Civil Service borne of the Pendleton Act is nearly complete (although the new paradigm is not entirely clear), questions about the effects of a changed government workplace are being raised. Some people believe the metamorphosis is from a caterpillar to a butterfly, while others think the opposite. Whether the changed Federal government is a thing of beauty or a distasteful organism will be determined over time by observations and assessments of the effects of the change. These effects will be both internal to the government workplace, itself, and external to it, involving the products, services, outputs, and outcomes it produces. This paper begins by describing some of the politically mandated changes that have altered the very foundation of the Federal government workplace over the past 20 years and made it a much less desirable place to work. Next, some of the effects of two politically mandated changes are examined: (1) downsizing or reducing the number of Americans who can work for their government and (2) contracting out or replacing government workers with private corporations. Political officials have told the media and the American public that these changes were needed to improve the government's efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. It has been suggested that these initiatives will reduce costs. However, an examination of downsizing and contracting out shows the opposite effect. While overall the Federal government has fewer employees now than in 1961, the statistics indicate that lower level employees have been cut the most:

• The number of secretaries decreased by 39% between 1992 and 1998.

• The blue collar workforce is down 40% since 1982, e.g., Supply Clerical and Technician (?35%), Accounting Technician (?24%), and Electronics Mechanic (?41%).

• Between 1993 and 1998 the number of GS‐1 to GS‐10 employees fell from 767,000 to 594,000.

• In 1983 the number of GS‐1 to GS‐10 workers exceeded GS‐11 to GS‐15 by nearly 300,000, while in 1997 GS‐11 to GS‐15 outnumbered the lower level workers by 44,000.

Although authoritative cost comparison studies are difficult to conduct because top officials have made little provision to collect information on the cost of contracting with private firms or the number of contract employees, available information indicates that it is much more expensive than using government employees. The contracting out we are talking about is not the usual kind—building ships or planes, or acquiring computer systems or special expertise not available in the government. Rather, it is contracting with private firms to do jobs that are currently being performed by Federal employees. Not satisfied with the level at which firms are being substituted for Federal employees, actions by political officials have created an environment which now favors private corporations and where they can be given work at top management's discretion, often regardless of cost. In fact, today most contracting out is done without the use of Circular A‐76 Cost Comparison Studies. There is empirical and logical evidence that shows that replacing government employees with private corporations is more expensive. For example, a study by the Department of the Army documents what people close to contracting have always known—that it is far more expensive to contract with a private firm for work than to have Federal employees do it. Logically, the government incurs additional items of cost when replacing Federal employees with private corporations. First, there is the profit that goes to the firm. Second, there is the firm's overhead which pays for corporate offices, staffs, and CEOs. Third, there are the costs of the contracting and award process and of contract administration and management. Although the worker on a government contract may be paid a little less than a government worker, the cost of the worker is only a third to a half of what the government pays the firm. Thus, replacing government workers with private firms usually costs far more and it is not unusual for it to cost two to three times as much. This paper partly is based on the authors' long experience in the Federal government. It is not based on the organizations in which they are currently employed.     

继续性合同及其类型论

理解继续性合同的概念,应着重把握时间因素在其中的作用,关键之处并不在于给付在时间上的持续性,而在于给付本质上的无限延续性,从而,时间的长短决定总给付范围的多寡,这是继续性合同的基本特色。继续性合同可分为固有的继续性合同、继续性供给合同与继续性交易关系三类。需要辨明,总给付范围自始可被预估的连续供应合同也属于继续性供给合同;电、水、气供应合同及电话合同在给付构成上虽略有不同,仍不失为继续性供给合同;现代企业间的继续性交易关系也是一类继续性合同。