Do the illegal and legal rents of politicians affect municipal election outcomes? Empirical evidence

This paper aims to analyse whether illegal (corruption) and legal rent extraction (high politicians’ wages) affect electoral outcomes at municipal level. We use an initial sample of 145 Spanish municipalities over 50,000 for two electoral periods: 2004–2007 (before the crisis) and 2008–2011 (during the crisis). Our findings show that neither illegal nor legal rent extraction impact on re-election in non-crisis times. However, we observe that citizens penalize legal rent extraction in the ballots during the crisis. Regarding the economic performance of the local governments, we find that its effect on re-election is important in non-crisis period. Nevertheless, in time of crisis, given that the economic situation is bad in general in the country, voters pay less attention to economic factors and focus on politicians’ behaviour.     

Weak states and uneven pluralism: lessons from Mali and Kyrgyzstan

We argue that certain important democratic practices and elements of pluralism are lasting features of political systems in many poor countries. Because of state weakness, such arrangements work to the benefit of both elites and citizens. The broader citizenry and civil society enjoy significant political freedoms and greater access to foreign aid. Elites tolerate these limited civil liberties and regular elections because they produce few costly consequences due to state incapacity. We evaluate this theory of ‘uneven pluralism’ in poor countries using evidence from a paired comparison of Mali and Kyrgyzstan. These two countries have experienced significant political turbulence, but on balance have shown a persistent and robust commitment to a free press, transparent elections, and respect for freedom of association. Our theory suggests that uneven pluralism is likely to continue in countries like Mali and Kyrgyzstan, even as significant limits on judicial independence, persistent corruption, and lack of government transparency make democratic consolidation unlikely.     

Government and Corruption: Scylla and Charybdis

Using public sector employment and corruption perception data for 72 countries across the world, this article demonstrates that despite common notion countries with “smaller” governments do not tend to have lower corruption. Under general assumptions, one can demonstrate that there is an optimal size of public sector employment corresponding to the highest capital intensity. The model has several implications: lower optimal sizes of governments for labor intensive countries and higher sizes for capital intensive ones, possibility to reduce corruption paying a cost of suboptimal output, and a higher “price” of an oversized government for labor intensive countries.     

Preventing Corruption Risk in Legislation: Evidence from Russia,Moldova, and Kazakhstan

ABSTRACT

Corruption risk assessment of draft laws and other normative acts is a relatively new instrument in the anti-corruption strategies implemented by developed nations, countries in transition, and the developing world. In connection with this, any practical experience accumulated in this area presents obvious interest. The analysis of such experience may allow to identify what works and what does not work in introducing the practices of anti-corruption screening of draft laws and other normative acts in various environments and settings, as well as contribute to dissemination of best practices in the countries of the region and elsewhere.

This article seeks to analyze and demonstrate the extent of practical implementation of corruption risk assessment of draft and enacted legislation in three post-communist countries, the problems encountered and solutions identified. Proceeding from this analysis, certain recommendations for practitioners in this field are formulated.     

The political and economic causes of satisfaction with democracy in Spain – a twofold panel study

This study tests the links between political and economic performance and satisfaction with democracy (SWD) in Spain. Contrary to the dominant theoretical paradigm that explains the aggregate evolution of and the individual-level differences in SWD mainly by means of economic factors, the article presents evidence that evaluations of the political process are equally relevant to account for both changes in individuals’ SWD over time and the evolution of SWD at the national level. Unlike most existing literature, this study supports its argument by combining analyses of a micro-level panel dataset (CIUPANEL) and of a pooled aggregate-level panel dataset based on the Spanish samples in the Eurobarometer and the Latinobarómetro between 1986 and 2014.     

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique’s US$2.2 billion secret debt deal

Strenuous efforts by donors and lenders over four decades turned Mozambique from a socialist success story into a neoliberal capitalist one. The private sector dominates; a domestic elite dependent on foreign companies has been created. But a secret US$2.2 billion arms and fishing boat deal involving Swiss and Russian banks and Mozambican purchases from France, Germany, and Israel, with large profits on all sides, was a step too far down the donor’s capitalist road. The International Monetary Fund cut off its programme and western donors ended budget support.     

A failure of governmentality: why Transparency International underestimated corruption in Ben Ali’s Tunisia

This article critiques the Foucauldian approach to governance indicators. Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) underestimated Tunisian corruption levels under President Ben Ali: his regime was highly corrupt but foreign investors were less affected. CPI methodology meant it reflected primarily the needs of foreign investors. The Foucauldian approach specifically excludes analysis of governance indicators’ methodologies. It thus fails to demonstrate the effectiveness of governance indicators as a technology of government, and it fails to show how the production of the CPI is embedded in a wider global political economy.     

Why are public offices sold in Kyrgyzstan?

Why are public offices for sale in Kyrgyzstan? To address this question, this article attempts to set out a new logic for understanding the motives, nature, and consequences of corruption in the country. Rather than securing access to a single favor through bribery, officials invest in political and administrative posts in order to obtain access to stream of rents associated with an office. Political and administrative corruption is organically linked in this system, and corruption stems not so much from weak monitoring as from being a franchise-like arrangement, where officials are required to pay continuous “fees” to their bosses. The key is to be the public official influencing the redistribution of rents as well as participating in the informal market where “public” goods are privatized and exchanged for informal payments. Thus, instead of control over the pure economic assets of the state, influence over the state's institutional and organizational framework is the dominant strategy for earning and investing in the country.     

Corruption and identity politics in divided societies

Corruption is a major problem for populations in various parts of the world. This article argues that to understand the problems and dynamics of corruption, we need to understand how discourses and practices of corruption (and anti-corruption efforts) are intertwined with the construction and contestations of identity. Identity politics is a salient feature in peaceful political struggles, as well as in contemporary armed conflicts, which are often characterised by the politicisation of collective identity (ethnic, national, religious) for the violent pursuit of power. The article outlines and discusses four ways in which identity politics and corruption intersect. First, it points to the often blurred lines between private and collective benefit from corruption, revealing the implications of group identity for how corruption is conceptualised. Second, it shows how corruption may exacerbate grievances along identity lines. Third, it highlights how corruption can be used strategically in identity-based conflicts. Finally, it explores how corruption may encourage cross-ethnic solidarity and mobilisation that defy conflict divides.     

Corruption complaints,inequality and ethnic grievances in post-Biafra Nigeria

Based on anthropological field work in southeastern Nigeria, this paper explores the public concerns and everyday experience of corruption in a society still living with the legacies of the Biafran secession attempt. The paper shows how the revival of Igbo nationalism and resentment over perceived marginalisation is fuelled by perceptions that the corrupt machinery of the federal government runs against the interests of the Igbo people, and funnels resources away from the southeast as punishment for the failed separatist struggle more than 40 years ago. Hence, complaints about corruption are used to critique the Nigerian state and other regional or ethnic groups, but they also figure in an internally focused critique by Igbos of their own complicity in Nigeria’s endemic corruption.