排污权交易的公示制度研究——兼谈物权公示制度

排污权交易制度的实质是具有排放资格的单位之间就排放容量进行自由交易的制度。基于排污权交易的特殊性。则需借鉴物权理论的公示制度,构建由“公法主导”转向“公私监管”的公示制度。物权的公信力来源于公示方式的科学性和合理性。现今因为环境污染的日益严重性。排污权交易制度也需被赋予公信力。物权变动的公示和公信力涉及物权的多样性和交易的安全性。即使排污权交易不存在上述问题,但就其交易对象的数量限定性和第三人的环境利益相关性．引入物权公示制度的同时也需要增强公信力。因此本文认为,应将政府采取的“批准”方式与公示生效主义相结合来构建新型的排污权交易公示制度。这一制度的建立,既能增加交易的自由度,也能增加这一方式的公信力．     

《京都议定书》框架下促进我国企业履行环境责任的思考

<京都议定书>是各成员国为应对全球变暖达成温室气体减排承诺的环境协议,我国作为发展中国家在<京都议定书>谈判的第三阶段将面临减排的压力,温室气体减排主要取决于相关行业的发展和企业环境责任的承担情况.企业的环境责任作为企业承担社会责任的组成部分,在理论上刚刚兴起.培育企业环境责任意识,完善企业环境责任理论,探索企业环境责任承担相应机制以实现企业的经济效益增长与社会环境效益的双赢.     

The Macroeconomic Effects of 2017 Through 2025 Federal Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards

In the absence of a national carbon price, the federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards and the related greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) standards are the primary mechanisms through which the U.S. reduces transportation GHG emissions. In 2012, these standards were set to rise for light‐duty vehicles between 2017 and 2025, eventually achieving a target of 54.5 miles per gallon in 2025. Since 2012, conditions have changed: forecasts of future gasoline prices have dropped dramatically, consumers have demanded larger vehicles, and the cost of compliance appears to be larger than previously thought. In this article, we analyze the possible macroeconomic effects of the standards with both 2012 inputs and updated inputs to reflect these new market developments. The results reveal that the short‐term effects of the federal standards will be negative, but the long‐term effects will be positive, using both 2012 and updated inputs. The transition from annual negative employment impacts to positive impacts occurs between 2023 and 2026, depending on which set of assumptions are used. Possible revisions to the standards that freeze them at 2020 levels or decrease their stringency reduce short‐term negative impacts but also reduce long‐term positive impacts. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications as they relate to the current energy and climate policy conditions.     

Converging Markets

The crucible in this scenario for the international climate regime is the emergence of an effective and liquid international carbon market with participation of private entities. In order to make the carbon market effective a bilateral negotiation track will develop, operating in parallel with the multilateral track under the UNFCCC. The purpose of the bilateral track is to integrate the various emissions trading schemes involving private actors. This bilateral track feeds into the UNFCCC negotiations, which still represents the main arena for the international climate negotiations. Through the bilateral, bottom-up negotiations, a multistage system develops, with differentiated rights and duties, complemented by a package of coordinated support mechanisms. The advantages of such a bottom-up approach prove to be, inter alia, fewer negotiating parties, new negotiation arenas, and a new set of selective incentives. The result is a continuously evolving agreement with the potential to gradually broaden participation and deepen the reduction commitments of the international climate regime. Moreover, the bilateral agreements for linking schemes with private actors also represent a fallback in the event of a collapse in the multilateral negotiations.The article has been written by funding from the Central Research Institute for the Electric Power Industry in Tokyo and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also represents an output of research financed by the Research Council of Norway, project no. 144768/520. The authors thank all three institutions for the funding, as well as the many participants at the workshops where the ideas in the paper have been presented. Their criticism and suggestions have been very stimulating, indeed.     

Assessing the role of regulatory quality,favouritism, administrative requirement and licencing restriction in curtailing carbon emissions

The urgent need to achieve the Paris Agreement has compelled countries to set mitigation targets to curtail carbon emissions. Notwithstanding, stakeholders' effort to implement emission-reduction policies is often constrained by institutional challenges. This study provides new evidence about the dynamic relationship between institutional quality and carbon emissions in 63 industrialised economies. Using a reduced-form energy emission model and the system GMM technique, we exploit four institutional quality measures—favouritism, administrative requirement, licencing restriction and regulatory quality—and analyse their impact on carbon emissions. The results show that institutions play a fundamental role in mitigating carbon emissions. However, the abatement effect depends on the regulatory quality, the extent of favouritism, licencing restrictions and administrative requirements. Our findings reveal that stringent regulations such as licencing restrictions reduce carbon emissions in the short and long run. Administrative requirement such as emission reporting inhibits carbon emission in the short and long run, whereas favouritism worsens it. The results are robust to alternative model specifications. The findings from this study highlight the need for policymakers to pay close attention to favouritism, as it tends to reduce the effectiveness of emission policy regulations. Additionally, we argue for the need for stringent administrative requirements given its critical role in internalising carbon emission intensity in industrialised economies.