网络规制立法问题研究——以言论自由保护为视角

在网络规制过程中,既要实现秩序与安全又要保障公民的言论自由.以言论自由保护为视角观察我国网络规制立法存在的问题会发现,目前,在网络规制立法领域存在立法层级低、立法主体混乱以及立法程序欠缺民主要素等问题.本文分析了网络规制立法的必要性以及存在的问题,并提出了相关的解决思路.     

Medical regulation of cognitive enhancement devices: some concerns

The authors present a cogent and detailed case for altering the Medical Devices Directive to allow regulation of cognitive enhancement devices (CEDs). Protection against significant risk of harm, especially for the vulnerable, and promotion of benefit through informed use of CEDs are all good features of the proposal. However, the pre-market approval process has limitations, which we explore. We raise the possibility of ‘risk compensation’ in response to the introduction of safety measures, which could alter its effectiveness. The proposal alludes to use of ‘formally trained practitioners,’ which provide a further tier of regulation for CEDs within the proposal. We consider some positive and negative implications of this aspect of the proposal that might warrant further consideration.     

试论对民事诉权滥用行为的规制

诉权是公民的一项宪法性权利.但民事诉权的行使一旦超出合法界限,损害他人合法权益,就应当承担相应的法律责任.本文剖析、阐述了民事诉权滥用的内涵以及对民事诉权滥用行为进行规制的理论与现实依据,并就对民事诉权滥用进行规制应注意的问题和如何进行民事诉权滥用规制进行了分析探讨.     

A Better Press: A Response to John Lloyd's ‘Regulate Yourself’

Writing recently in The Political Quarterly, the journalist John Lloyd took issue with regulatory remedies for ‘bad journalism’ in the United Kingdom that were proposed by the Leveson inquiry of 2011–12 and endorsed by Parliament in 2013 in the form of a Royal Charter. State action will fail, he asserted, because only journalists can change journalism, and he urged British journalists to undertake this transformation. This response argues that Lloyd dismisses the Leveson process too lightly and takes too little account of the many victims of press abuses, who are entitled to better protection. A decent society had to do something about this, and the Leveson Charter process was a measured and constructive response that offers the best hope of higher press standards and of protection for ordinary citizens while safeguarding freedom of expression for journalists. Lloyd's proposal for action by journalists, by contrast, is impractical, not least because it ignores powerful forces preventing journalists from taking control.     

Command without control: The case of China's environmental target system

In the existing literature there is general agreement that the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control instruments versus market‐based instruments is highly context specific. A country's particular regulatory environment and state capacity, as well as the features of given environmental problems, play an important role in ascertaining what the “right” set of policy instruments for environmental management might be. This article examines how command and control instruments are used as an environmental enforcement mechanism in China's authoritarian state. Based on extensive fieldwork, this paper shows that the reliance on binding environmental targets as the main domestic policy instrument in China has generated numerous undesirable consequences. While China's target‐based approach to implementation has incentivized local officials to strictly enforce environmental mandates, there are numerous shortcomings in the system. In particular, target rigidity, cyclical behaviour, poor data quality, and the absence of an independent monitoring agency have generated adverse effects and contribute to a yawning gap between regulatory goals and outcomes. The paper concludes that binding environmental targets as the main command–control instrument in China can be more accurately described as “command without control” as the target‐setting central government does not exercise a high degree of control over implementation and monitoring processes. But command and control instruments can be suited for managing “first‐generation” environmental problems and addressing environmental issues that have easily identifiable pollution sources and which are easy to verify.     

The authoritarian logic of regulatory pluralism: Understanding China's new environmental actors

Over the last decade, Chinese citizens, judges, and prosecutors have started to take action against industrial pollution, pluralizing a regulatory landscape originally occupied by administrative agencies. Regulatory pluralism here has an authoritarian logic, occurring without the retreat of party‐state control. Under such logic, the party‐state both needs and fears new actors for their positive and negative roles in controlling risk and maintaining stability. Consequently, the regime's relation to regulatory pluralism is ambivalent, shifting between support and restriction. This prevents a development of a regulatory society that could bypass the regulatory state. Theoretically, this special edition argues for a subjective definition of regulation in a context of pluralism. Moreover, it finds that regulatory pluralism need not coincide with a decentring of regulation. Finally, it highlights how entry onto the regulatory landscape affects the non‐regulatory roles of new actors, creating unintended consequences for regulatory pluralism.     

Turning defiance into compliance with procedural justice: Understanding reactions to regulatory encounters through motivational posturing

This paper uses Braithwaite's motivational posturing framework to explain how individuals react to encounters with regulatory authorities. Of interest is whether procedural justice can reduce defiance and improve self‐reported compliance among individuals who are either resistant or dismissive of regulatory authority. Using longitudinal survey data collected from tax offenders (Study 1), and individuals who had a recent police‐citizen interaction (Study 2), it will be shown that procedural justice can promote compliance behavior. Procedural justice is also found to be effective for reducing resistant forms of defiance over time, but not dismissive defiance. Further, the results reveal that neither resistant defiance nor dismissive defiance moderate the effect of procedural justice on compliance, suggesting procedural justice works equally well for both low and high resisters and low and high disengagers. Finally, an unexpected result reveals that resistance, but not dismissive defiance, mediates the effect of procedural justice on self‐reported compliance behavior. The findings have implications for procedural justice research and for the regulation of defiance.     

Judicial enforcement deputies: Causes and effects of Chinese judges enforcing environmental administrative decisions

This paper explores how and why Chinese courts became involved in regulating pollution by aiding administrative agencies in executing sanction decisions and collecting pollution levies. It also studies the effects of their regulatory involvement, both in terms of deterrence inferred from available information, as well as the compliance behavior of regulated actors defined as payment of regulatory penalties. It finds that judicial involvement in regulatory enforcement proved to be short‐lived and depended on a particular context at a particular period of time when a regulatory need coincided with administrative and financial judicial needs and particular judges. The paper also finds that court involvement enhanced deterrence in terms of certainty of punishment and to some extent the severity of punishment; however that deterrent effect was undermined by the close relationship between the courts and the regulated entities as fines and levies were almost always negotiated. In effect, deterrence increased the number of compliers paying levies without increasing the depth of compliance in terms of their full payment.     

浅论构建能源竞争性市场的法律路径

中国能源市场面临的首要问题就是需要构建能源竞争性市场,以期为未来实现能源发展的最终目标铺平道路。竞争意味着存在合格的产业组织和多元的产权主体,因此,国有企业需要改革升级,民营企业应当被大力引进能源市场。在政治和经济的博弈中,能源法律制度为这个竞争性市场提供了一把保护伞。     

Ignorance is bliss: self-regulation and Ag-Gag laws in the American meat industry

Abstract

In America, we like to say that we live in a democracy. Yet, it is difficult to believe that the majority would allow current practices to continue if citizens knew how the food animals they eat are treated – both during their short lives and during slaughter. The problem is that the citizens don’t know, and it is not a case of willful blindness. Take a moment to recall what you know about our meat industry. Can’t think of much? That is the goal of the meat industry: out of sight, out of mind. In several states, so called ‘Ag-Gag’ laws are designed to keep the truth from the public. In those states, it is a felony to obtain a job with the intent of being a whistle blower. The meat industry knows that if it were to be exposed, the public would demand better treatment of animals, a demand that would decrease profits for the meat industry. This paper will explain these ‘Ag-Gag’ laws in detail, explore their effect on our society, shed light on the practices that the meat industry tries – very successfully – to hide from voters and consumers, and examine the scary results that can occur when an industry is allowed to regulate itself.