百年中国司法权体系的发展进程及现实反思

司法独立是现代法治国家的重要标志之一。司法能否独立,直接取决司法权体系能否独立与完整。我国近代意义上的司法权体系肇始于清末,至今时届百年。在这不算短的历史长河中,司法权体系的发展经历了大陆法系模式、三权分立模式、五权分立模式及社会主义模式,由于缺少良好的政治、社会及文化环境,其独立进程坎坷起伏,障碍重重,难以健康发展,对国家政治稳定及社会秩序造成过巨大负面影响。反思百年中国司法权体系发展的经验和教训,有助于为当下中国建立健全真正独立完整的司法权体系、促进法治社会的建设寻找良策。     

The political and practical obstacles to the reform of the judiciary and the establishment of a rule of law in China

Is China’s “socialist rule by law” (社会主义法制) qualified to be called “rule of law” (法治) or a “thin rule of law” proposed by Randall Peeremboon, without abolishing the political supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of an independent judiciary? Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese legal system and its judiciary have gone through reforms and on the whole modernized. However, the Chinese judiciary still faces many problems, and among them the lack of professional jurists, corruption and local protectionism appear as crucial ones. The current political and institutional arrangements and lack of freedom of the press and freedom of association clearly intensify these problems. “Rule of law” (法治) or “rule by law” (法制) in China is still more often interpreted in the light of the respective political, bureaucratic and economic powers of the parties involved than according to principles of law or equity. The modernization of the legal system will continue, but the political translation of the legal demands of society and the international community will take time to materialize. In the meantime, risks, setbacks and difficulties will continue to prevent China from establishing a truly independent judiciary and what is universally called a rule of law.     

论全球化时代的国家主权保护

经济全球化的发展和不断深入,使国家主权面临日益严峻的冲击。各主权国家为了共享经济全球化的成果,不得不在经济管理、政治决策和国家管辖权等方面让渡部分主权。在经济全球化进程中处于不利地位的发展中国家,必须加强国家主权的保护,树立新的主权观,坚持主权平等, 维护国家利益,以保护自身的安全和独立。     

罪刑法定原则与刑事司法——以“医生受贿案“为视角

罪刑法定原则,是刑法的基本原则,充分体现了对人权的尊重.罪刑法定原则和司法实践是紧密相连的,文章分析了医生收受回扣行为的性质,认为在我国确立罪刑法定的原则,必须摆脱情理、民愤对司法的影响,正确对待法律的滞后性,树立人权神圣的理念.     

香港基本法的解释权——刍议全国人大常委会和香港法院在基本法解释上的关系

香港基本法的解释对于保证基本法的正确平稳实施具有重要作用,而关于基本法解释权的问题在最近的三次案例中都引起了颇多争议。本文先对有关的法律条文进行演绎分析,从而论证基本法的解释权归于全国人大常委会,香港法院可以解释基本法是缘于授权,对于自治范围外的条款需要提请常委会解释。再通过对比内地的法律解释体系和欧盟的先行裁决制度,并借助“法克坦姆案”来说明这样的制度设计无损于香港的司法独立。     

农民的市场主体地位:实现农民组织化的基点

人是一切经济行为的核心所在。农民组织化和发展合作经济是以“行为主体”的一定素质为前提的,即商品生产者自由个性的觉醒、经济理性的成熟,作为契约主体的独立人格的存在以及社会交换关系的发达。而这一前提的获得,是需要确立农民在经济市场化过程的市场主体地位,促使其个体主体的“主体性自由”的实现。为此,政府的制度设计和进行制度安排时应遵循的理念是:市场机制和政府适度干预并重;理顺现行农村各种经济体之间的关系;对农业经济支持与建立农村社会保障体系并重。也只有这样才能给农民组织化营造一种自主性的空间,而且这也是农民理性由传统“生存理性”转向现代“发展理性”的内在规定。     

法官独立探微

本文从法官独立的内涵出发,探讨现代社会中制约法官独立的种种因素,提出应建立保障法官独立的各项制度。     

刑事辩护律师与正义的实现

刑事辩护律师应忠实地维护犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的合法权益,承担服务于法律和正义事业的责任.但是在实现正义的过程中,刑事辩护律师只能维护"部分正义",这体现了程序正当与实体真实的矛盾.本文通过辩护律师与法官职责的对比、理论基础的分析来论证这一观点,并从维护被控人权益、实现控辩双方平衡、保证律师职业独立等角度探讨了这一观点的实践意义.     

Are regulatory agencies independent in practice? Evidence from board members in Spain

Are the board members of regulatory agencies (regulators), taken as a particular cluster within the public sphere, independent of elected politicians and tenured bureaucrats? How can we assess their independence in practice, beyond formal rules? To address these questions, this paper delves into two key dimensions: board members' social connections and their security of tenure in office. Firstly, we focus on regulators' identity as policy adjudicators and examine their political and administrative relations. In doing so, we expect to understand better how regulators' social and political situations may influence their behavior. Secondly, we assess their political vulnerability through political cycles in order to measure their de facto independence over time. Additionally, variations in these two dimensions are compared with respect to the effect of different de jure appointment rules. We contrast these expectations with the empirical evaluation of board members of regulatory agencies in Spain (1979–2010). Thus, we confirm that regulators who have an administrative profile are more vulnerable to political changes than those with political ties, while appointment rules have an influence on their political vulnerability.     

Formal independence of regulatory agencies and Varieties of Capitalism: A case of institutional complementarity?

The Varieties of Capitalism literature posits that national economic institutions reflect the mode of coordination of a country's market actors. Despite the importance of this claim and a rich literature on the emergence of regulatory capitalism, few studies test such prediction for Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs). This article connects the two fields of research by analysing the impact of economic coordination on the formal independence of IRAs. The results show that, beyond issues of credible commitment and policy stability, the collective action capacity of market actors matters. In particular, regulators in Coordinated Market Economies enjoy less independence than in Liberal Market Economies, while intermediate regimes grant IRAs the least autonomy. The policy implications are nontrivial. Similar to other macroeconomic institutions, inappropriate combinations of economic coordination and IRA independence may engender Pareto‐suboptimal regulatory solutions. In such cases, policymakers should reconsider the rules governing national regulators.