债权人追究股东出资责任的法律问题

我国公司法没有规定债权人可以追究股东出资责任的条款,但司法实践中债权人诉请股东承担出资责任的情况时有发生。本文介绍了我国及美国、德国、法国、日本、澳门等国家或地区对此类纠纷的相关做法,着重分析了债权人追究股东出资责任的五种理论,指出在我国的公司法中应明确:股东的出资义务为法定之债;债权人对股东应向公司行的法定之债享有代位求偿权;股东应以出资为限承担责任。     

经济法立法权初探

经济法立法权具有主体的多元性、涉及范围的广泛性、行使中有较强的政策性取向等特征。依据不同的标准可以将经济法立法权分为明示的经济法立法权和默示的经济法立法权,中央经济法立法权和地方经济法立法权,以及职权经济法立法权和授权经济法立法权。     

论外资国民待遇标准与中国外资立法政策的调适

随着经济全球化、投资自由化趋势的日益增强 ,外资国民待遇标准的处延有逐步拓展、并在形式上有专门多边条约调整的趋势。我国改革开放以来过分依赖给予外资优惠的立法政策已显现出负面影响 ,为因应国际投资自由化和我国经济转型的需要 ,我国的外资立法应采取以维护内外资公平竞争环境为价值取向的政策。     

影响罪刑法定原则司法化若干问题之探析

罪刑法定原则纳入我国刑法典,具有划时代意义。但罪刑法定原则司法化在我国仍任重而道远。不能正确解读该原则,在观念上存在误区;刑法规则的模糊性与欠合理有违罪刑法定原则之要求;实践中相关制度与罪刑法定原则相冲突,这一切都严重地影响罪刑法定原则的贯彻落实。     

对我国通信侦控的法律思考

通信侦控是目前行之有效的侦查工作方式之一,属于强制性侦查措施,我国相关法律对通信侦控的主体、目的、范围、对象、方式方法、法律程序等方面及其他事项作了一些规定,但存在着立法滞后等诸多问题,因此要加强立法,对上述问题进行规范和制约。     

构建我国立法效果评估制度

我国的立法机关注重立法前的调研和论证,对立法后的实际效果缺乏有效的评估论证,某些法律法规部分被执行或落实的不彻底的现象严重存在,影响了法律的严肃性和权威性.因此,必须建立和完善具有中国特色的立法效果评估制度.     

上市公司自愿性信息披露的法律规制

上市公司自愿性信息披露是强制性信息披露的有效补充，上市公司基于寻求信息租金的逐利性考虑，存在进行自愿性信息披露的动机。由于立法不够健全和上市公司自身存在的问题，我国上市公司自愿性信息披露还存在着较多不规范性问题，因此，从立法、执法、司法等角度对上市公司自愿性信息披露进行鼓励、保护和监管是有效引导上市公司自愿性信息披露有效运作的制度条件。     

论行政合同的基本特性

行政合同是行政主体为直接实现行政的目的或单纯为行政事务与他方订立的合同。在行政主体合同权利的限制、行政主体在合同中的特权、合同的瑕疵与救济方面,行政合同均存在有别于普通合同的特性。这些特性意味着行政合同具备自身存在的理论基础和实践价值。     

Service Quality Effects of Incentive Regulation on Access Service in Telecommunications in the United States

Incentive regulation in the form of price caps was adopted for interstate access service in 1991 as a way to provide local exchange carriers with an incentive to improve their productive efficiency. An issue that has arisen with the adoption of price cap regulation is whether deterioration in service quality for interstate access service has been an unintended consequence. The analysis in this paper uses several different measures of service quality, including the average installation interval, the percent of commitments met, total trouble reports, and the average repair interval for both switched access service and special access service, to investigate empirically whether there has been a decline in service quality between 1991 and 2000. The results are conclusive. Overall service quality has fallen. To rectify the situation, a proposal is offered to adjust the price cap index to penalize LECs who fail to provide an acceptable level of aggregate service quality.     

Economic incentives for the self-regulation of the release of price-sensitive information

Companies, as primary disseminators of information, and financial institutions, as major recipients, have economic incentives to self-regulate the transmission and usage of price-sensitive information. These include increased (lost) reputation costs and adverse share price penalties arising from poor management of information disclosure. The economic motivation for self-regulation is seen as conceptually linked to but distinct from legislative changes. Self-regulation has the strong support of economic efficiency arguments, whereas recent additional new legislative changes do not. This article examines a major corporate and institutional response to the new regulatory climate—to internalize part of the regulatory process during their regular relationship communications. Relationships between the case companies and institutions already exist for transaction purposes. They are used as a convenient and low-cost means to pursue self-regulation and to avoid errors of price-sensitive information release. This self-regulatory process is illustrated using case material. It is clear from the response pattern presented that the development of a self-regulatory framework by the parties has been an iterative one. The corporate and institutional systems that have been evolving seem to be significantly influenced by the regulatory trends. The regulatory changes appear to have played a role in increasing market costs incurred by those companies with poor stock market communication practices. The article ends by arguing that new proposals to change in the formal regulatory system should recognize that further legislation is unlikely to improve the poor prosecution record. Nevertheless, legislative changes can combine with and buttress the self-regulation process to create an effective regulatory system.