Economic incentives for the self-regulation of the release of price-sensitive information

Companies, as primary disseminators of information, and financial institutions, as major recipients, have economic incentives to self-regulate the transmission and usage of price-sensitive information. These include increased (lost) reputation costs and adverse share price penalties arising from poor management of information disclosure. The economic motivation for self-regulation is seen as conceptually linked to but distinct from legislative changes. Self-regulation has the strong support of economic efficiency arguments, whereas recent additional new legislative changes do not. This article examines a major corporate and institutional response to the new regulatory climate—to internalize part of the regulatory process during their regular relationship communications. Relationships between the case companies and institutions already exist for transaction purposes. They are used as a convenient and low-cost means to pursue self-regulation and to avoid errors of price-sensitive information release. This self-regulatory process is illustrated using case material. It is clear from the response pattern presented that the development of a self-regulatory framework by the parties has been an iterative one. The corporate and institutional systems that have been evolving seem to be significantly influenced by the regulatory trends. The regulatory changes appear to have played a role in increasing market costs incurred by those companies with poor stock market communication practices. The article ends by arguing that new proposals to change in the formal regulatory system should recognize that further legislation is unlikely to improve the poor prosecution record. Nevertheless, legislative changes can combine with and buttress the self-regulation process to create an effective regulatory system.     

Corporate Governance: Towards a Theory of Regulatory Shift

Providing effective corporate governance regulation and controls is a contemporary challenge to all law makers. There exists a need to restore investor confidence while seeking to facilitate and encourage enterprise. This paper reflects on the traditional choice between shareholder versus stakeholder models of corporate governance and suggests that these are inappropriate in the light of emerging news theories of the firm. Instead this paper suggests that law makers should accommodate a shift away from the traditional paradigms of these models in favour of a processual approach of governance. This would require a recognition of the tensions that exist in the regulation of corporate governance and invite the application of a collibratory process to the control of governance. The development and reform of directors’ duties and liabilities, in the UK, is provided as an illustration of the need for the recognised application of a collibratory process. Within that we also consider the application of the economists concept of ‘rent-seeking’ and the conflict between private property rights and public interference.JEL M14, D72, K22, K33     

迈向合作治理:通过法律规制平台经济的制度边界及优化

通过法律规制平台经济的过程,其实质是在治理平台经济发展带来的负面性问题。借助法律多元主义理论视角分析平台经济发展的制度供给,会发现国家法律与平台规则共同构成平台经济发展的制度约束与保障,同时也是平台治理的重要制度资源。任何一项制度资源的投入会随着制度实施的环境条件以及制度执行者的价值观念变化而产生制度成本与效益的边际效应,这就为国家法律与平台规则的功能范围设定了制度边界,因而需要优化配置制度资源的投入和组合。而国家法律和平台规则的互嵌性,以及国家法律与平台规则在服务于平台经济创新发展的目标耦合性,也就决定了国家法律和平台规则之间存在制度合作的空间。因此在平台经济治理中,通过审慎评估国家法律在平台经济领域的实施效果,有效吸纳平台规则的治理优势,优化政府监管执法资源投入,可以有效形成合作治理的平台经济秩序。     

“正当程序”作为行政程序司法审查标准的立法建议

《行政诉讼法》第54条规定,具体行政行为违反法定程序将导致撤销或部分撤销,并可以判决被告重新作出具体行政行为。《行政诉讼法》对行政程序的要求改变了"重实体、轻程序"的执法模式。把"法定程序"作为司法审查标准有很大局限性,本文建议将司法审查标准提升为"正当程序"标准。     

论行政垄断的法律规制

行政垄断已经成为阻碍我国市场经济发展的最大障碍,对其进行治理根除,已经迫在眉睫.行政垄断存在双重违法性,其本质特征是行政权的膨胀和对私权的干预.行政垄断规制悖论的产生,理论根源在于经济法、行政法部门法划分理论上的内在冲突以及由此造成的法律调整范围上的重叠.因此在对行政垄断进行规制时要坚持法律规制为主,系统监督和党纪监督辅助结合、反垄断法与行政法互相配合以及坚持结构、行为与结果认定行政垄断三原则,在具体的法律规制中通过调整反垄断法对行政垄断范围的界定、调整行政诉讼法和宪法时抽象行政垄断行为的规制以及建立行政垄断的责任制度来逐步根除行政垄断,加快我国市场经济的完善和发展.     

农民专业合作社政府规制体系——基于法约尔企业管理理论的探讨

政府规制是政府为了维护公众利益和纠正市场失灵而规范市场主体活动的行为。农民专业合作社是因提高农民组织化程度而具有广泛正外部效应的特殊市场主体,如何认识、规范并推动其发展,就成为政府规制研究领域的重要议题。本文借鉴法约尔企业管理理论的经典归纳,构建了农民专业合作社政府规制体系和分析框架,沿着农民专业合作社经营所涉及的管理活动、商业活动、技术活动、资本活动、会计活动和安全活动等六条清晰线索,将合作社本质特征所决定的不同于营利性企业的经营特点考量在内,以目前政府相关规制政策为依据,创设了农民专业合作社的政府规制体系,并从中国农民专业合作社现实出发,概括了每项规制的内涵及构成,试图为研究中国农民专业社及政府规制提供一套有效的分析框架。     

别居制度之比较研究——兼谈我国别居制度的设立

别居制度作为一项现代婚姻家庭制度,其在调整夫妻关系,维护家庭和睦稳定方面发挥着不可小觑的作用,我国《婚姻法》应在保障离婚自由的前提下建立别居制度,赋予婚姻当事人在特定条件下申请协议别居或司法别居的权利,明确别居的申请程序、期限、效力及终止条件等,以解决目前过度的离婚自由带来的社会问题。     

Judiciaries as crucial actors in Southern regulatory systems: A case study of Indian telecom regulation

This article addresses regulatory reforms in the Indian telecommunications sector and emphasizes the role of the Indian judiciary. Our claim is that when confronted with a series of disputes relating to the nascent telecom regulatory landscape, the Supreme Court of India sought to make a constructive contribution to both the actual disputes as well as the overall regulatory framework. Our reading of these cases suggests that in the sphere of telecom, the Supreme Court has been less interested in stamping its own authority on issues, and has instead sought to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the recently constituted telecom regulatory institutions. We seek to draw attention to the role of the Indian judiciary as marking an exceptional feature of evolving regulatory systems in the Global South. Conventional wisdom in the regulatory jurisprudence that has evolved in the Global North suggests that judiciaries should have little or no role to play in regulatory systems. We suggest that to overcome the special challenges that regulatory systems in the Global South confront, more established institutions and actors might have to lend credibility and legitimacy to enable nascent regulatory actors to develop over time. At least in the Indian case, this is one way to understand the Indian judiciary's interventionist actions in the sphere of telecom regulation.     

The political economy of regulatory change: The case of British merger control

This article aims to explain the broader evolution of British merger control. To this end it outlines a novel critical political economy perspective on regulation and regulatory change which differs from established political economy approaches, such as the regulatory capitalism/state perspectives, in three main ways: it places regulatory ideas at the heart of the analysis, it differentiates between different degrees of regulatory change, and it links regulatory change in delineated issue areas with changing power balances between fractions of capital and labor. The application of this perspective to the analysis of the evolution of British merger control provides some important new insights, most notably that the content, form, and scope of merger control in Britain have been deeply transformed in accordance with neoliberal ideas since the 1980s and that this process, which was part of a broader regulatory and ideational shift, was premised on the ascendancy of transnational capital.