侦查讯问的博弈性探究

博弈论是研究理性行动者相互作用的形式理论,它正深入到经济学、政治学等社会科学,其原理也被广泛应用于这些学科。侦查讯问学本身也是一门研究参与双方决策互动的应用学科。讯问双方存在利益均衡点,运用讯问策略体现了博弈论原理,犯罪嫌疑人在讯问中面临不同“期望支付”的抉择,侦查讯问实际上是一个信息不对称的博弈。讯问的博弈性充分说明供述原理存在着博弈论根据。     

地方保护主义:地方与中央的博弈关系

地方保护主义造成了种种危害,只有通过转变政府职能、有效划分事权和加强法制建设的对策性措施,才能从根本上解决地方保护主义这一棘手难题,使中央与地方关系走上健康发展的轨道。     

Digital Game Playing and Direct and Indirect Aggression in Early Adolescence: The Roles of Age,Social Intelligence,and Parent-Child Communication

The roles of age, social intelligence and parent-child communication in moderating the association between digital game playing and direct and indirect aggression were examined in 478 Finnish 10- and 13-year-old schoolchildren based on self-reports. The results confirmed that digital game violence was directly associated with direct aggression, especially at age 10, but only among boys. The moderating role of social intelligence was substantiated among older boys: game violence was associated with indirect aggression among those with high level of social intelligence. Further, as hypothesized, digital game playing was associated with direct aggression especially when parent-child communication was poor, but only among boys. Our findings emphasize the importance of individual and situational factors as moderators of the link between game violence and aggression.     

国际贸易谈判的政治经济分析:一个初步的框架(6)

加入WTO将给中国的改革开放进程带来深远的影响,也将会对中国的经济管理体制改革和政府管理体制改革带来巨大的挑战。对国际政治经济学有关贸易与国内政治的研究、国际贸易理论关于贸易政策之形成的研究、国际关系理论和博弈论关于国际谈判的研究进行了评述,并从国际政治经济学的角度提出分析国际贸易谈判的一个初步的分析框架。通过强调国内政治、策略行为和国际规则的重要性,并从公民政策偏好的形成、利益集团集体行动、两国贸易谈判之间的双层博弈、国际规则的制约因素等多方面讨论了如何分析贸易谈判。     

互联网平台企业劳动用工策略的博弈分析

互联网平台企业中多元化的用工方式和灵活自主的用工制度强力冲击着传统劳动关系的边界,其便利的监管手段和大数据分析功能在某种程度上进一步加剧企业与劳动者地位不对等的程度,致使企业与劳动者关系不和谐、平台劳动者的身份难以明晰、劳动者的合法权益也未能得到有效的保护。目前司法实践、管理学界在保护平台劳动者的合法劳动权益、互联网平台企业与平台劳动者的关系类型及互联网平台企业的用工策略选择等问题上均未有定论。本文通过文献梳理总结出互联网平台企业和平台劳动者之间存在的劳动关系和劳务合作关系,并从合同法角度加以佐证。在此基础上构建企业与劳动者博弈收益分析模型,以及二者在劳动、劳务合作关系下的演化博弈模型和政府介入的有限博弈模型,发现互联网平台企业与平台劳动者的具体收益取决于双方的关系类型和相关参数的变化。     

The Ground Game in the 2012 Presidential Election

Relatively little research has examined the effects of campaign-led field activity in a competitive election. In this article, we leverage a unique data set containing the location of every Barack Obama and Mitt Romney field office and county-level data on the presidential vote to understand how communication with voters in the field may have affected the outcome of the 2012 presidential election. We find that the presence of Obama field offices was associated with greater Obama vote share at the county level, although we cannot detect a similar relationship for Romney field offices. We conduct additional robustness tests to address the potential limitations of these observational data. Ultimately, we conclude that even if Obama’s field organization out-performed Romney’s, the aggregate impact of Obama’s field organization was not large enough to determine the outcome of the 2012 presidential election.     

关于生物资源开发与可持续发展的博弈分析

通过对生物资源开发与可持续发展所涉及的核心利益相关者（环保部门和农户或企业）的动态博弈分析,得到均衡解,并对均衡解围绕其经济利益展开,进一步分析得到众多结论：农民（企业）在收益下降时会加大对生物资源的不可持续开发;政府、公众和舆论媒体要加大对环保部门的监督;环保部门在存在寻租的情况下,偏向降低处罚力度,让农户过度开发,从中得到贿赂;要确保生物资源合理利用而不被毁灭性的开发,政府部门除了监管要到位,还要对为保护生物资源而承受的贫困给予补偿等。     

Strategic Interaction in the 1994 and Earlier Cuban Refugee Crises

The 1994 Cuban refugee crisis is modeled as a prisoners' dilemma game for Cuba and the United States. A threat power version of the theory of moves yields a cooperative outcome in the game, sustained by mutual threats that deter defections by each player, which is consistent with moves made by the players. After the countries implemented deterrent threats, they agreed that Cuba would patrol its borders and the United States would admit 20,000 Cubans each year. We show that the analysis, suitably adapted, also illuminates strategic choices in the 1965 and 1980 Cuban refugee crises.     

Can Unilateral Leadership Promote International Environmental Cooperation?

Why do governments sometimes exercise unilateral leadership in international environmental cooperation, such as the mitigation of global climate change? It is usually the case that unilateral leadership cannot solve the problem at hand, so it is not clear what the benefits of unilateral leadership are. In this article, I provide a new political rationale for unilateral leadership. I show that if a green politician (worried about environmental destruction) fears that he or she will probably lose power soon, he or she may want to unilaterally implement domestic mitigation policies to reduce the domestic cost of mitigation in the future. By exercising unilateral leadership, this politician ensures that even a future brown politician (only mildly interested in environmental protection) is, due to the domestic cost reduction, willing to engage in international cooperation. The findings imply that while unilateral leadership is not a panacea, it may be a useful commitment device under empirically plausible conditions.     

审美的智力游戏——试论博尔赫斯幻想小说的艺术构思

博尔赫斯以其幻想小说创作的艺术构思为之后的创作者打开了创造性空间,在他的小说中,利用玄思玄想来触摸真实/虚幻的边界,借助“迷宫故事”实现对语言媒介的自指/自反,以及通过对时间中穿行的视觉化表达,达到对传统文学母题的某种“破坏性重述”,使得小说创作成为一场审美的智力游戏。