Interest Arbitration in the Federal Service

The binding decisions of the Federal Service Impasses Panel are examined through logistic regression and discriminate function analysis. A sample of eighty-four issues decided by the Panel between 1987 and 1999 were coded for content to identify factors influencing Panel decision making. Seven standards are posited as having influence over Panel decisions. The article concludes that the decision processes of the Panel are subject to various arguments used by labor and management, and the impact of these processes on Panel decision making varies by party. Further, final offer procedures are the dominant procedure used by the Panel. Finally, it appears the Panel may weight the arguments of the parties differently depending on the issue in dispute.     

Low Power,First Offers,and Reservation Prices: Weak Negotiators are Self-anchored by Their Own Alternatives

Although most scholars recommend making the first offer in negotiations, recent research and practitioners' experience have uncovered a second-mover advantage in certain situations. In the current article, we explore this first- versus second-mover dynamic by investigating the circumstances under which negotiators would make less favorable first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on the effects of negotiation power in the form of alternatives. Additionally, we examine the effects of low power on reservation prices and whether these effects could be mitigated using an anchor-debiasing technique. In Study 1, we manipulated negotiators' power in the form of the best alternative to the negotiated agreement and examined its effect on first offers and reservation prices. Our results showed that low-power negotiators would receive more favorable first offers than they would have made themselves when facing either low- or medium-power counterparts. Also, our results suggest that low-power negotiators had less favorable reservation prices than their medium- and high- power counterparts. In Study 2, we investigated whether this effect would persist in the face of anchor-debiasing techniques. Our results showed that while anchor-debiasing techniques did improve their first offers, low-power negotiators would still benefit from making the counteroffer rather than moving first. Our findings uncover the disadvantageous effects of low power on first-offer magnitude while offering practical advice to negotiators.