备用信用证法律特征之考察

备用信用证的本质是银行对受益人承担偿付的直接允诺 ,它具有不可撤销性、独立性、单据性、强制性的特征。备用信用证与银行独立保证和跟单商业信用证在许多方面都有不同。     

Living in a Policy State: From Trust for Sale to Trust of Land

The Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996has transformed the nature of co-ownership interests in land.The trust for sale, which governed dealings in co-ownedproperty under the Law of Property Act 1925, and whichmade sale the presumptive object of co-ownership, has been replaced by a trust of land, under which co-owners retainan interest in the land itself, rather than its capital value.This article considers the likely impact of this legislativepolicy departure, particularly in relation to the court'swillingness to grant an order for the sale of co-owned propertyon application by a creditor, and against the wishes of anon-debtor co-owner occupier.     

关联合同中产生于买卖合同的抗辩权对贷款合同的适用性问题——从一则案例看德国消费信贷法抗辩权延伸制度

随着我国商品房买卖纠纷案件的不断发生,司法实践面临着诸多难以解决的新问题,其中一个重要问题就是在信贷消费中产生于买卖合同的抗辩权是否可以适用于与其构成关联合同的贷款合同的问题.作为消费信贷法中的一项重要制度,德国消费信贷法的抗辩权延伸制度赋予消费者在买卖合同与贷款合同构成关联合同的情况下,以买卖合同所产生的对销售者的抗辩权来对抗贷款合同中的贷款人的权利.这一制度安排使消费者不至于因为关联合同中买卖合同与贷款合同的分离而承担比传统买卖合同更大的风险,致力于消费者保护.     

上海开展"学分银行"教学改革工作的启示

因应社会经济发展对教育创新的需要,提高职业教育的辐射能力和服务能力成为一项重要课题。上海市将高等职业教育的改革、“学分银行”的构建作为推进学习型城市建设、完善终身教育体系的重要载体,并采用集团化办学方式创新职业教育发展模式。上海市关于“学分银行”教学改革的构想和实践对于北京市成人高等职业教育改革的理论研究和试点工作具有很强的借鉴价值。     

Demand for credit,international financial legitimacy,and vulnerability to crises: Regulatory change and the social origins of Iceland's collapse

By analyzing how credit in Iceland expanded to culminate in the country's 2008 financial collapse, this article advances theories about financial crises, regulatory change, and the role of credit. It also complicates popular accounts of Iceland's collapse that focus on the actions of unrestrained bankers by examining the larger context that facilitated these banking practices. After financial liberalization, Icelandic businesses and households had strong demand for credit as a result of: (i) the institutional meaning of credit, (ii) an emergent growth strategy of aggressive international expansion, and (iii) increasing consumption. Incorporating business demand for credit extends demand‐side theory of crises and shows how dominant strategy and shared government and business orientation toward opportunity shaped credit expansion. Credit‐based consumption also stabilized social relations despite increasing inequality. Notwithstanding warnings of risk, regulation did not restrain risky leverage. International market reactions reinforced beliefs about Icelandic success to limit regulatory reach, as Iceland's international financial legitimacy produced market‐based measures that leaders interpreted as signals of economic success.     

The role of rural indebtedness in the evolution of capitalism

Few studies have attempted to systematize the broader consequences of ordinary indebtedness – the inevitable other side of credit. My purpose here is to suggest four preliminary theses on the role of indebtedness in the evolution of capitalism, with special reference to the rural sphere. I argue that across time and space, credit/debt relations have not only been a key factor behind social differentiation through the control of land, labour and capital (Thesis I). They have also fostered market discipline by forcing the borrower – whether a poor peasant or a company manager – to calculate, pay, trade, work, intensify (Thesis II). Interest-bearing and guarantee-based loans have thus generated pressures for economic growth, short-termism and innovations, but have also undermined traditional community bonds and environmental conditions (Thesis III). Through its remarkable reward-or-punish nature, the credit/debt couple represents a powerful mechanism of social selection that has, in the long run, crucially shaped the evolution of capitalism (Thesis IV).     

"诚信"的自律与他律研究

崇尚诚信是和谐社会建设的重大问题,如何加强诚信建设,应首先对诚信的自律与他律机制进行研究,诚信的自律与他律机制的失灵,导致了我国在许多方面出现诚信危机,严重影响社会和谐.诚信的自律与他律机制的特点和失灵,既有历史文化的原因、又有思维方式的原因,同时还有现代化的原因.重构现代诚信机制须吸取先人及外国人的经验,从多方面入手揭示诚信的自律和他律.     

关于地方政府融资平台贷款的深层思考

地方政府融资平台在促进地方经济发展,缓解资金紧张中发挥了特殊的作用,但其融资信贷风险等问题也逐步凸显。文章对地方政府融资平台的各种争论进行了比较研究,并对全面评估和有效防范地方政府融资平台风险提出了建议。     

Capital Account Liberalization,Financial Structure,and Access to Credit in Latin America

This article revisits the question of whether capital account liberalization improves access to credit by advancing and testing a theory of how the structure of the financial sector shapes the willingness and ability of banks and governments to repress the domestic financial sector. In a highly concentrated financial sector, banks and governments are more willing to reap the benefits of financial openness by suppressing liberalizing reforms to domestic financial policies, and they can also better coordinate with one another to stifle these reforms compared to when the financial sector is diffuse. Using a panel dataset of Latin American and Caribbean countries, I find that capital account liberalization leads to a decrease in loans to private firms and households and an increase in loans to governments and state-owned enterprises when the financial sector is highly concentrated. Only when the financial sector is diffuse does capital account liberalization lead to reforms in entry barriers, directed credit programs, and banking sector supervision, which extends to improved access to credit for private firms and households.     

Debt in just societies: A general framework for regulating credit

Debt presents a dilemma to societies: successful societies benefit from a substantial infrastructure of consumer, commercial, corporate, and sovereign debt but debt can cause substantial private and social harm. Pre‐crisis and post‐crisis solutions have seesawed between subsidizing and restricting debt, between leveraging and deleveraging. A consensus exists among governments and international financial institutions that financial stability is the fundamental normative principle underlying financial regulation. Financial stability, however, is insensitive to equality concerns and can produce morally impermissible aggregations in which the least advantaged in a society are made worse off. Solutions based only on financial stability can restrict debt without accounting for the risk of harm to persons least able to bear the risk, worsen preexisting inequalities, destroy or impair the net worth of households, and impose unfavorable distributive consequences. This article offers a new approach to assist policymakers in developing and evaluating regulation to take criteria in addition to financial stability into account, but which do not undermine the aim of financial stability. It calls for a luck egalitarian approach, offering policymakers options to take the debtor's choices into account while still accounting for cognitive mistakes people often make in debt decisionmaking. It offers a general framework for the underlying principles for the regulation of debt: its focus is not on any particular forms of debt or its regulation but in structuring debt regulation more generally. It offers a set of recommendations on how regulators can take concerns about luck and equality into account in regulatory design.