Is Any Publicity Good Publicity? Media Coverage,Party Institutions,and Authoritarian Power-Sharing

Existing literature identifies nonofficial media as a tool for rulers to gather information from below. We argue that such media also help identify threats among elites. Motivated by profit, partially free media tend to cover politicians who challenge implicit norms of the regime. These political elites are perceived as threats to the power-sharing status quo, which leads peers to sanction them. We test this argument with evidence from the Chinese Communist Party’s intraparty elections of alternate Central Committee members in 2012 and 2007. With Bayesian rank likelihood models, we find that candidates who appeared more frequently in various partially free media received fewer votes from the Party Congress delegates, and this pattern is robust after accounting for a series of alternative explanations. Detailed case studies also show that low-ranked candidates have more partially free media coverage because they broke party norms.     

Civil War Settlements,Size of Governing Coalition,and Durability of Peace in Post–Civil War States

We examine the ways in which the size of the governing coalition in a post–civil war state affects the durability of the peace. Previous studies relate the durability of the peace to the outcome of the civil war, the extent and forms of power-sharing arrangements, and the role of third-party security guarantors. We argue that the way conflict terminates and the power-sharing agreements between former protagonists structure the composition of governing coalition in the post–civil war state. Any settlement to civil war that broadens the size of the governing coalition should increase actors' incentives to sustain the peace rather than renew the armed conflict. Peace is more likely to fail where the governing coalition is smaller because those excluded from the governing coalition have little to lose from resuming armed rebellion. To test these propositions, we analyze data on post–civil war peace spells from 1946–2005.     

宗族组织与乡村权力结构--赣南和粤东两个村镇个案的研究

中国农村的宗族组织是基于自然的世系关系和地缘关系而形成的一种有漫长历史的乡村组织。新中国成立后,宗族在形式上已经消失,而实际上却仍然存在于乡村生活的许多层面。20世纪80年代以后,随着农村改革的发展,宗族出现了复兴和重建的现象。赣南和粤东两个村镇具有典型性个案的研究,说明了宗族对不断变化的社会政治经济和文化环境的适应,及其在乡村权力结构体系中的角色和地位。     

Sharing Power and Faking Governance? Lebanese State and Non-State Institutions during the War in Syria

ABSTRACT

The war in Syria has caused both external and internal pressures on the Lebanese political system and state institutions. Yet, the Lebanese power-sharing system rests on a set of institutional mechanisms, both state and non-state, which allow its politicians to continue to govern, even in this tumultuous situation, and to respond to crisis. Empirical evidence on how policies were negotiated concerning security, elections, and refugees between 2012 and 2018 shows an interaction between state and non-state institutions and highlights the role of such mechanisms in power-sharing institutions.     

Succession,power-sharing and the development of representative institutions in medieval Europe

Historians have documented that in medieval Europe, bargaining over the loyalty of lay magnates and high clergy was most intense during successions and that this often forced monarchs to give political concessions. We argue that matters related to succession predict short-term power-sharing concessions by rulers but that – because they do not permanently alter the balance of power between ruler and elite – they only trigger lasting changes of political institutions if these changes are in the mutual interest of the ruler and the elite groups. It follows that successions are unlikely to have long-term effects on representative institutions but that they may consolidate the rules regulating succession (the succession order). Using the natural deaths of monarchs as an instrument for successions, we confirm these claims with a new dataset that includes fine-grained data on succession and parliament-like assemblies in 16 European polities between 1000 and 1600. These findings shed new light on the development of representative institutions in medieval Europe, on the changes in succession orders that brought about clear rules about primogeniture and on the political leeway of legislatures in authoritarian regimes more generally.