The wild (white) ones: comparing frames of white and black deviance

In this case study, I establish how a racial privilege shields whites from being framed as deviant by using two racially segregated motorcycle rallies as a naturalistic experiment. I conduct a content analysis of reader posts to online newspaper stories about the biker events (which regularly include deviance) and discover the bikers, their behaviors, and the proposed community reactions are framed in nearly opposite ways. Posters attribute a ‘white innocence’ to white bikers, framing them as upper class exemplars of American Individualism who temporarily suspend their morality during the rally by drinking, exposing their nude bodies, and ignoring newly passed laws, banning loud mufflers, and requiring helmets. Posters claim these unpleasant, although non-dangerous forms of deviance can be ignored, overlooked, and even celebrated as defiant acts against authority. The white innocence can appear racially innocuous until compared to the perception of black bikers who engage in similar behaviors at their rally but are framed as underclass criminals who attend the rally to steal and murder. This reveals how a usually unseen privilege shields whites from entanglements with the criminal justice system, as posters also call for further policing of racial minorities.     

Selection and Incentives in the Electoral Security‐Constituency Communication Relationship

The relative importance of selection and incentives is essential for understanding how elections structure politicians’ behavior. I investigate the relative magnitudes of these two effects in the context of US House members’ constituency communication. Consistent with previous research, I find that there is a negative cross‐sectional relationship between electoral security and the intensity of constituency communication. The negative relationship holds in a panel‐data setting where only within‐legislator variation in electoral security is used to identify the effect of electoral security on legislator behavior. Due to the likely presence of myopic voters, the impact of electoral security increases as the election approaches. Point estimates suggest that the total effect is almost entirely driven by incentives, and I am able to reject the hypothesis that the incentive effect is zero at conventional levels of statistical significance.