加强虚假出资民事责任追究

在虚假出资问题上,现存的法律责任追究方式仍未能从根本上弥补债权人的损失,同时容易滋生公司法人人格滥用等种种弊端。虚假出资民事责任可分为公司实有资本已达最低注册资本要求以及来达最低资本要求两种情况区别对待,它更加注重对债权人权益的保护。     

论中小股东利益保护制度

公平效率、诚实信用是中小股东权利保护的理论依据，我国就借鉴国外的立法经验对中小股东权利保护制度予以完善。     

我国股东代表诉讼制度评判与适用——兼评《公司法解释(二)(征求意见稿)》的相关规定

为使我国2005年《公司法》及《公司法解释(二)(征求意见稿)》所确立的股东代表诉讼制度得到正确理解与适用,有必要对其作深入的理论研究与学理解释。在股东代表诉讼制度中,以下问题需要作深入的理论评判:股东代表诉讼的原告、股东代表诉讼的被告、公司在股东代表诉讼中的地位、其他股东在股东代表诉讼中的地位、股东代表诉讼的前置程序、股东代表诉讼的管辖、诉讼费用担保制度、对原告股东诉讼权利的限制、股东代表诉讼的法律后果、股东代表诉讼的案件性质与诉讼费用的缴纳、诉讼费用补偿制度。通过比较研究与学理解释,为上述问题提供了具体可行的解释与法律适用方案。     

我国股东代表诉讼制度建立的法理基础和基本思路

股东代表诉讼的诉权基础是共益权,股东代表诉讼的当事人适格必须结合股东代表诉讼判决的对世效力一并予以考虑。在当事人适格方面,决定原告资格的惟一条件是股东的公正性和代表性;被告的适格问题必须与公司的诉讼地位一并考虑,公司在股东代表诉讼中处于共同诉讼的参加人。由于股东代表诉讼涉及到公司的利益,且代表公司行使诉权的管理人员可能与公司有利益上的冲突,因此,在股东代表诉讼中应当适当地限制当事人主义的适用。     

建立MBO的合理运行机制

MBO是我国在国有经济战略性改组和企业改革中引进的一种做法 ,它对国有企业未来的命运和企业家的成长 ,正产生重大的影响。建立合理的MBO运行机制应从四个方面进行探索 :即股权转让定价机制、收购融资机制、法律监管机制和收购后的经营管理机制     

论公司的司法解散

司法解散作为公司解散的一种重要方式,在两大法系诸多国家公司法中均有规定,而在我国公司立法中则鲜有所闻。在本文中,笔者就司法解散的概念与特征、两大法系其他国家的立法经验、积极作用、以及立法构想等方面进行了简要论述。     

股权转让中股东资格的确定

有限责任公司的股权转让涉及新旧股东的交替,新股东的股东资格何时认定将对公司及第三人产生不同的影响。《公司法》规定了股权转让经变更工商登记后得对抗第三人,但尚未明确新股东的股东资格的生效时间,导致实践中的不同判断标准,亟待解决。未变更工商登记,则不得对抗善意的第三人,其股东资格并不完整。     

股权优先购买权研究：交易成本视角

结合民法的基本理论和现实的股权交易实际存在的问题,从法经济学尤其是交易成本的角度,对现行《公司法》的有关立法规定进行检讨,股权优先购买权现行立法中存在制度缺陷和操作难度,从便利股权流转和保护交易、降低交易成本的目的出发,应完善现行的股权优先购买权制度。     

Stakeholder Orientation vs. Shareholder Value—A Matter of Contractual Failures

This article analyzes the conflict of interests between shareholders and other stakeholders, including when such conflicts of interests may arise. It is argued that shareholder value cannot be justified simply by referring to any prerogative property rights of the shareholders. Instead, shareholder value coincides with the efficient hypothetical perfect contract. However, due to contractual failures in certain bargaining situations, management may be unable to internalize the firms externalities. This means that in these situations there is a tradeoff between a broad duty of loyalty for management in listed firms and other traditional remedies. The theoretical insights are applied on a case from the Danish Supreme Court (Louis Poulsen A/S) where the interests of the stakeholders were decisive. It is shown that the verdict may instead harm the relevant stakeholders illustrating how cautious the legal system should use a doctrine based on the company's interests. In addition, the notion of a firm's social responsibility is critically evaluated together with the associated pitfalls of accepting this concept.     

Judges and CEOs: French Aspects of Corporate Governance

The debate about corporate governance has brought to the front stage the notion of social interest or interest of the company itself as distinct of its stakeholders. French Law, judges, and CEOs use this notion with different meanings and intentions. The judges refer to it mainly to guarantee the continuity of the firm, especially when the latter faces economic difficulties; the CEOs refer to it to keep a free hand in managing the company. Shareholders see the notion as ambiguous and mostly used against their own interest. Shareholders and company interest do not merge. They differ on the industrial relations policy they induce and in the management freedom bestowed on CEOs. A reform of French Company Law currently under discussion seeks conciliation while trying to comply with the principles of corporate governance best practices.