Advertising Spending by Incumbents and Challengers

Abstract

As candidates spend increasing amounts of money on television advertising, it becomes critically important to assess the degree to which this advertising produces results. In an examination of a particularly hard fought primary for a major state-wide office, this study compares the impact made by each candidate's television advertising on voter intentions during the campaign and the votes ultimately received at the end. Results suggest that over the course of the campaign, television advertising benefited the challenger more than the incumbent.     

Beyond sticks and stones: Human capital enhancement efforts in response to violent crime in Latin America

Violent crime has been commonplace in Latin America over the past decades. While existing research has made progress in explaining the rationale and outcomes of government coercive strategies against crime, it has overlooked the non‐coercive strategies implemented to improve public security. It is argued in this article that political authorities make human capital enhancement efforts to shape actors’ incentives about criminal activity and mitigate crime. Accordingly, it is hypothesised that violent crime increases human capital enhancement efforts, and that the effect of violent crime on human capital enhancement efforts is larger when left‐oriented governments are in power because they stress actors’ motivations over windows of opportunities as the main drivers of crime. Support for these hypotheses is found in a sample of Latin American democracies in the period 1990–2007.     

Political Ideology,Political Party,and Support for Greater Federal Spending on Environmental Protection in the United States: Evidence from the General Social Surveys, 1993–2018

This paper focuses on the effects of political ideology and party affiliation on support for more government spending on environmental protection. Pooled‐sample results show that Liberals (Democrats) are more likely to support higher government spending on environmental protection than Moderates (Independents), who, in turn, are more likely to support higher spending levels than Conservatives (Republicans). The results persist even when we control for respondents' opinions concerning whether the federal government, in general, does too little or too much. When stratifying by party, ideological divisions generally narrow, while stratifying by ideology leads to slightly wider divisions between Democrats and Republicans. Together, these results suggest that when Liberals and Conservatives form opinions about government spending on the environment, party affiliation, to some degree, dampens the effects of ideology. Between 2014 and 2018 the probability of supporting more environmental spending increased, albeit slightly, for all ideologies and parties, but more so for Liberals and Democrats.     

How federalism influences welfare spending: Belgium federalism reform through the perspective of the synthetic control method

The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.     

All spending is not equal: European Union public spending,policy feedback and citizens’ support for the EU

While public support is central to the problem‐solving capacity of the European Union, we know little about when and why the EU can increase its citizens’ support through spending. Extensive research finds that citizens living in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU budget are more supportive of the EU, assuming that citizens care equally about all forms of spending. It is argued in this article, however, that the amount of spending is only part of the story. Understanding the effects of spending on support requires a consideration of how transfers are spent. Drawing on policy feedback theories in comparative politics, it is shown that support for the EU is a function of the fit between the spending area and economic need in individuals’ immediate living context. Results from a statistical analysis of EU spending on human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environmental protection in 127 EU regions over the period 2001–2011 corroborate this argument. As the EU and other international organisations become increasingly publicly contested, the organisations themselves may increasingly try to shore up public support through spending, but they will only be successful under specific conditions.     

¿Cómo recaudar más sin gastar mejor? Sobre las dificultades de incrementar la carga fiscal en México

This article explores how tax revenue can be increased in Mexico, especially through more collection in higher-income sectors. An overview of the Mexican government's capacity to collect taxes is offered before analyzing the reasons why tax revenue has not increased in over more than two decades. A sketch of strategies that the recent Peña Nieto administration could have followed in order to increase tax revenue in a progressive fashion is also provided. One of the article's main arguments is that without more efficient public spending, it will be difficult to collect more taxes permanently, especially in such an open economy, with institutions that are as weak as those in Mexico. Furthermore, in a democracy, there is little public acceptance for more taxes, no matter how progressive they may be, unless the government can provide certainty about more efficient public spending. For these reasons, unless the quality and progressiveness of public spending and tax collection advances, it is even undesirable that the government increase its tax revenue.     

Scientific Research on the Efficiency of Public Expenditures: How and Where is it Going?

ABSTRACT

Recent scientific research has advanced the measurement of the relative performance of organizations and the efficiency of public spending, based on analyzes of the services offered and results achieved. However, from the methodological point of view, there are several methods to analyze the performance and efficiency of spending in the private and public sectors. In this sense, the present study performs a systematic bibliometric review to analyze all scientific publications on the efficiency of public spending published in the last 20 years. The results show that most cost-efficiency analyzes have been limited to education and health expenditures and have used quantitative analysis, mainly through the application of data-involution analysis. The present review is a first step in mapping scientific publications on efficiency in public spending, which will support researchers and managers to make public spending more efficient.     

Public Choice Failure and Voter Incompetence in France

This article explains failures of politics and government through the incompetence of voters and their perception biases. It illustrates this argument using the French case. If voters lack knowledge and develop irrational beliefs, then voting is probably not effective as a mechanism for sanctioning public policy. The incompetence of French voters and their anti‐capitalist bias is well documented. This incompetence can be partly explained by the low cost of holding irrational beliefs in politics. Voters’ anti‐capitalist attitudes are explained by the utility they obtain from expressing themselves in favour of state intervention, and by France's prohibitive level of justification costs of holding pro‐capitalist views. The resulting biases contribute to the failure of public choice.     

Social spending,partisan bias and vote choice. Evidence from the US

Most models in political science and political economy assume that benefiting from public spending increases the likelihood of voting for the government. However, we do not have much empirical evidence on the conditions under which recipients of public spending reward governments for their public transfers. This article studies the electoral implications of welfare spending cuts in the early years of the Reagan Presidency, when public spending changes were particularly pronounced. Using 1982 NES data, this paper demonstrates that voters who lost public benefits punished Reagan but this only occurred when they identified with the Democratic Party. By contrast, benefit recipients not affected by government cuts were more likely to support Reagan, but again this was only significant among voters identifying with the party of government. This paper thus finds that governments cannot automatically “buy” votes by using welfare spending, the influence of which is instead cushioned by party identification.