大学生心理健康状况普查报告

采用大学生人格问卷(UPI)和症状自评量表(SCL-90)对陕西经济管理职业技术学院在校大学生进行心理健康状况测量。结果表明,大学生总体心理健康状况良好,但部分学生心理健康状况值得关注;大学生心理健康状况个体差异显著,影响其心理健康水平的因素多样,不同年级大学生心理健康状况差异显著,且面临的困扰也表现为不同内容;大学生心理问题在表现形式上有所侧重。     

Socioeconomic Inequalities and Attitudes toward Violence: A Test with New Survey Data in the Niger Delta

Although socioeconomic inequalities are assumed to increase the risk of conflict, the mechanisms behind how inequalities affect attitudes toward violence are poorly understood. The differences between individual (vertical) and group (horizontal) inequalities, and the role that perception of inequality plays, have not been investigated to any great extent due to limited data availability. This study aims at providing a better understanding of the effects of different kinds of inequality by testing new survey data collected in the Niger Delta. Using attitudes of acceptance of the use of violence as the dependent variable, the study compares the effects of horizontal and vertical inequalities and actual versus perceived inequalities. The effect of access to oil resources is also tested for horizontal inequalities (actual and perceived). The results show that both vertical and horizontal inequalities matter for the acceptance of violence. While relatively deprived individuals are more likely to support violence, among groups it is the relatively privileged. However, in oil regions, the more deprived groups are more likely to support violence. In general, perceived inequalities appear to be more important than actual inequalities.     

Who supports democracy? Evidence from a survey of Chinese students and scholars in the United States

Does the experience of living in the United States lead Chinese people to believe that China should pursue democracy? Our study produced mixed results, as we found that overseas study resulted in significant attitude changes by various means. Education in social sciences and consumption of foreign media were both associated with supportive attitudes toward democracy, and also led respondents to believe that Western liberal democracy is a good thing and to push for it. Conversely, living overseas had a negative effect on respondents’ support for Chinese democratization, as the longer they had lived in the United States, the better they understood Western democracy and were suspicious about whether China should pursue immediate democratization. Meanwhile, we also find Chinese media has a negative impact on public support for democracy, both instrumental and intrinsic. Finally, factors associated with attitudes toward democracy, such as traditional values, self-expression values, and perceived performance of the Chinese government, were also significant.     

Corruption and support for decentralisation

Existing explanations of individual preferences for decentralisation and secession focus on collective identity, economic considerations and party politics. This paper contributes to this literature by showing that preferences for fiscal and political decentralisation are also driven by concern about the quality of government in the face of corruption. It makes two claims. Firstly, information on national-level corruption decreases satisfaction with national politicians, and subsequently increases preferences for decentralisation and secession. Secondly, information on regional-level corruption pushes citizens of highly corrupt regions to prefer national retrenchment and unitary states. The effects of this political compensation mechanism crosscut national identities and involve regions that are not ethnically or economically different from the core. We test our argument using a survey experiment in Spain and confirm its cross-national generalisability with data from the European Values Study.     

Stakeholder consultations and the legitimacy of regulatory decision-making: A survey experiment in Belgium

Agencies consult extensively with stakeholders such as industry associations, nongovernmental organizations, and trade unions. One rationale for consultations is that these improve procedural legitimacy and lead to greater acceptance of regulatory outcomes by citizens and the regulated industry. While this presumption of a positive relation between stakeholder consultations and the legitimacy of agencies is widespread, research analyzing this relationship remains scarce. Using a survey experiment, we examine the effect of open and closed consultations on the acceptance of procedures and regulatory outcomes in the field of environmental politics. The results demonstrate that consultation arrangements positively affect the acceptance of decision-making procedures, especially when regulators grant access to different types of stakeholders. However, although the consultation arrangement itself does not directly affect acceptance of the regulatory outcome, procedural legitimacy matters, as it increases decision acceptance among individuals who are negatively disposed toward government regulation.     

常见不规范侦查讯问行为及其程序性处置调查分析

通过访谈和问卷方式对侦查讯问程序中常见不规范行为的调查结果显示,实践中的讯问违法多发生于讯问主体、讯问地点、讯问时间和讯问方式等方面,而由于法律的不完备和现实利益驱动等原因往往导致对这些违法讯问行为置之不理,即便是进行了修正,也往往具有掩饰性,不能从根本上改变违法的状况,更不用说对权利加以救济。     

Sowing the seeds of skepticism? Electoral-integrity beliefs among political elites

Elections in many democracies have come under attack “from within”, with political elites challenging the integrity of the electoral process and calling its outcomes into question. Such allegations may delegitimize democratic outcomes and compromise citizens' confidence in elections. Yet aside from their rhetoric, little is known about political elites' electoral-integrity beliefs. This study breaks new ground by investigating how political elites perceive the integrity of elections, and which factors may account for differences in their electoral-integrity beliefs. Using innovative data from the 2021 candidate survey of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), the empirical analysis shows that political candidates exhibit mostly positive views about the integrity of the electoral procedures and the 2021 election, while being more skeptical about the fairness of the campaign period. Moreover, the findings show that negative campaign experiences, an affiliation with a populist political party, and electoral defeat are important drivers of candidates' skepticism about the integrity of elections. These findings provide novel insights on the nature, background, and diagnostic significance of political elites’ electoral-integrity beliefs in modern democracies.     

The Base Rate Study: Developing Base Rates for Risk Factors and Indicators for Engagement in Violent Extremism

Improvements have been made in identifying the prevalence of risk factors/indicators for violent extremism. A consistent problem is the lack of base rates. How to develop base rates is of equal concern. This study has two aims: (i) compare two methods for developing base rates; the Unmatched Count Technique (UCT) and direct questioning, (ii) generate base rates in a general population sample and compare these to a sample of lone-actor terrorists (n = 125). We surveyed 2108 subjects from the general population. Participants were recruited from an online access panel and randomly assigned to one of three conditions; direct survey, control, or UCT. Survey items were based on a lone-actor terrorist codebook developed from the wider literature. Direct questioning was more suitable under our study conditions where UCT resulted in deflation effects. Comparing the base rates identified a number of significant differences: (i) lone-actor terrorists demonstrated propensity indicators related to a cognitive susceptibility, and a crime- and/or violence-supportive morality more often; the general sample demonstrated protective factors more often, (ii) lone-actor terrorists demonstrated situational indicators related to a crime- and/or violence-supportive morality more often, whereas the general sample experienced situational stressors more often, (iii) lone-actor terrorists demonstrated indicators related to exposure to extremism more often. Results suggest there are measurable differences in the prevalence of risk factors between lone-actor terrorists and the general population. However, no single factor “predicts” violent extremism. This bears implications for our understanding of the interrelation of risk and protective factors, and for the risk assessment of violent extremism.     

Dark necessities? Candidates’ aversive personality traits and negative campaigning in the 2018 American Midterms

Are candidates with “dark” personality profiles more likely to go negative? We triangulate data for the 2018 Senate Midterms in the United States from two independent sources (the automated coding of social media posts and an expert survey) and test the extent to which the candidates’ “dark” personality traits (narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism) are associated with their negativity and incivility. By and large, we find that this is the case, especially when combining the separate traits into broader indicators of “dark” personality (“dark core” and underlying personality dimensions). These results resist robustness checks via models run with alternative specifications, such as using measures of personality (and campaign) that are adjusted to filter out the ideological profile of experts, additional covariates, more restrictive modelling, and alternative measurement of key dependent variables.     

Beyond protest and discontent: A cross‐national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support

Studies on populist parties – or ‘supply‐side populism’ more generally – are numerous. Nevertheless, the connection with demand‐side dynamics, and particularly the populist characteristics or tendencies of the electorate, requires more scholarly attention. This article examines in more detail the conditions underlying the support for populist parties, and in particular the role of populist attitudes amongst citizens. It asks two core questions: (1) are populist party supporters characterised by stronger populist attitudes than other party supporters, and (2) to what extent do populist (and other) attitudes contribute to their party preference? The analysis uses fixed effect models and relies on a cross‐sectional research design that uses unique survey data from 2015 and includes nine European countries. The results are threefold. First, in line with single‐country studies, populist attitudes are prominent among supporters of left‐ and right‐wing populist parties in particular. Second, populist attitudes are important predictors of populist party support in addition to left‐wing socioeconomic issue positions for left‐wing populist parties, and authoritarian and anti‐immigration issue positions for right‐wing populist parties. Third, populist attitudes moderate the effect of issue positions on the support for populist parties, particularly for individuals whose positions are further removed from the extreme ends of the economic or cultural policy scale. These findings suggest that strong populist attitudes may encourage some voters to support a populist party whose issue positions are incongruous with their own policy‐related preferences.