论上市公司股东持股变动信息披露法律管制的限度--以证券公开原则与信托法上的保密义务的冲突为例

信托公司以委托人交付的信托财产大量投资于某一只股票时,证券界一直要求信托公司无条件披露委托人名单,从而与信托法规定的保密义务发生了冲突.实际上,信息披露管制的界限应当以"防范不公正金融交易"为限度,而委托人也不得为非法目的而利用保密义务来规避其应承担的信息披露义务.法律界应当充分注意到信托财产投资运用控制权的多样性,区分积极信托、消极信托等不同的类型分别规定信息披露的方法.     

Towards contextualising stakeholder relationship indicators for corporate–community relationships

Abstract

In circumstances that are substantially different from the norm, new ways of thinking about those alternative contexts are necessary. In the context of corporate governance and corporate social investment (CSI) the relationship between corporate donors and community organisations is regarded as important, but the indicators used to describe this relationship need revisiting. The argument in this article is that context-specific indicators are needed to bring the true nature of the corporate–community relationship to the fore. In addition, a suggestion is made that such indicators be both rigorous and relevant in describing the relationship. In an interpretative, qualitative exploration of data from individual interviews it was revealed that well-known relationship indicators were inadequate to describe the relationship between corporate donors and community organisations accurately. The article could serve as the first step in reviewing stakeholder relationship indicators from organisational communication research and adapting these indicators to a specific context.     

Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,Government Credibility,and Foreign Direct Investment

Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overlapping political jurisdictions increases the likelihood that investment contracts will be honored. Empirical analyses of cross-sectional time-series data for 115 countries, from 1975–1995, are used to study how political institutions affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. After controlling for the effect of relevant economic and political variables, we find that both democratic and federal institutions help attract FDI, although the additive effect of democracy and federalism is small. This is not surprising; democratic systems already have low political risk; they do not need the additional credibility that the federal system provides to attract FDI. In contrast, we expect that federal structures significantly improve the trustworthiness of less democratic states. Empirically, we find that less democratic countries with federal political systems attract some of the highest levels of FDI.     

Looking Beyond the National Level: Foreign Direct Investment Attraction in U.S. States

International relations scholars need to look beyond the national level because U.S. states and governors are increasingly important actors in world politics. One way to look at their international activities is by examining the ways in which U.S. states seek to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), just one research puzzle at the nexus of international relations and U.S. state politics, two fields that rarely talk to one another. After pointing out the gaps within theories from international relations and international political economy, this paper describes the evolving global roles of both U.S. states and governors and shows how U.S. states attract FDI through the use of their international offices and governor-led overseas missions. Empirical findings indicate that U.S. states' international offices and a higher level of economic interdependence help states attract FDI, and the paper argues that extension of institutional approaches from IPE may be valuable for future research about the international capabilities of subnational governments and their leaders.     

Domestic Institutions,Capacity Limitations,and Compliance Costs: Host Country Determinants of Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 1987–2007

The number of investment treaty arbitrations has exploded in recent years. However, the distribution of known arbitral claims varies among states. Some states have had multiple claims brought against them, while others appear not to have experienced any. This article represents the first study to seek causal explanations for this variation. My principal hypothesis is that a country's institutional capacity for protecting investor rights should be negatively correlated with the number of treaty-based arbitral claims brought against it. A panel analysis suggests that, after controlling for other determinants, countries with greater institutional capacity experience fewer disputes than those with lower capacity. This finding reveals an important truth about investment treaties: while they may be designed to help developing countries compensate for domestic-level institutional deficiencies in order to attract more foreign investment, it is precisely those countries with the weakest institutions for which the costs of treaty compliance are likely to be the highest.     

Credibility and Flexibility: Political Institutions,Governance, and Foreign Direct Investment

This article argues that the relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment is both nonlinear and conditional upon status quo policies. The empirical analysis demonstrates an inverted U-shaped relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment in developing countries, with four veto players being the most attractive institutional arrangement. Countries with too few or too many veto players are not favored because of either high policy uncertainty or high policy rigidity. In addition, the benefits and costs of credibility and flexibility vary in good times and hard times. The benefits of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the costs in countries with good initial regulatory environment. The costs of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the benefits when countries are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks.     

公平与公正待遇标准:国际投资法中的“帝王条款”?

在国际投资仲裁实践中,公平与公正待遇标准得到了最广泛的运用,并显现了极度扩张解释之势;同时,一些西方学者也将之与民商法中的诚实信用原则相提并论,实际上是尊奉该待遇标准为国际投资法中的"帝王条款"。但倘若如此,不仅将严重损害东道国管理外资的主权,而且,法理上也存在诸多疑点。公平与公正待遇标准对于国际投资条约的具体规定,并无"帝王条款"意义上的补缺、修正及解释之功能;同时,该标准应是"国家造法",而非"法官造法"的产物,其与"帝王条款"的实质也不相符。我国应转而支持以国际习惯法的具体规则来诠解该项外资待遇的内容。     

期货投资的VaR模型及实证分析——以上海期铜15年历史数据为例

VaR模型作为测量金融风险度的标尺,可用以期货投资的风险测度.根据上海期铜过去15年的历史数据,分别运用静态VaR模型、GARCH(1,1)模型和EⅥ'模型来测量其VaR水平,并在此基础上对这些模型的测量结果进行检验和比较,结果表明:静态VaR模型并不能有效地测度风险,而GARCH(1,1)模型和EvT模型的结合则可以较好地控制风险.     

论国际投资争端解决中的自然遗产保护

随着经济全球化的发展,国际投资活动对自然遗产的保护构成了威胁和挑战。在认定东道国的限制行为是否构成征收时,应采用目的和纯粹效果相结合的标准。在争端解决方式上应当结合使用仲裁、调解等替代性争议解决方式。同时可以在投资协定中采用文化例外条款来免除东道国因保护自然遗产而产生的责任。     

论利用影响力受贿罪的客观方面

利用影响力受贿罪是《刑法修正案（七）》增设的犯罪,与我国《刑法》规定的受贿罪有本质区别,与《联合国反腐败公约》中的影响力交易罪存在处罚范围上的差异。利用影响力受贿罪的客观方面包括利用影响力、通过职务行为为请托人谋取不正当利益、索取或者收受财物和数额较大或者有其他较重情节几个构成要素,除了索取或者收受财物这一要素外,其他的要素自有其特殊性。