Three statutory regimes at impasse： ＂Reverse payments＂ in ＂pay-for-delay＂ settlement agreements between brand-name and generic drug companies

Antitrust authorities in both the United States and Europe have expressed deep concern over settlements of antitrust cases in the pharmaceutical sector, settlements involving ＂reverse payments＂ from plaintiffs to defendants, large sums paid by branded pharmaceutical companies to generic competitors in exchange for promises to stay offthe market. Such ＂pay-for-delay＂ settlements have proliferated in the United States since Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have found them unproblematic despite the Federal Trade Commission＇s persistently strong position that they violate the antitrust laws. These cases arise at the intersection of three statutory regimes seeking to promote innovation, three clusters of doctrine and policy that have interacted only to reach impasse： the Patent Act, the 1984 amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and finally the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Antitrust is a late comer to the fierce competition over patented drugs, competition that permeates the approval process in the Food ＆ Drug Administration [FDA], competition that is restrained by these pay-for-delay settlement agreements. To set the stage, we begin with the Patent Act and its relationship to the FDA approval process. The story of pay-for-delay settlements then proceeds to the settlement agreements and their antitrust implications. We conclude that the best solution in these antitrust cases would be adoption of the FTC＇s approach of presumptive illegality. Together with an amendment proposed to fix the food and drug act, the presumptive illegality of pay-for-delay settlements under the antitrust laws would make the market for pharmaceuticals more price competitive, open weak patents to serious challenge, and as a result save consumers billions of dollars annually without taking from branded drug companies legitimately earned incentives to engage in research and development.     

关于我市开展劳动竞赛的调研报告

目前我市劳动竞赛呈现的主要特点是:普遍重视了找准劳动竞赛的切入点;与企事业单位中心工作的融入不断深化;竞赛体制进一步得到健全与完善。今后应注重推动劳动竞赛向系统化、专业化、精细化方向发展,进一步突出竞赛过程的科学管理,并将其与全面提高职工整体素质作紧密的结合。     

乘劳动竞赛东风 铸优质精品工程

城建集团在"五比一创"劳动竞赛中,将劳动竞赛作为工会融入企业经济工作的重要渠道。通过强化全员参与,提升了职工的综合素质;通过强化过程管理,形成规范的责任机制;通过强化目标落实,提高了工程建设目标的实效性。在高标准、高质量、高水平地完成工程建设中,发挥了工会组织的作用,铸造企业的优质精品工程。     

著作权内在利益平衡机制与反垄断法的介入——美国录音制品数字表演权制度的启示

反垄断与保护知识产权均仅是实现其共同目标的手段,其本身并非最终制度目的。就著作权法律制度而言,这体现在其应当建立完善的内在利益平衡机制,从"护权——限权"两个角度对著作权既加以保护、又防止其滥用。在这方面,美国的DPRSR制度堪称典范,我国与之对应的信息网络传播权制度却有待完善。著作权内在利益平衡机制一旦失灵,根据其失灵的情形,可能产生不同的损害。其中对于可能产生竞争损害的,在必要条件下,反垄执法机构应当及时介入,保护市场竞争和消费者利益不受著作权滥用行为的损害,保障反垄断和保护知识产权共同目标的实现。     

Observing FDI spillover transmission channels: evidence from firms in Uganda

Abstract

We observe and analyse three intra-industry foreign direct investment (FDI) spillover transmission channels using unique firm-level data collected from on-site interviews and observations regarding domestic and foreign firms operating in Uganda in 2015. Our main results are: (1) the spillover effects mainly depend on the channel(s) by which they occur (the competition channel is most important while spillover benefits through the worker mobility and the imitation channels are less prevalent) and (2) both positive and negative spillover effects occur within the same channel and, moreover, effects differ by channel for the same case. These are novel and challenging findings that have not yet been recognised in theoretical and empirical research on FDI spillovers. Our results suggest that long-term pecuniary spillover effects are predominantly stimulated via the competition channel and show that only limited short-term and long-term technological spillover effects occur through the imitation and the movement of workers channels. These channels are not only less prevalent, but also appear to be constrained by competition-determined spillovers. We are confident that these directions for future research will have a high pay-off because, as shown by this exploratory fieldwork, a more complete picture of the spillover effects is reached when the channels are considered simultaneously.     

The Time Path of Legislative Party Switching and the Dynamics of Political Competition: The Italian Case (1996–2011)

Political competition is more realistically described as a dynamic process rather than as a series of static stages in which parties compete over policy and government formation. This paper focuses on legislative party switching as the main manifestation of this endogenously evolving process, linking individual switching behaviour to policy and office incentives that are assumed to evolve throughout the life of the entire legislature. Using a new data set tracking the timing of MPs’ changes in party affiliations between 1996 and 2011 in Italy, it is found that switching is mainly motivated by policy reasons and that it is more likely during government formation periods and budget negotiations. These results are a consequence of the interplay between MPs’ ambition and the alternation of key phases in the legislative cycle.     

Ethnic party competition beyond the segmented market

The outbidding model of ethnic politics focuses on party competition in an ethnically perfectly segmented electoral market where no party appeals to voters across the ethnic divide. The power sharing model retains this assumption, yet tries to prevent outbidding through moderation-inducing institutional design. Empirically, imperfectly segmented electoral markets and variance of ethnic party strategies beyond radical outbidding have been observed. To provide a stepping stone towards a more complete theory of ethnic party competition, this article introduces the notion of nested competition, defined as party competition in an imperfectly segmented market where some – but not all – parties make offers across ethnic divides and where competition in intra-ethnic arenas is nested within an inter-ethnic arena of party competition. The notion of nested competition helps explain why ethnic outbidding is not omnipresent in contemporary multi-ethnic democracies. A moderate position on the ethnic dimension that appears inauspicious from the perspective of intra-ethnic competition can turn into the strategically superior choice once ethnic parties take the whole system of competitive interactions within intra- and inter-ethnic arenas into account. A case study of nested competition for Hungarian votes in the Vojvodina region of Northern Serbia illustrates the conceptual innovations.     

Constraining political corruption: an empirical analysis of the impact of democracy

The present article addresses the relationship between democracy and political corruption. Extending past studies, this article introduces important refinements that respond to theoretical and methodological concerns. The theoretical framework proposed here is developed based on an electoral conception of democracy, which makes it possible to avoid the potential endogeneity problems associated with substantial definitions of democracy. I argue that despite the influence of other important aspects of democracy, elections and inter-party competition per se help to constrain political corruption. The article examines two analytical dimensions of democracy, the current level of democracy and its degree of consolidation over time. Unlike previous studies, a cross-national empirical analysis of a sample of more than 100 countries reveals that when tested together, the level of democracy and its degree of longitudinal variation are both significantly related to the control of corruption. The level of democracy affects corruption in a non-linear way. Hybrid regimes that are more autocratic than democratic show a lower level of corruption control than democracies, near-democracies, and closed dictatorships. The analysis also confirms that, despite having adopted different measures, more consolidated democracies are more powerful in constraining corruption.     

What it takes to win when the game is rigged: the evolution of opposition electoral strategies in Moscow, 2012–2017

This paper examines how the political opposition innovated strategies to overcome obstacles presented by Russia’s uneven electoral playing field. Using evidence from two municipal elections in Moscow, I argue that members of the opposition have coordinated around local contests in response to political opportunities created by the Kremlin, including the anti-electoral fraud protests of the winter of 2011–2012 and the resurrection of gubernatorial elections in 2012. Following these openings, grassroots electoral initiatives recruited and trained opposition-minded individuals, first focusing on established activists and then on politicized individuals, to run for municipal council seats. The campaigns provided training using ad hoc educational seminars and later developed electronic tools that lowered barriers to political participation. As a result of these campaigns, electoral competition has boomed at the local level in Moscow even as regional and national contests have become less competitive. The campaigns demonstrate the continued vulnerability of authoritarian regimes that rely on elections for political legitimacy. Furthermore, the development of highly portable online tools for campaigning has potentially long-term democratizing consequences.     

国家综合配套改革试验区的实践探索与发展趋势

近几年,为适应改革开放新形势的需要,国家推动了综合配套改革试验区建设,赋予其落实科学发展观、体制创新、探索新发展模式、提升区域竞争力以及建设和谐社会的历史使命。从目前已经推行综合配套改革的几个试点城市来看,改革方案的内容及举措均体现出鲜明的时代和区域特色,尤其是与以往经济特区模式相比具有较大的差异。在当前区域竞争日益激烈的情况下,能否利用自己的特色和优势,推进体制创新,掌握改革主动权,将决定一个城市或地区在未来竞争格局中的位置。获准设立国家综合配套改革试验区,对于一个城市或地区来说,无疑相当于获得一次体制创新、再创业和腾飞的机会。这也正是各地在申报建立国家综合配套改革试验区上竞争激烈的原因所在。