论反垄断法适用除外制度的理论基础

适用除外制度之所以成为反垄断法的一项重要制度,有其深刻的经济基础和法律基础。从经济基础上讲,垄断与竞争均是利弊兼具,垄断并不必然消灭竞争,甚至会使竞争加剧。适用除外制度的确立,有利于发挥垄断的积极作用, 克服竞争的某些消极作用。从法律基础上讲,反垄断法要解决虽然属于垄断、但又不予禁止的技术问题,只有通过适用除外制度加以解决;另一方面,适用除外制度还是反垄断法与其他法律进行协调的一项必不可少的措施。     

“一带一路”、中间地带与美国对华战略博弈

基于争夺国际中间地带的地缘战略传统,美国将“一带一路”倡议作为对华战略博弈的重要场域。自中国提出并落实“一带一路”倡议以来,美国政府的反应策略可以划分为战略意图警惕、少边主义阻断和多边制度竞争三个阶段。美国对华竞争策略的演变逻辑集中表现为愈发强调争夺中间地带国家的重要性,以谋取第三方支持作为其“竞赢”中国的战略工具。美国对中国及其“一带一路”倡议的负面战略评估,以及美国国内外对华共识凝聚力的上升,为其对华竞争手段赋予了承诺扩大化、议题安全化和策略明晰化的特质。美方的举措破坏了国际多边合作机制的现有框架,也在美国社会层面扰乱了舆论生态和决策环境,加剧了国际安全环境中的不可控风险。跟踪分析美国针对“一带一路”倡议在中间地带展开的竞争举措,不仅能够理解中美关系的演变轨迹与发展趋势,也要求中国通过战略研判、意图传递与制度对接等路径予以应对。     

我国《反不正当竞争法》中的消费者权益保护问题探讨

维护自由公平的竞争秩序与保护消费者权益实质是一个问题的两个方面。我国《反不正当竞争法》将消费者权益保护作为立法目标之一,并将消费者合法权益是否受损作为不正当竞争行为的认定标准之一,但由于消费者概念不明确,又缺乏直接的救济手段,该法的立法与实践出现了落差。不正当竞争行为认定中的消费者标准不宜套用《消费者权益保护法》中的消费者概念,同时在司法救济上,应赋予消费者以消费者组织的名义进行团体诉讼的有限诉权。只有这样才更能体现反不正当竞争法的立法宗旨。     

Issue ownership attack: how a political party can counteract a rival’s issue ownership

Abstract

A central part of representative democracy is that voters evaluate political parties based on how competently they handle issues, so-called ‘issue ownership’. Since issue ownership is a central ingredient in the vote choice, rival parties often try to influence how voters evaluate a competing party. This is an issue ownership attack. However, despite intense scholarly interest in issue ownership, the understanding of how parties shape issue ownership is very limited. Therefore a new theoretical model is tested here to understand issue ownership attack. Using several survey experiments, the analysis shows that a mainstream party can counteract another mainstream party’s issue ownership by reframing the issue and by blaming the party for its performance, but not by changing its own position on the issue. Hence, the study not only advances the understanding of issue ownership stability and change but also brings important insights on how parties influence voters.     

From Reset to Restart: The US-Russia Cyclical Relationship in the Post-Cold War Era

ABSTRACT

After a quarter of a century of oscillating relations between Washington and Moscow, Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy named Russia as one of the main challengers to the US-led order. Power transition theory is used to explain the alternating cooperative and competitive phases during each of the first three post-Cold War US presidencies: first, initial attempts at cooperation are driven by US willingness to integrate its former rival into the liberal order; then, regression into competition follows as Washington’s influence rises in territories that Moscow considers sensitive for its national security.     

高管在职消费与产品市场竞争的公司治理效应：替代还是互补？

目前鲜有文献关注高管在职消费隐性激励机制与外部产品市场竞争监督机制之间关于公司治理效应的相互关系。基于此，文章首先将产品市场竞争引入管理层在职消费问题的理论框架中，推导发现无论是在纯寡头亦或混合寡头市场结构中，高管在职消费与产品市场竞争之间的公司治理效应均存在明显的替代性。其次，文章选择2003—2015年中国沪深两市A股上市公司的大样本数据进行实证分析，结果表明，高管在职消费与产品市场竞争均能有效提升公司绩效，并且这两种机制间的公司治理效应存在显著的替代关系。进一步研究发现，上述结论在国有企业和民营企业中均成立，但仅存在于低薪酬和小规模企业中。最后通过机理分析发现，产品市场竞争机制主要通过信息冲突效应、市场掠夺风险效应、竞争淘汰效应三个路径弱化在职消费的激励效用。文章的研究结论丰富了公司治理机制的相关研究，为进一步完善公司治理体系提供了理论和经验证据支持。     

Issue yield,campaign communication,and electoral performance: a six-country comparative analysis

Abstract

This article develops and tests a model that explains election outcomes on the basis of party strategy. It employs a new comparative dataset linking representative mass surveys from six European countries with Twitter analysis of campaign activity. The expectation is that parties whose issue agendas exploit electoral opportunities while avoiding risks will be rewarded at the polls. These risks and opportunities are modelled using issue yield, a general framework summarising public support, electoral alignments, and party credibility. Empirically, the article traces a three-step process: (1) the configuration of electoral risks and opportunities (which is captured through public opinion surveys) guides party communication (measured with Twitter data), and to the degree that (2) parties design their campaigns strategically (identified through issue yield), this in turn (3) improves their electoral performance (measured using official statistics). The analysis explains some of the most salient election outcomes of recent years.     

技术权力、技术生命周期与大国的技术政策选择

大国技术竞争是指国家行为体综合运用各类政策手段争夺技术权力的过程。技术权力可分为强制性权力、网络性权力和制度性权力。技术竞争往往是一个长时段的互动过程,可能涵盖一个或多个技术生命周期。各类技术权力在一个技术生命周期内出现的时间有所不同,技术权力的积累在两个技术生命周期的交替期也可能呈现延续或中断的不同走向。这意味着在技术发展的不同阶段,竞争主体的政策选择将依据技术权力的变化而相应发生改变。美、俄、中、欧在全球卫星导航领域的博弈以及美、欧、日、中在移动通信领域的竞争,均鲜明体现了驱动国际政治行为体开展技术竞争的意愿因素(获取权力)以及它们在技术发展相应阶段的政策选择。前者仅涉及单个技术生命周期,后者则包含多个时间上紧密衔接的技术生命周期。中国是当前大国技术竞争的主要参与者。为了在竞争中立于不败之地,应注意把握技术发展的阶段性特征,因时制宜,选择与技术发展阶段匹配的技术政策,并针对下一阶段技术发展的重点方面提前进行布局,以坚持自主创新和扩大对外开放为基本原则,通过科技创新掌握技术权力,推进构建新发展格局。     

Full and Open Competition in Public Procurement: Values and Ethics in Contracting Opportunity

ABSTRACT

Governments have sought to respond to increasing pressures to accomplish aims with efficiency and at low cost. A perception of the potential for corruption and waste of public resources has been met with calls for transparency and accountability. Competition is believed to lead to impartial, optimal outcomes, but attention paid to competition in the literature suggests that the benefits are not universally clear. This paper considers ‘full and open competition’ as a policy promise, ethical obligation, and a matter of justice, drawing upon work of John Rawls and others, in the United States case. The research question is: What do Federal procurement data tell us about the nature of full and open competition in practice? This study draws upon contract data available from the U.S. Federal government, for fiscal years from 2015 to 2018. Through an ordinal regression, it is suggested that variation in the extent of competition results in part from size of project, size of the business (or potential business) receiving the project, and the industry classification, particularly in cases centering on commercial acquisitions. While ‘full and open competition’ is frequently employed, the difference between the normative value of the concept in statute, and practical outcomes in implementation, is clear. This difference has consequences for both vendors and the government.     

Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions

This paper discusses the impact of a leniency program on incentives within cartels. The objective of this program is to encourage a cartel member to confess and implicate his co-conspirators with hard evidence about their collusive agreement. We develop a simple model of cartel behavior under a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction and we show how an effective leniency program can prevent the internal coordination of cartel members.