Elections in Western European parliaments

Parliaments often elect holders of important extra‐parliamentary offices such as heads of state, constitutional judges, heads of audit institutions and ombudsmen. What drives the behaviour of parliamentary actors and the outcome of such elections? This article explains actor behaviour theoretically, drawing on spatial factors, principal‐agent arguments about the importance of nonspatial candidate characteristics and signaling arguments about competitive considerations beyond the specific election. Empirically, it provides the first comparative analysis of such elections outside the United States Senate using original data on 100 elections for four external offices in 14 Western European parliaments. The findings show that spatial variables, nonspatial candidate characteristics and features of the competitive context systematically affect the election outcome. The article contributes to comparative parliamentary research in general by demonstrating how parliamentary activities, other than lawmaking, can be analysed using established theories and by showing that consensual aggregate outcomes can be explained within a competition‐based rational choice model.     

论不公平条款制度——兼论我国显失公平制度之于格式条款

为防止格式条款阻却正义、伤害社会,德国和欧盟法确立了不公平条款制度,通过对违背诚信原则、导致合同权利义务严重失衡的格式条款的否定来控制格式条款的内容,保护弱势合同当事人。我国应当借鉴德国和欧盟法,在格式条款制度之下建构不公平条款制度,而不应将其整合到现行颇具争议的显失公平制度之中。我国不公平条款制度除了建立公平性审查的一般规则外,亦应当建立不公平条款"黑名单"与"灰名单"以及公平性审查之"豁免"规则,为法官、当事人、行政机关和相关社会团体提供法律指引,为格式条款自律、行政监督、公益诉讼和司法审查提供制度支撑。     

Recasting Competition Concurrency under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013

The concurrent enforcement power granted to certain sector economic regulators is one of the more remarkable features of UK competition law. In practice, regulators have tended to under‐enforce their competition powers, preferring to resolve market difficulties through regulatory interventions. Recent amendments to the concurrency framework, introduced by sections 51 to 53 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, seek both to strengthen the priority of competition enforcement and to provide plausible sanctions – including, ultimately, the removal of competition jurisdiction from regulators – for continued underuse. This article assesses these reforms in light of the history and (limited) application of the concurrent competition powers of regulators to date. It argues that the absence of an overarching policy rationale for this curious example of UK antitrust ‘exceptionalism’ complicates the determination of whether the reforms, which ostensibly seek to reinforce but potentially also undermine concurrency, are likely to have a positive market impact in practice.     

Contextual variation in interdependent policy making: The case of tax competition

Many studies show that policy makers react to the policy choices made in other jurisdictions, but we still know relatively little about the factors driving interdependent policy making, especially about how context shapes interdependence. Theoretical arguments suggest that contextual factors, such as stable institutions and geographic location, explain variation in interdependence. However, there is a lack of empirical research investigating contextual heterogeneity in interdependent policy making, mainly because it cannot be analysed with standard spatial econometric methods. This article introduces multilevel modeling that allows the study of contextual variation in interdependence and illustrates the method with the analysis of uneven tax competition in Switzerland. The findings of fine‐grained data show that cantonal governments compete more strongly with their competitors the closer a unit is located to a metropolis with comprehensive public good provision. The analysis demonstrates that we can better understand the mechanisms of interdependent policy making by studying its contextual drivers.     

苏联时代特权现象的制度根源及其启示——基于利益机制的分析

苏联时代实行的"官职等级名录制",揭示了苏联时代特权现象的制度化特点。依据于权力道德化的干部作风建设,而不是着眼于建立权力客观化利益机制的政治制度,官僚特权现象不但不能得到有效遏制,反而会借助于道德化的利益机制而滋生和蔓延开来。因此,通过政治体制改革适度引入竞争机制,同时建立相对公平的利益机制,清除制度性和政策性特权,将成为遏制特权现象的重要制度化机制,这就是从苏联反特权教训中得到的重要启示。     

Portfolio Allocation and Policy Compromises: How and Why the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats Formed a Coalition Government

The question of ‘who gets what?’ is one of the most interesting issues in coalition politics. Research on portfolio allocation has thus far produced some clear‐cut empirical findings: coalition parties receive ministerial posts in close proportion to the number of parliamentary seats they win. This article poses two simple questions: Why did the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats agree to form a coalition government and, secondly, did the process of portfolio allocation in the United Kingdom in 2010 reflect standard patterns of cabinet composition in modern democracies? In order to answer these questions, a content analysis of election manifestos is applied in this article in order to estimate the policy positions of the parties represented in the House of Commons. The results show that a coalition between the Tories and Lib Dems was indeed the optimal solution in the British coalition game in 2010. When applying the portfolio allocation model, it turns out that the Conservatives fulfilled the criteria of a ‘strong party’, implying that the Tories occupied the key position in the coalition game. On account of this pivotal role, they were ultimately able to capture the most important ministries in the new coalition government.     

论国际反垄断法适用除外制度的价值取向

分别对竞争公平价值和社会公平价值进行全面分析,并对二者的关系也进行比较研究。社会公平价值是受高位阶法律规范或者宪法规范保护的高层级价值标准,竞争公平是受下位经济法保护的低层级价值标准,当二者发生实质冲突时,社会公平应当受到优先保护。社会公平价值标准高于竞争公平价值标准是反垄断法适用除外制度产生和存在的基础。二者的冲突并不是不可调和的,只有发生实质性冲突时,社会公平价值才优先适用,反之,竞争公平价值应当在经济法领域中得以顺利实现。     

探析临床紧急用血中法律原则的适用

我国法律对临床紧急输血有严格的规定,血液必须经检验合格后方可用于临床。但临床中因紧急输血不能而发生的事故时有发生,究其原因乃法律的严格规定与保护个人生命原则的竞争。通过对法律原则和法律规则的价值衡量,在临床紧急用血的情况下,医疗机构可以直接根据患者生命权至上原则和救死扶伤、保障临床需要的原则为患者紧急采血、输血。     

国际形势回顾展望北大核心

高端智库的调研与谋划职能,要求其树立正确学术观,涵养敏锐的学术点,并能激活信息死穴,打通"信梗"瓶颈,从形势变动之形,推知事物发展之势;实现出精品、出思想、出人才的目的。先贤有曰:"锐始者必图其终,成功者先计于始。"岁末年初的国际形势务虚讨论,即是把脉天下之善始。