EU Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean: What Relationship with the Arab Uprisings?

This article analyzes the European Union (EU) policy for democracy assistance toward the Southern Mediterranean countries and tracks changes in the last decade, with a special emphasis on the most recent period. It shows that the EU policy, which goes under the acronym of EIDHR, has evolved, but predominantly in response to internal dynamics rather than to developments in Arab countries. The EU has increasingly provided assistance to local actors on the ground in non-member countries and has differentiated its action in authoritarian countries from countries in transition. When it comes to implementing its own policy, however, the EU is less able to promote democracy than human rights, and most of the funds go to support projects centered on relatively uncontroversial rights such as women's and children's.     

Not a Curse at All: Why Middle Eastern Oil States Fail and How it can be Prevented

Western scholarship has often noted that oil states in the Middle East are affected by the ‘resource curse’. Thus, such states are to eventually fail due to their plundering of resources and their neglect of the social contract with their citizens. However, this is not the case, as oil states are neither failed states, nor fully democratic. They hover in a middle ground in which they assure security through coercion, but lack representation and legitimacy. Due to the events of the Arab Spring, a pragmatic, insightful and comprehensive review of oil states in the region is necessary. Although oil states in the region thus far have remained stable, change can be expected in the future. How will oil states deal with the pressures of a more demanding society and an ever-challenging economic atmosphere? Furthermore, what can history teach us so that state failure can be averted?     

Muted criticism in Egypt (Part 2)

Egypt, the heart of the Arab world, is the dominant player in Arab‐Israeli and inter‐Arab affairs. Close scrutiny of political and intellectual trends in Egypt tells us much about these trends throughout the Arab world. Reporting from a country such as Egypt, which has an authoritarian form of government, presents problems for journalists and researchers. There is much criticism of the government, but it is muted, often lying just below the surface. One must try to discern the underlying political reality without seeming to criticize the government. Journalists who are considered pro‐Israel are viewed with suspicion. Journalists who ask probing questions may be classified as pro‐Israel. This study examines the complex fabric of Egyptian political reality through interviews with prominent intellectuals and government leaders. The interviews focus on crucial areas of foreign policy.     

Antithesis – the reconstruction of the African Union for a viable and sustainable solution for the unity of Africans

ABSTRACT

Franz Fanon, the Algerian revolutionary of African descent, once declared: ‘Each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfil it or betray it.’ The challenge confronting African researchers on matters related to the Afro-Arab borderlands – regions spanning Tchad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania and the Sudan where the African and Arab worlds meet – centre on resolving, reversing and undoing historical denials and inaccuracies. This article critically reviews the falsification of history in this part of Africa, in the Sudan in particular, and the role of the Arab League, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Organisation of African Unity and its successor the African Union, in addressing the plight of its inhabitants. The article concludes with the recommendation of the creation of a new, culturally based Pan-African organisation able to fill a void and offer redress.     

What Factors Determine the Allocation of Aid by Arab Countries and Multilateral Agencies?

This article provides a statistical analysis of the determinants of Arab aid allocation using Heckman's two-step estimator. It is found that poorer, Arab, Islamic and Sub-Saharan African countries are more likely to receive some positive amount of Arab aid (gate-keeping stage). The same is true for countries not maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel as well as those with voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly similar to Saudi Arabia. Arab and more populous countries also receive a higher share of the total aid allocated (level stage). The same is true for Islamic countries in the case of bilateral aid and countries with voting similarity in the case of multilateral aid. Donor interest, in particular Arab solidarity, plays a clear role at both stages, whereas recipient need as measured by a country's level of income only affects the gate-keeping stage, not the level stage.     

The language that unites and the language that divides us: Why was Arabic kept and Serbo-Croatian abolished?

This article explores why the Arabs chose to keep a common language, while the Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and Montenegrins chose not to. The study argues that the main reason for this can be found in the ideological constrains resulting out of the salience and interaction between different religious and ethnic group building projects in former Yugoslavia and the Arab states. Political elites in both regions favored the ethnic and religious category to different extents. Language planning reflected and implemented the respective ideological imperatives resulting out of these processes. This led to different approaches in defining the common language and its subsequent standardization.     

The Arab Spring and the European Response

Europeans enthusiastically embraced the Arab Spring. However, the EU and its member states have lacked significant influence in a neighbouring region in turmoil. The EU has not devised new and more appropriate approaches towards the region, but rather relied on its traditional tools and frameworks. The Eurozone’s financial crisis and threat perceptions have quickly underminded the readiness of EU member states to contribute meaningfully to Arab transformations with money, market access and mobility. In addition, European support has not been equally welcomed across the region, and delays in terms of building empowered governments have prevented a quick impact. Moreover, the violent power struggles triggered by the Arab Spring have revealed the EU’s weakness with regard to effective conflict prevention and timely crisis management – and thus created an environment averse to democratic transformation and regional stabilisation.     

The Challenge of Talking about Terrorism: The EU and the Arab Debate on the Causes of Islamist Terrorism 1

The Arab “hegemonic debate” on the causes of Islamist terrorism nurtures (pan-) Arab, anti-Western sentiments and delegitimizes criticism of the political status quo. The European Union's emphasis on multilateral means of conflict resolution and trade promotion leads to official pronouncements that barely address the Arab world's domestic problems, instead referring to international tensions such as the Arab-Israeli conflict as a particular cause of Islamist terrorism and the need for cooperation with Arab governments. By failing to challenge the official narratives of authoritarian Arab regimes the EU obstructs interests in the democratization of the region and the delegitimization of Islamist violence.     

To govern,or not to govern? Opportunity and post-coup military behaviour in Egypt 2011–2014

This article examines Egyptian military behaviour in 2011 and 2013 to address the question of why officers remain in power following some successful coups, and allow for a transition to civilian rule after others. My evidence suggests that in post-1970 cases where international factors fail to exert sufficient pressure, outcome variation is influenced by levels of corporate opportunity, defined here as the ease with which the army can use control of the state to expand its corporate interests. Drawing on the existing literature, I posit consensus against military rule, high popular support for democracy, strong civil society, the presence of a strong opposition party, and low levels of cohesion among officers as factors which constrain opportunity. Prior research suggests that when the level of opportunity is high, controlling the state becomes a high-risk/low-reward endeavour, making it likely that officers will allow for a transition to civilian rule. My study contributes to the existing scholarship by using original data gathered through interviews with Egyptian officers, as well as other experts on the Egyptian military, to argue that low consensus against military rule, low support for democracy, and high organizational cohesion are jointly sufficient to produce governing intervention.