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221.
Hiro Katsumata 《The Pacific Review》2013,26(5):619-637
Abstract Observers of Southeast Asian affairs commonly assume that the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are reluctant to pursue liberal agendas, and that their main concern is to resist pressure from Western powers to improve their human rights practice. This article, however, argues that such a conventional view is too simplistic. The Southeast Asian countries have voluntarily been pursuing liberal agendas, and their main concern here is to be identified as ‘Western’ countries – advanced countries with legitimate international status. They have ‘mimetically’ been adopting the norm of human rights which is championed by the advanced industrialized democracies, with the intention of securing ASEAN's identity as a legitimate institution in the community of modern states. Ultimately, they have been pursuing liberal agendas, for the same reason as cash-strapped developing countries have luxurious national airlines and newly-independent countries institute national flags. Yet it should be noted that the progress of ASEAN's liberal reform has been modest. A conventional strategy for facilitating this reform would be to put more pressure on the members of ASEAN; however, the usefulness of such a strategy is diminishing. The development of an East Asian community, the core component of which is the ASEAN–China concord, makes it difficult for the Western powers to exercise influence over the Southeast Asian countries. Hence, as an alternative strategy, this article proposes that ASEAN's external partners should ‘globalize’ the issue of its liberal reform, by openly assessing its human rights record in global settings, with the aim of boosting the concern of its members for ASEAN's international standing. 相似文献
222.
Eric Harwit 《The Pacific Review》2013,26(4):361-383
Abstract This article uses extensive fieldwork data to focus on the question of how Chinese and Japanese companies are competing in neighboring countries of Asia, and what economic forces will shape their future growth in the region. It begins by briefly discussing the history of Chinese and Japanese investment in the South and Southeast Asian regions. It traces the development of Japanese overseas investment policies, as well as China's more recent ‘Going Out’ government program to encourage overseas flows of capital. It then builds on prior political economy work as it uses case study focuses, with primary data based on the author's fieldwork research in several nations of Southeast Asia and in India, of the two key sectors of automobiles and electronics. It compares and contrasts the investment strategies of companies from each country, as well as the successes and failures of investments in the industries. It finds that Japanese companies’ advantages lie in industries utilizing advanced technology and management skills. Though the Japanese continue to lead in many areas, including automobiles, they have begun to face competition and potentially reduced profits in vital manufacturing areas. Meanwhile, Chinese overseas companies have made significant advances in the consumer electronics sector, using low prices and good quality, though overseas automobile investments have gained little traction. The article concludes that, if the Chinese can improve their product quality, capitalize on improving managerial skills and a deeper level of experience in the region, and establish brands they can sell with reliable distribution networks, Japanese companies could face losses to their Asian neighbor in these important parts of the continent they have dominated for decades. 相似文献
223.
Silvia Atanassova Croydon 《The Pacific Review》2013,26(2):289-310
AbstractStretching a third of the way around the globe, the Asia Pacific is the world's most populous region. Yet, it remains the sole region without a human rights court or commission, and without a human rights treaty. The notable absence there of a human rights mechanism based on such institutions is often explained away by reference to the region's size and heterogeneity, the constituent states’ reluctance to interfere in the affairs of others, and the existence of rivalries. Whilst agreeing that there is no inter-governmental initiative that looks set to change the present state of affairs in the Asia Pacific, this article places the spotlight on another model of creating a regional human rights mechanism, that is, the unique and burgeoning Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions. Specifically, it assesses the prospects for Japan, Taiwan and China – three key regional players whose membership of the Forum is still outstanding – to create domestic human rights bodies that eventually join. 相似文献
224.
François Godement 《The Pacific Review》2013,26(2):175-187
The Asia policy of the Bush administration follows from two principles: its preference for ‘hub-and-spoke relationships’ led from Washington, and the restored priority of security issues over the mixture of trade interests and human rights that was the hallmark of the Clinton presidency. The initial focus of the administration on the restoration of political and strategic ties with old allies such as Japan, and on strategic competition, has been mitigated by another realistic approach: the need to seek new allies and partnerships. This policy was already evident towards India before September 11, 2001, but has been magnified with the onset of a coalition against terrorism, and almost as importantly, against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resumption of strategic and military ties with China, the priority of anti-terrorist cooperation over human rights issues with Southeast Asia, the increased support for India that is of more strategic value than America's tactical involvement with Pakistan, are developments that overshadow the US relationship with traditional allies such as Japan or the European Union. The major weakness of the Bush Asia policy, however, is its relative neglect of major economic and social issues in the region. Although support for some weakened ASEAN economies has increased, there is neither a more intense coordination of economic policies with Japan, in spite of initially declared intentions, nor a major economic and social strategy for Southeast and South Asia that would support the fight against terrorism. 相似文献
225.
Barry Buzan 《The Pacific Review》2013,26(2):143-173
I argue that there is a distinct and longstanding regional structure in East Asia that is of at least equal importance to the global level in shaping the region's security dynamics. Without considering this regional level neither ‘unipolar’ nor ‘multipolar’ designations can explain East Asian international security. To make this case, I deploy regional security complex theory both to characterize and explain developments in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity is well understood in thinking about how the ending of the Cold War impacted on East Asia. Less written about in Western security literature are the parallel developments at the regional level. Prominent among these are the relative empowerment of China in relation to its neighbours, and the effect of this, as well as of the growth of regional institutions, and the attachment of security significance to East Asian economic developments, in merging the security dynamics of Northeast and Southeast Asia. How China relates to its East Asian region, and how the US and China relate to each other, are deeply intertwined issues which centrally affect not only the future of East Asian, but also global, security. With the notable exception of some crisis between China and Taiwan, this whole pattern looks mainly dependent on internal developments within China and the US. Also significant is whether the basic dynamic of interstate relations in East Asia is more defined by the Westphalian principle of balancing, or by the bandwagoning imperative more characteristic of suzerain-vassal relationships. The main probability is for more of the same, with East Asian security staying within a fairly narrow band between mild conflict formation and a rather odd and weak sort of security regime in which an outside power, the US, plays the key role. 相似文献
226.
Karoline Postel‐Vinay 《The Pacific Review》2013,26(4):489-503
The Sea of Japan Zone (SJZ) is an area that has been shaped essentially by transnational relations between the localities of western Japan, northeastern China and the Russian Far East. The emergence of this new type of space, based on interlocal cooperation, is a significant aspect of what could be called the ‘new’ regionalism, i.e. the polymorphous and multicen‐tred movement that is affecting international relations today as opposed to its more rigid version of the late 1950s. The shape of the new regionalism reflects the transformation of international relations in general: this particular regionalization process, that gave shape to the SJZ, is linked to the transnationalization of local actors. The idea of creating the SJZ, in the late 1960s, was first an external answer (interlocal cooperation) to an internal problem (uneven development in Japan). It became a reality some twenty years later as Russian and Chinese localism eventually converged with Japanese localism. Despite important domestic differences the need for local actors around the Sea of Japan to look outside for better development conditions made the synergy possible. It produced a new regional entity that needs to be defined and, for that purpose, that could be compared to other transnational zones in East Asia or even in Europe. Their common characteristic appears to be a functional approach to regional cooperation. 相似文献
227.
Russ Swinnerton 《The Pacific Review》2013,26(2):327-343
Southeast Asia faces a range of challenges in adopting maritime confidence‐ and trust‐building measures in the very promising atmosphere of political endorsement that exists after the ASEAN Regional Forum, with possible changes to the strategic balance caused by maritime rearmament within the region. This paper briefly analyses the roles or activities of maritime forces in the region on the basis of their sensitivity to scrutiny: the hard or contentious kinds of activities, usually warlike, that navies will only practise together in an environment of considerable trust, and the soft, usually non‐warlike activities, that they could undertake cooperatively with fewer security concerns. From this list of shared roles two lists of possible CBMs are derived, the easy (or likely‐to‐succeed) and the hard (or less‐likely), based on the level of sensitivity of the activities to be undertaken cooperatively. 相似文献
228.
Richard Stubbs 《The Pacific Review》2013,26(2):297-318
From the inception of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 to 1991 economic cooperation among its members was virtually non-existent. However, in January 1992 the leaders of the member states agreed to work towards an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Following an uncertain initial phase the leaders rededicated themselves in 1995 to an accelerated implementation of the AFTA agreement. The key to the change in policy and to the relatively successful implementation of AFTA was the shift in the domestic balance of power in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand from economic nationalists to liberal reformers. This occurred as the result of a series of recessions and booms that affected the economies of the region from the early 1980s onwards. Also crucial to the successful implementation of AFTA was the distinctive approach to regional cooperation that has developed among the ASEAN members. 相似文献
229.
Herman Joseph S. Kraft 《The Pacific Review》2013,26(3):453-472
In April 1999, ASEAN formally admitted Cambodia thereby completing its declared goal of grouping together all ten Southeast Asian countries under its umbrella. This was the culminating event in the latest phase of ASEAN's enlargement. This process, however, had been problematic from the start. The entry of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam without any clear criteria for admission has raised questions regarding the preparedness of these countries to participate in ASEAN. More importantly, it led to strains in ASEAN's relations with its dialogue partners over the legitimacy of some of the governments in power in these countries. The was further complicated by the economic upheaval caused by the financial crisis which struck Southeast Asia in 1997. The impact of these events on ASEAN has put into question the association's growing role as a leading player in Asia-Pacific affairs. More importantly, it has raised issues which are central to ASEAN's continued existence. 相似文献
230.
Leszek Buszynski 《The Pacific Review》2013,26(3):287-303
Abstract Russia's President Vladimir Putin has centralized decision making in Moscow and has reduced the role of domestic actors. He has demonstrated his own personal management of foreign policy in relation to China and Japan. He has used negotiations over oil and territory to place Russia in a more favourable position between them. In relation to oil, he has overruled the oil company Yukos and others within his own government and decided in favour of the Japanese pipeline route, which includes a branch line to China. Putin decided on the Japanese route because it promised access to wider markets in the Asia Pacific, besides China. It also entailed deeper Japanese involvement in Russia's development and reduced Russian dependence upon China. In terms of territory, Putin undermined the power of local opposition and offered territorial settlements to both China and Japan, to remove sources of future tension. With China he compromised over the river islands which had been left outstanding since the main border agreement was signed in 1991. To Japan he again offered a compromise over the disputed islands based on the 1956 agreement to improve relations. Russians may hope that energy dependence would induce the Japanese to become more willing to compromise over the territorial issue. The Japanese, however, expect that Russia's need for funding for the pipeline would allow them to resist that pressure and to demand a return of all disputed islands. If Russia emerges as an energy supplier to both China and Japan its influence and its regional role would be enhanced. Much depends upon the prospects for the oil pipeline and its branch line, whose feasibility has been questioned. 相似文献