An agenda for change in U.S. climate policies? Presidential ambitions and congressional powers

The U.S. membership in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) constituted an important element in the Bush administration’s voluntary and non-committing ‘soft-law’ approach to climate change. With the inauguration of President Barack Obama, the U.S. has embarked on a shift in its climate policy towards a legislative, ‘hard-law’ strategy. Obama’s approach implies that the distribution of interests in Congress becomes more significant. In this article, we assess the rules and procedures governing the relationship between the president and the Congress embedded in the U.S. Constitution and explore implications of a stronger congressional involvement in U.S. climate policies for President Obama’s ability to realise his climate policy ambitions at both the domestic and the international levels. We argue that the strong relationship between natural resource dependence (coal and oil) and opposition to climate policies is a constant feature of the U.S. climate policy debate. In order to succeed, Obama must break the enduring gridlock characterising congressional debate in this policy area by designing policies that, through compromise and compensation, can mobilise the support of oil- and coal-state representatives in Congress. The acceptability of an international climate treaty in Congress, moreover, depends inter alia on the resolution of the difficult issue of developing country participation. Success may be enhanced by using the APP and the Major Economies Initiative as informal arenas for negotiation and sector-based cooperation, thus providing a much-needed supplement to the UN-based negotiation process.

海外投资保险制度立法的思考

海外投资保险法是对海外投资进行保护、促进和规范的有效法律手段,我国应当借鉴他国经验尽快建立海外投资保险法律制度。结合海外投资保险的性质特点、国外的经验和我国的资本发展的现状和趋势,我国应以海外投资保险体制、保险范围、投资承保的条件和海外投资保险机制等四个方面加强海外投资保险方法。     

Towards contextualising stakeholder relationship indicators for corporate–community relationships

Abstract

In circumstances that are substantially different from the norm, new ways of thinking about those alternative contexts are necessary. In the context of corporate governance and corporate social investment (CSI) the relationship between corporate donors and community organisations is regarded as important, but the indicators used to describe this relationship need revisiting. The argument in this article is that context-specific indicators are needed to bring the true nature of the corporate–community relationship to the fore. In addition, a suggestion is made that such indicators be both rigorous and relevant in describing the relationship. In an interpretative, qualitative exploration of data from individual interviews it was revealed that well-known relationship indicators were inadequate to describe the relationship between corporate donors and community organisations accurately. The article could serve as the first step in reviewing stakeholder relationship indicators from organisational communication research and adapting these indicators to a specific context.     

Domestic Institutions,Capacity Limitations,and Compliance Costs: Host Country Determinants of Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 1987–2007

The number of investment treaty arbitrations has exploded in recent years. However, the distribution of known arbitral claims varies among states. Some states have had multiple claims brought against them, while others appear not to have experienced any. This article represents the first study to seek causal explanations for this variation. My principal hypothesis is that a country's institutional capacity for protecting investor rights should be negatively correlated with the number of treaty-based arbitral claims brought against it. A panel analysis suggests that, after controlling for other determinants, countries with greater institutional capacity experience fewer disputes than those with lower capacity. This finding reveals an important truth about investment treaties: while they may be designed to help developing countries compensate for domestic-level institutional deficiencies in order to attract more foreign investment, it is precisely those countries with the weakest institutions for which the costs of treaty compliance are likely to be the highest.     

Credibility and Flexibility: Political Institutions,Governance, and Foreign Direct Investment

This article argues that the relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment is both nonlinear and conditional upon status quo policies. The empirical analysis demonstrates an inverted U-shaped relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment in developing countries, with four veto players being the most attractive institutional arrangement. Countries with too few or too many veto players are not favored because of either high policy uncertainty or high policy rigidity. In addition, the benefits and costs of credibility and flexibility vary in good times and hard times. The benefits of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the costs in countries with good initial regulatory environment. The costs of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the benefits when countries are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks.     

Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,Government Credibility,and Foreign Direct Investment

Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overlapping political jurisdictions increases the likelihood that investment contracts will be honored. Empirical analyses of cross-sectional time-series data for 115 countries, from 1975–1995, are used to study how political institutions affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. After controlling for the effect of relevant economic and political variables, we find that both democratic and federal institutions help attract FDI, although the additive effect of democracy and federalism is small. This is not surprising; democratic systems already have low political risk; they do not need the additional credibility that the federal system provides to attract FDI. In contrast, we expect that federal structures significantly improve the trustworthiness of less democratic states. Empirically, we find that less democratic countries with federal political systems attract some of the highest levels of FDI.     

Looking Beyond the National Level: Foreign Direct Investment Attraction in U.S. States

International relations scholars need to look beyond the national level because U.S. states and governors are increasingly important actors in world politics. One way to look at their international activities is by examining the ways in which U.S. states seek to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), just one research puzzle at the nexus of international relations and U.S. state politics, two fields that rarely talk to one another. After pointing out the gaps within theories from international relations and international political economy, this paper describes the evolving global roles of both U.S. states and governors and shows how U.S. states attract FDI through the use of their international offices and governor-led overseas missions. Empirical findings indicate that U.S. states' international offices and a higher level of economic interdependence help states attract FDI, and the paper argues that extension of institutional approaches from IPE may be valuable for future research about the international capabilities of subnational governments and their leaders.     

略论发起人违反出资义务时对公司承担民事责任的性质

发起人违反出资义务是指发起人违反发起人协议和公司章程的约定,不履行或者不按约定履行对公司承担的交付出资财产义务的行为。发起人违反出资义务会产生对其他守约发起人、公司以及特定情形下的公司债权人的民事责任。从现行民商事立法看,发起人违反出资义务时对公司承担的民事责任在性质上并非违约责任、侵权责任或者违约责任与侵权责任的竞合,而是一种公司法上的特殊的独立的债不履行责任。当然,如果将来相关民商事立法有较大的修订则另当别论。     

英国公投退欧及影响的对策分析

英国全民公投退欧引发全球关注,无疑将会对英国、欧盟乃至世界的政治经济格局产生重大影响,尤其是欧洲一体化的未来及欧盟的应对将备受关注。此次全民公投退欧是英国基于历史和现实的多重因素考量后的选择,本质是基于对英国自身利益的维护,但最终左右退欧进程的决定性因素是公投背后的合法性要素是否得以满足。英国退欧不仅给正在稳定发展的中英、中欧政治关系带来了诸多不确定性,也会对中英经贸合作、中欧投资协定谈判、中欧自贸区联合可行性研究等产生重要影响,因此我国应尽早做好各项准备以抵御英国退欧带来的各种潜在风险。     

中国投资协议实体保护标准的自由化和多边化演进

与双边投资协议在全球范围内的爆炸式增长形成鲜明对比,国际投资保护领域的多边协定相对而言谈判进展缓慢并且较少受到关注.亚洲地区最近的多边投资协定,当属《东盟—中国投资协议》及《中日韩三方协定》.本文以中国签订的双边和多边投资协议为研究对象,考察国民待遇、最惠国待遇、公平和公正待遇、全面保护与安全、征收以及资本转移等主要实体保护标准的演进.《东盟—中国投资协议》与《中日韩三方协定》为外国投资者提供的实体保护标准,越发显示出更为自由的保护投资者的立场,这将有利于促进投资、改善投资相关规章制度的透明度、加强投资领域的多边合作,最终推动整个亚太地区的区域投资协定的签署以及投资法律体系的自由化和多边化发展.