Credibility and Flexibility: Political Institutions,Governance, and Foreign Direct Investment

This article argues that the relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment is both nonlinear and conditional upon status quo policies. The empirical analysis demonstrates an inverted U-shaped relationship between political institutions and foreign direct investment in developing countries, with four veto players being the most attractive institutional arrangement. Countries with too few or too many veto players are not favored because of either high policy uncertainty or high policy rigidity. In addition, the benefits and costs of credibility and flexibility vary in good times and hard times. The benefits of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the costs in countries with good initial regulatory environment. The costs of maintaining status quo tend to outweigh the benefits when countries are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks.     

Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,Government Credibility,and Foreign Direct Investment

Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overlapping political jurisdictions increases the likelihood that investment contracts will be honored. Empirical analyses of cross-sectional time-series data for 115 countries, from 1975–1995, are used to study how political institutions affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. After controlling for the effect of relevant economic and political variables, we find that both democratic and federal institutions help attract FDI, although the additive effect of democracy and federalism is small. This is not surprising; democratic systems already have low political risk; they do not need the additional credibility that the federal system provides to attract FDI. In contrast, we expect that federal structures significantly improve the trustworthiness of less democratic states. Empirically, we find that less democratic countries with federal political systems attract some of the highest levels of FDI.     

Looking Beyond the National Level: Foreign Direct Investment Attraction in U.S. States

International relations scholars need to look beyond the national level because U.S. states and governors are increasingly important actors in world politics. One way to look at their international activities is by examining the ways in which U.S. states seek to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), just one research puzzle at the nexus of international relations and U.S. state politics, two fields that rarely talk to one another. After pointing out the gaps within theories from international relations and international political economy, this paper describes the evolving global roles of both U.S. states and governors and shows how U.S. states attract FDI through the use of their international offices and governor-led overseas missions. Empirical findings indicate that U.S. states' international offices and a higher level of economic interdependence help states attract FDI, and the paper argues that extension of institutional approaches from IPE may be valuable for future research about the international capabilities of subnational governments and their leaders.     

略论发起人违反出资义务时对公司承担民事责任的性质

发起人违反出资义务是指发起人违反发起人协议和公司章程的约定,不履行或者不按约定履行对公司承担的交付出资财产义务的行为。发起人违反出资义务会产生对其他守约发起人、公司以及特定情形下的公司债权人的民事责任。从现行民商事立法看,发起人违反出资义务时对公司承担的民事责任在性质上并非违约责任、侵权责任或者违约责任与侵权责任的竞合,而是一种公司法上的特殊的独立的债不履行责任。当然,如果将来相关民商事立法有较大的修订则另当别论。     

英国公投退欧及影响的对策分析

英国全民公投退欧引发全球关注,无疑将会对英国、欧盟乃至世界的政治经济格局产生重大影响,尤其是欧洲一体化的未来及欧盟的应对将备受关注。此次全民公投退欧是英国基于历史和现实的多重因素考量后的选择,本质是基于对英国自身利益的维护,但最终左右退欧进程的决定性因素是公投背后的合法性要素是否得以满足。英国退欧不仅给正在稳定发展的中英、中欧政治关系带来了诸多不确定性,也会对中英经贸合作、中欧投资协定谈判、中欧自贸区联合可行性研究等产生重要影响,因此我国应尽早做好各项准备以抵御英国退欧带来的各种潜在风险。     

建立证券投资保险法律制度，完善对投资人利益的保护

随着我国证券市场的发展 ,证券领域的竞争逐步加剧 ,优胜劣汰机制开始发挥作用。一家证券公司的倒闭将直接影响到其客户 (也即证券市场投资人 )的利益。如何在推进市场退出机制的同时 ,有效地保护投资人的利益 ,成为我国目前理论和实践亟待解决的问题。本文拟在对我国证券投资者保护现状进行剖析的基础上 ,提出建立我国证券投资保险法律制度的必要性和紧迫性 ,并对建立该制度提出一点拙见 ,以期推动我国当前证券市场退出时对投资人利益保护的难题的解决     

缔约过失责任刍议

缔约过失责任制度是我国新合同法中确立的一项崭新的法律制度,其许多相关理论有待探求。文章主张缔约过失制度的理论基础应采诚实信用说,并在此基础上提出缔约过失责任的构成条件以及主要类型,以期推进缔约过失责任的理论研究。     

198O年代末以来柬埔寨华人经济地位的发展变化

在柬埔寨,华商依凭其得天独厚的比较优势,在当地的商贸活动中发挥了不可替代的作用。本地华人经济渐趋复兴,以制衣业为代表的中国对柬直接投资蓬勃发展。     

Institutional competitiveness,social investment,and welfare regimes

Are the rather generous welfare regimes found in most European countries sustainable; that is, are they competitive in a globalizing economy? Or will they, on the contrary, be crowded out by the more austere and less expensive regimes generally found in liberal Anglo‐Saxon countries? We first discuss this issue conceptually, focusing on the notions of institutional competitiveness, social investment, and short‐term and long‐term productivity. We then briefly present the results of an empirical study of 50 social indicators of policies and outcomes in 20 Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries during the early 2000s. We conclude that welfare regimes have not been forced to converge through a “race to the bottom.” There remain three distinct ways to face the “trilemma” of job growth, income inequality, and fiscal restraint: Nordic countries achieve high labor market participation through high social investment; Anglo‐Saxon countries attain the same objective through minimal public intervention; while Continental European countries experience fiscal pressures because their social protection schemes are not promoting participation to the same extent.     

民族教育投资体制改革及政策建议

民族教育投资体制改革应坚持“有进有退,适度竞争”的原则,应建立起以国家为主、地方为辅的投资体制、设计双赢的民族教育投资体制、建立补偿性民族教育投资体制、建立起以就业为导向的民族教育投资体制、建立起以产业为导向的民族教育投资体制和建立起规范的民族地区义务教育财政转移支付制度,提出了相应的对策建议。