A Low Information Theory of Ballot Position Effect

This article suggests a theory of ballot position effect based on the amount of information present in the electorate while accounting for several alternative hypotheses. The more information that voters have, all other factors held constant, the less a role ballot position will play. Additionally, the role of electoral institutions in mitigating or magnifying the effect is considered. The theories are tested with precinct-level data from city council elections held in Peoria, Illinois, from 1983 through 1999. Position effect is found to account for a bonus of 0.7% to 5.2% of the precinct-level vote share per position on the ballot. The level of aggregate information and the institutional setting explain a significant share of ballot position effect, even while examined in the presence of alternative explanations such as incumbency, endorsement, campaign expenditure, gender, and race.     

The primary runoff as a remnant of the old South

During the Jim Crow era, the American South developed a distinctive one-party political structure. One important feature of that structure was the primary runoff, which was adopted to require candidates to generate majority support in the nomination process and to stimulate competition within the Democratic Party (thus keeping the Republican Party irrelevant). In this piece, I argue that although the South has become a two-party region and the runoff has lived beyond its original purposes, it continues to do many of the things it was put into place to do. As in decades past, the runoff still has an impact on such things as candidate emergence, the competitiveness of primaries, and the ability for voters to reevaluate their choices.     

重庆市土地行政征收案件调查报告

现行征地立法规范存在较强局限性,行政征地权缺乏自我约束、自我发展、自我完善的内部约束与激励机制,人民法院在审理征地案件时,既不能评判既有的征地规则,也不能对具体征地案件从形式上与实质上进行审查,难以有效监督、制约征地行为。改革征地制度,限制政府征地权力,保障农民土地的最大收益权,已经成为实现城乡统筹发展,构建和谐重庆的关键所在。以城乡统筹发展观为指导,提高征地与征地补偿法律位阶,制定《重庆市土地征收条例》,制定《重庆市行政征收程序规定》,以及建立和完善我市土地整理制度是防治征地行政争议扩大化的根本性解决机制。     

新中国协商民主制度的回顾与展望——献给新中国诞辰60周年

回顾新中国的民主发展历程,协商民主在我国早已有所实践,其中人民政协和近年来出现的基层协商民主是其主要载体。协商民主弥补了票决民主和选举民主的不足,其蕴含的内在品质有利于和谐社会建设。     

对中国立法权设置的反思——以几个法律文本为考察中心

通过对现行《宪法》,以及《立法法》、《地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法》、《国务院组织法》、《民族区域自治法》文本的考察发现,我国现行宪法和法律关于地方性法规制定权、自治法规制定权、部门规章和地方政府规章制定权的规定并不一致。导致这种不一致的原因,最为浅显的是立法者（以及修宪者）在制定法律性文件时没能与其他法律性文件相协调;更为深层的原因则根植于两种错误观念中：一是误解了人民权利的正当性基础与国家权力（包括法律性文件制定权）合法性来源的差异,二是混淆了《宪法》和法律在规范国家权力中的不同作用。     

Losers' Second Chances and Control of the Party Machine: Aspirant Premiers in Regional Spain

In parliamentary democracies, controlling party machines has traditionally been a key asset for nascent political leaders, allowing them to continue in their position even after suffering a bad electoral start. Recent research suggests that in ‘old democracies’ this is no longer the case. Seeking to find whether this finding also applies to ‘young democracies’, the article analyses a dataset (built by the author) of candidates from the main national parties for the premiership of the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas, to ask whether being party chair increases the chances of ‘reselection’ after losing a first election. I conclude that in Spain, an example of a ‘young’ democracy, party machines still play a fundamental role at the start of politicians' leadership careers.     

“Keeping Pandora's (ballot) box half-shut”: a comparative inquiry into the institutional limits of external voting in EU Member States

The article compares the institutional constraints that limit the potential electoral impact of external voting in national legislative elections in the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU). It shows that the discrepancy between policy aims and outcomes can be mainly attributed to a variety of institutional constraints restricting the scope of the policy (through residence and professional qualifications); limiting eligible voters’ access to the ballot (through cumbersome registration procedures and voting methods); and reducing the electoral weight attributed to their votes (through distinct modes of representation). It argues that the discrepancy is at least partly the result of a combination of electoral and normative concerns about the influence that external voters could and should have in elections. Institutional restrictions on the franchise of external citizens may be interpreted as a way to keep the “Pandora's box” of unexpected electoral consequences half-shut, by extending the suffrage to a traditionally excluded electorate while at the same time moderating the implications.     

美国公司债券发行制度分析

美国公司债券发行有公募发行和私募发行两种方式.公募发行实行注册制,信息披露制度是公募发行和交易监管的核心.私募发行包括一般私募发行和144A私募发行.本文通过比较研究美国公司债券公募和私募发行制度,总结出美国公司债券市场的成功经验为:灵活自由的债券发行制度,充分的信息披露、完善的债权人保护机制和对发债公司高管违法行为的严刑峻法.