论中国援外不附加政治条件原则的理论基础及现实意义

不附加政治条件原则的雏形是中国援外八项原则中的不附加任何条件原则。伴随中国改革开放和援外体制改革,期间曾表述为不附加任何政治条件。只字之差,反映了中国援外政策的变与不变之道。国家主权平等原则、不干涉原则以及经济发展的内在性要求,是不附加政治条件原则的理论基础。西方国家之所以歪曲和批评这一原则,归根结底还是出于对中国影响力上升的猜忌和遏制。着眼长远,中国援外的国际化道路是一个必然趋势,但是在变与不变之间,不附加政治条件原则仍将具有长久的生命力。     

The institutional failures of International Monetary Fund conditionality

The purpose of this paper is to propose an analytical framework integrating the diverse explanations of the failure of IMF conditionality. The IMF is a key player in the running of markets in a global economy. The institutional failures of IMF conditionality are appreciated at two complementary levels: (a) its intrinsic bureaucratic bias, and (b) the inability of the IMF to manage the institutional change required for the development of market processes. A new approach of conditionality suggests the separation of the role of the IMF as financial backer from its role as adviser to countries confronted by the globalization process.

Success in slow motion: The Europeanization of Romanian child protection policy

This paper analyzes the influence of the European Union (EU) through a qualitative case study of child protection policy in Romania. This is a particularly tough case for the growing “Europeanization” literature. Prior research has called attention to several factors that promote Europeanization, including the presence of a pro-reform domestic coalition, the clarity and consistency of the EU’s own legislative targets, a state’s own prior involvement in the setting of European standards, a strong consensus among EU member states backing the European position, and strong non-European support for EU initiatives. According to these propositions, Romanian child protection seemed to provide a worst case scenario for Europeanization, as initially none of these conditions held. And yet the paper shows that substantial Europeanization occurred anyway. We argue that the EU experienced a very slow start with Romania but that it cultivated an opposition that responded to EU initiatives when that opposition took power. Moreover, the EU found three “workarounds” to the obstacles just noted: it asserted legislative targets it did not possess itself, invented new policy tools, and drew protection for its most controversial policy from another international organization, the ECHR. Our central theoretical claim is that external pressure requires internal accommodation in order to have lasting effects. The claim has important implications for the diffusion and conditionality debates.