Actions by Political Officials Have Weakened the Federal Government Workplace: Downsizing Has Cut Lower Level Workers the Most and Replacing Federal Employees with Private Corporations Costs Much More,Creating the Need for Immediate Reform

Abstract

The authors of this paper are four practitioners each of whom has many years of experience working in the Federal government and also has pursued doctoral studies in public or business administration. Three ideas developed in this paper are that: (1) the Federal civil service has been changed from being a model workplace to a much less desirable one; (2) although downsizing has been touted as an efficiency and economy measure, lower level employees experienced the most cuts and (3) the current practice of replacing Federal employees with private corporations costs much more. Over the past two decades private sector workplaces in the United States, and now the Federal government workplace, have experienced so much change that previous theories, concepts, models, and expectations no longer hold. Just as private industry workplaces have been changed by downsizing, reorganizations, mergers, elimination of middle management, and outsourcing, so, too, has the Federal government workplace been fundamentally altered. Reducing the number of government workers, replacing Federal employees with private firms, increasing the number of officials with political agendas, and using harsh personnel management practices have transfigured the Federal workplace. Examples of factors that have contributed to a changed workplace include: the Civil Service Reform Act which replaced the Civil Service Commission with the Office of Personnel Management; importing private sector approaches into the government, e.g., the Grace Commission; replacing the Civil Service Retirement System with the Federal Employees Retirement System; pressure to downsize and privatize; and many elements of the National Performance Review and Government Performance and Results Act. Now that the metamorphosis away from the traditional Civil Service borne of the Pendleton Act is nearly complete (although the new paradigm is not entirely clear), questions about the effects of a changed government workplace are being raised. Some people believe the metamorphosis is from a caterpillar to a butterfly, while others think the opposite. Whether the changed Federal government is a thing of beauty or a distasteful organism will be determined over time by observations and assessments of the effects of the change. These effects will be both internal to the government workplace, itself, and external to it, involving the products, services, outputs, and outcomes it produces. This paper begins by describing some of the politically mandated changes that have altered the very foundation of the Federal government workplace over the past 20 years and made it a much less desirable place to work. Next, some of the effects of two politically mandated changes are examined: (1) downsizing or reducing the number of Americans who can work for their government and (2) contracting out or replacing government workers with private corporations. Political officials have told the media and the American public that these changes were needed to improve the government's efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. It has been suggested that these initiatives will reduce costs. However, an examination of downsizing and contracting out shows the opposite effect. While overall the Federal government has fewer employees now than in 1961, the statistics indicate that lower level employees have been cut the most:

• The number of secretaries decreased by 39% between 1992 and 1998.

• The blue collar workforce is down 40% since 1982, e.g., Supply Clerical and Technician (?35%), Accounting Technician (?24%), and Electronics Mechanic (?41%).

• Between 1993 and 1998 the number of GS‐1 to GS‐10 employees fell from 767,000 to 594,000.

• In 1983 the number of GS‐1 to GS‐10 workers exceeded GS‐11 to GS‐15 by nearly 300,000, while in 1997 GS‐11 to GS‐15 outnumbered the lower level workers by 44,000.

Although authoritative cost comparison studies are difficult to conduct because top officials have made little provision to collect information on the cost of contracting with private firms or the number of contract employees, available information indicates that it is much more expensive than using government employees. The contracting out we are talking about is not the usual kind—building ships or planes, or acquiring computer systems or special expertise not available in the government. Rather, it is contracting with private firms to do jobs that are currently being performed by Federal employees. Not satisfied with the level at which firms are being substituted for Federal employees, actions by political officials have created an environment which now favors private corporations and where they can be given work at top management's discretion, often regardless of cost. In fact, today most contracting out is done without the use of Circular A‐76 Cost Comparison Studies. There is empirical and logical evidence that shows that replacing government employees with private corporations is more expensive. For example, a study by the Department of the Army documents what people close to contracting have always known—that it is far more expensive to contract with a private firm for work than to have Federal employees do it. Logically, the government incurs additional items of cost when replacing Federal employees with private corporations. First, there is the profit that goes to the firm. Second, there is the firm's overhead which pays for corporate offices, staffs, and CEOs. Third, there are the costs of the contracting and award process and of contract administration and management. Although the worker on a government contract may be paid a little less than a government worker, the cost of the worker is only a third to a half of what the government pays the firm. Thus, replacing government workers with private firms usually costs far more and it is not unusual for it to cost two to three times as much. This paper partly is based on the authors' long experience in the Federal government. It is not based on the organizations in which they are currently employed.     

China＇s Labor Contract Law and the liberalization of global markets： Will employees＇ rights equate to employers＇ nightmares？

Lower labor costs and realization of profits have been key components in the expansion of the global market. As we continue to witness the prolific liberalization of the global market, it is essential that we remember the importance of human capital. Workers play a paramount role in the realization of continued and sustained global market growth. Paradoxically, sustained growth in the global market is also fueled by the absence of workers＇ rights and the resulting reduction of labor costs. Thus, multi-national companies and workers employed by multi-national companies, have encountered a seeming contradiction of workplace realities. From a capitalistic economic perspective, it is necessary for multi-national companies to compete for market share and realize profits. However, in order to promote social harmony and ensure against large-scale social unrest, workers must be given basic rights ensuring economic security and workplace justice. China has enacted the Labor Contract Law to address challenges surrounding these issues. This paper will discuss the efficacy of China＇s embracing the rule of law so as to effectively enforce the Labor Contract Law. The paper will also give an overview of the concepts forming the foundation of the rule of law. Further, the paper will offer a brief comparative analysis of the United States＇ use of the rule of law in relation to resolving post-slavery labor issues. Finally, the paper will recommend a model system for use by China in enforcing the Labor Contract Law.     

Creating markets in no-trust environments: The law and economics of smart contracts

Smart contracts, self-executing agreements based on blockchain technology, have the capacity to create trust in what we term no-trust contracting environments. We argue that using them in such environments is the path to unleash the full potential of smart contracts. Compared to the contract enforcement mechanisms characterized by traditional contract law or relational contracts, smart contracts can offer a superior solution for facilitating trade.Several lawyers and economists have debated whether smart contracts might offer the prospect of cheaper, faster and better transactions. As we discuss below, contract law scholars caution that they neither replicate the relational context essential for the day-to-day practice of contracting nor offer a superior solution to problems addressed by traditional contract law, such as contract validity and legality. We clarify and systematize the current thinking on the legal nature and reliability of smart contracts, and address the concerns of contract law scholars. While doing that, we suggest a step forward in characterizing contracting environments, contract enforcement mechanisms and the trust relationship underlying contracts.     

试析《合同法》中合同义务的扩张及意义

传统的民法理论、民事立法实践中对合同义务和合同责任的规定过于狭窄 ,不利于保护合同当事人的权益 ,也不利于提高交易效率和保障交易安全。新《合同法》中对合同的义务进行了拓展 ,表现为先合同义务 (缔约过失责任和保守商业秘密 ) ,合同履行中的附随义务和后合同义务 ,这无论从理论上还是实践性上均具有重要意义。     

An optional European contract law code: Advantages and disadvantages

Should the EU introduce an Optional European Contract Law Code and what should it look like? By applying economic theories of federalism and regulatory competition (legal federalism), it is shown why an Optional Code would be a very suitable legal instrument within a two-level European System of Contract Laws. By allowing private parties’ choice of law to a certain extent, it can combine the most important advantages of centralisation and decentralisation of competences for legal rules. Through differentiated analyses of three kinds of contract law rules (mandatory substantive rules, mandatory information rules and facilitative law), important conclusions can be reached: which kinds of contract law rules are most suitable to be applied on an optional basis (e.g. facilitative law) and which might be less so (e.g. a core of information regulations). Furthermore a number of additional general conclusions about the design and scope of an Optional EU Code and some conclusions in regard to sales law are derived.     

论欺诈、胁迫之民事救济——兼评《合同法》之二元规定

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契约、身份与劳动关系变迁——国企改制以来的国家与工人阶级

国有企业改制以来的劳动关系通常被表述为行政化向契约化的转变。本文的讨论则以身份和契约作为核心变量，以二者自身内涵的变化以及在国企改制前后结合形式的差异为主线。典型单位体制下，劳动关系的行政化不过是国家与工人阶级社会契约的外在形式，它能够发挥作用是因为工人阶级的单位身份。国企改制是将劳动关系商品化的过程，而劳动关系之所以能够成为商品，是因为契约关系发生了变化。它分为两部分：国家与工人阶级的契约表现为调控性的政策和法律；工人和企业的契约表现为市场劳动合同。而工人的单位身份则转化为公民身份，它是现代契约的基础。这一身份的转换表明我国开始以个人主义而不是集体主义构建社会。     

行政法的革命性创新——评杨解君教授《中国行政法的变革之道——契约理念的确立及其展开》

杨解君教授的《中国行政法的变革之道——契约理念的确立及其展开》是一部富有理论创新内涵的行政法学著作。该书提出和论证的行政法应该确立契约理念的观点,突破了传统行政法学理论对于契约的认识,也是对传统公法、私法界分理论的挑战。这一观点与人类社会进步的一般规则和中国社会转型的时代发展脉络相契合,具有深刻的革命性意义。     

合同诈骗罪“非法占有目的”之结构性认定

从理论及实务经验来看，盗窃、诈骗等侵财类犯罪的“非法占有目的”一般由“排除意思”与“利用意思”两个方面构成。排除意思侧重排除权利人的法益保护，利用意思侧重财物的经济利用。合同诈骗作为诈骗的特殊形态，其非法占有目的也可以从此两结构进行认定。具体来说，从签订合同时、合同履行中判断其是否具有排除意思及利用意思，也可以从合同履行中履行完毕前对通过合同取得财物的利用方式判断其是否具有非法占有目的。     

我国合同法归责原则重构

归责原则所要解决的,乃是依据何种事实状态确定责任的归属问题,归责原则是违约责任,乃至合同法的核心制度。从责任的本质入手,归责的判断标准应符合最起码的伦理道德底线,并能体现合同自由和矫正正义。因此,有必要从民法与合同法的关系出发,反思我国合同归责原则。