Quasi-citizenship as a category of practice: analyzing engagement with Russia’s Compatriot policy in Crimea

This article analyzes engagement with Russia’s Compatriot policy, as an example of ethnizenship-type of quasi-citizenship, in Crimea, as the most likely case of Compatriot engagement. The article focuses on unpacking the lived experience of Compatriot identification and engagement and the rationale for this engagement. The article finds a narrow and niche engagement with the Compatriot policy in Crimea where only the most politicized and discriminated individuals, alongside beneficiaries of the Compatriot policy, identify as Compatriots. However, the article also finds dissatisfaction with the Compatriot policy because it fails to offer the kind of status, and rights and benefits, of ‘full’ citizenship. Thus, while citizenship might be becoming fractured, via quasi-citizenship policies, citizenship remains the key point of entry to the kin-state. Focusing on the lived experience of quasi-citizenship, and examining quasi-citizenship as a category of practice, is crucial for developing understanding of the social and political impacts of quasi-citizenship policies.     

Silencing the contestant. Legitimizing Crimea’s annexation by mimicking the West

ABSTRACT

This article analyses Russia’s endeavours in legitimising the annexation of Crimea in the eyes of the Western community. The paper argues that Russia’s strategy of “silencing” the international contestation has been focused on the use of the West’s “language” for the justification of contested actions. Starting from the assertion that the formulation of Russia’s foreign policy is determined by Western normative frameworks and by the West’s international behaviour, the article scrutinised Moscow’s official narrative after March 2014 by comparing it with the West’s arguments used in particular in the cases of NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia and the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.     

Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians and why Novorossiya failed

This article discusses two inter-related issues. Firstly, the factors lying behind Russia's fervent belief that its Novorossiya (New Russia) project, aimed to bring back to Russia eight oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhhya, Odesa, Mykolayiv, and Kherson in eastern and southern Ukraine and launched during the 2014 “Russian Spring,” would be successful. Russian identity misunderstood, and continues to misunderstand, Ukraine and Ukrainians through stereotypes and myths of Ukraine as an “artificial state” and Ukraine's Russian speakers as “fraternal brothers” and Russians and Ukrainians as “one people” (odin narod). Secondly, why Ukrainian national identity was different than these Russian stereotypes and myths and how this led to the failure of the Novorossiya project. Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians came face to face with the reality of Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriotism and their low support for the Russkij Mir (Russian World). The article compares Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians with how Ukrainians see themselves to explain the roots of the 2014 crisis, “Russian Spring,” and failure of Russian President Vladimir Putin's Novorossiya project.     

History and Culture in Russia and Ukraine: How to Complicate a Crisis of European Security

Russia’s annexation of Crimea was a major blow to the post-World War II security order in Europe and could well be the start of a new Cold War. This is especially the case since it was followed by the initiation of a proxy war in eastern Ukraine. The two works reviewed here deal the current crisis and provide historical background. Although there are actual concrete “national interests” involved in the Russian-Ukrainian relationship, the differences in how history is remembered complicates any attempt at resolving the issues.     

Social media and Russian territorial irredentism: some facts and a conjecture

ABSTRACT

After Kremlin policymakers decided to incorporate the territory of Crimea into Russia, updates on public attitudes in Russian-speaking communities elsewhere in Ukraine would have been in high demand. Because social media users produce content in order to communicate ideas to their social networks, online political discourse can provide important clues about the political dispositions of communities. We map the evolution of Russian-speakers’ attitudes, expressed on social media, across the course of the conflict as Russian analysts might have observed them at the time. Results suggest that the Russian-Ukrainian interstate border only moved as far as their military could have advanced while incurring no occupation costs – Crimea, and no further.     

俄乌克里米亚争端及其原因浅析

1954年,为纪念乌克兰与俄罗斯合并300周年,苏联最高苏维埃主席团决定将克里米亚作为“礼物”赠送给乌克兰,以示俄乌之间的亲密关系。但这一决定,却为后来双方的争吵埋下了祸根。苏联解体后,克里米亚争端伴随着俄乌之间一系列冲突的发生很快浮出水面,成为90年代初困扰俄乌关系发展的一大障碍。经过多回合的较量、妥协与各种力量的分化组合,克里米亚争端在1997年基本得到了解决,也给我们留下了一些值得思考的问题和启示。