Regulating electronic identity in the European Union: An analysis of the Lisbon Treaty’s competences and legal basis for eID

This paper discusses the feasibility of EU legal action in the field of electronic identity (eID) within the new distribution of legal competences and the provision of novel legal basis engendered by the Treaty of Lisbon. The article attempts to find a ‘legal anchor’ to the idea of a pan-European electronic identity within EU law, looking at the issues of competences and legal basis. After examining various different areas of competence and the most feasible (and probable) candidates for a legal basis supporting an EU legal framework for eID, the paper argues that the latter should be found in the combination of Article 16 TFEU (concerning the right to the protection of personal data) with Article 3 TUE, and Articles 26 and 114 TFEU (concerning the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market), which also constitute the area of competence where an eID legal initiative can be pursued.     

Security,privacy and freedom and the EU legal and policy framework for biometrics

The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon and the granting to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the same legal force as the Treaty has lent a new impulse to the consideration of fundamental human rights by the European Union (EU). The question remains, however, as to how this legal discourse, centred upon human rights, is actually shaping the EU regulatory framework in specific policy domains. The aim of this paper is to critically appraise the ways that the fundamental rights of security, privacy and freedom guaranteed by the Charter are being construed in the context of EU law and policy on biometrics, an ethically and morally sensitive security technology whose development and use are being actively promoted by the EU. We conclude that the interpretation of the pertinent rights, as well as their balancing, owes a great deal to the goals of EU policies for research and development, and under the auspices of Freedom, Security and Justice, shaped largely by political and economic considerations. These considerations then tend to prevail over ethically or morally-based legal claims.     

EU和WTO预防原则解释和适用比较研究

预防原则是国际法上重要的法律原则,其法律地位存在很大争议,不同国际组织对其认可和适用的程度不尽相同。欧盟的预防原则理念领先于其他国家和地区,在区域内的实践呈扩大的趋势。WTO框架内预防原则的实践则发展缓慢,由于宗旨的不同和背后利益集团的博弈,与欧盟的预防原则立法和实践存在较大差异。     

Economic Insecurity,Blame, and Punitive Attitudes

This study examines the relationship between punitive attitudes toward criminals, two measures of economic insecurity and a measure of blame for stagnating incomes that targets welfare, affirmative action, and immigration. In effect, we are testing whether punitiveness toward criminals is part of a general constellation of resentment toward what Gans (1995 Gans, H. J. 1995. The war against the poor, New York: Basic Books.  [Google Scholar]) has termed the “undeserving poor” and that Garland (2001 Garland, D. 2001. The culture of control, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) has described as the “politics of reaction.” Survey data involving 1,476 adults are assessed using OLS regression. Results indicate that blame of welfare, affirmative action, and immigration is the strongest predictor of punitiveness. Economic insecurity has variable input to punitive attitudes that depends on the measure used and the sex and race of respondents. Some evidence of an “angry White male” phenomenon is also provided by the results.     

论欧盟公共采购法采购主体的界定标准及其对我国的借鉴意义

欧盟公共采购法包括三类主体———公共部门、经营四个指定公用事业行业的公共企业和在政府授予的特殊或排他性权利基础上开展经营的私有企业。其中将公共部门纳入政府采购是由于委托—代理关系的存在,而将企业纳入政府采购是为了防止政府对企业的采购过程施加影响。相比之下我国政府采购法规定的采购主体仅限于公共部门的范畴,这是由我国目前的社会经济发展需要决定的。政府采购法的采购主体制度不是一成不变的,应随着社会经济发展需要的变化而发展变迁,我国国有企业改革完成后,也应将国有企业按照不同性质进行分类,一部分由竞争法调整,一部分纳入政府采购法的调整范围。     

Coercive Europeanization: the EU's struggle to contain secessionism in the Balkans

Secessionism is still the predominant conflict type in Europe. Even though the European Union (EU) extended the enlargement perspective to the Balkans 15 years ago, secessionist ambition remains pervasive, especially in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia. How does secessionism affect Europeanization and how does Europeanization affect secessionism? It is argued here that in cases of unattained statehood domestic power struggles among deeply divided elites over status and territorial control undermine the consensus needed for Europeanization. In cases of attained de facto statehood the conflict focuses on recognition, which likewise polarizes societies and marginalizes reform. In such high-resistance scenarios, where the inclusionary EU norms clash with the exclusionary norms of the secessionists, the EU vigorously works to marginalize the secessionists by relying mainly on denial, punishment and imposition. Still, the EU's leverage is often insufficient in moving the conflicting parties towards within-state solutions and reform. A study of Bosnia's transformation since Dayton reveals, however, that the EU's leverage varies over time and that the EU at times itself inadvertently fans secessionism.     

US mainland,EU archipelago? Convergence and divergence on transnational organized crime

The fight against organized crime has become a top security priority for the European Union (EU). While a new policy area is emerging, it is difficult to understand who is in lead and how the process develops. This article delves into the post-Lisbon EU security model, exploring how Washington and Brussels collaborate in combating organized crime in a context of changing definitions, actors and policies. It argues that US definitions, operational models and policies influence EU institutional thinking and policies, shifting the emphasis from prevention and rule of law to execution and intelligence. The dynamics of policy convergence and divergence on criminal matters in the transatlantic community reflect tectonic shifts in the deepest levels of thinking security in the West, affecting the moulding of a European security identity.     

New threats – different response: EU and NATO and Somali piracy

When the European Union (EU) launched its first military naval mission, EU NAVFOR Somalia, Atalanta, the states who are members of both the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made a political choice: to prioritize the EU over NATO in their multilateral military efforts to fight piracy and its consequences. Thereby, Atalanta challenges the conventional assumption that EU security cooperation will remain limited. It also challenges the widely held belief that the European states will chose to act through NATO if dealing multilaterally with international security issues. How can we explain this decision? This analysis suggests that it can be explained in two phases where different mechanisms were at work. In the first phase, which can be accounted for from a neo-realist perspective, France, who held the Presidency, used particular favorable geopolitical conditions to put an autonomous EU operation on the agenda. However, agreement on the EU option cannot be explained as a result of strategic bargaining. Instead, in a second phase and in line with an alternative hypothesis building on the theory of communicative action, the EU member states came to support the French suggestion due to legitimacy considerations regarding the legal framework of the two operations.     

Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis

This paper assesses the role of the European Union in the Libyan crisis (2011) and critically considers the implications for its evolution as an international security actor. Employing role theory, the paper reviews the historical development of the Union's security actorness and sheds specific light on the balance between self-conception and external expectations in the case of the Libyan crisis. Its central argument is that, despite external expectations and European narratives of a ‘comprehensive power role’, the Libyan crisis showed that the Union still acts in line with its traditional role as a civilian power. The inability to go beyond civilian power stemmed from internal dissonance on a potential hard power role and a corresponding lack of material capabilities. The growing gap between expectations about comprehensive actorness on the one hand and performance on the other is likely to damage the Union's future credibility as an international security actor.     

Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy: the USA and the European Union in Somalia and Mali

The French intervention in Mali in early 2013 emphasizes that the decision-makers in Paris, Brussels, and Washington considered the establishment of the radical Islamist regime in Northern Mali a threat to their security interests. The widespread instability including the rise of radical Islamist groups in Somalia was perceived as a threat to western interests. It is the core argument of the paper if western powers decide to provide security in Africa, they will be inclined to use proxy instead of deploying own troops. Security provision by proxy in African means that African troops are doing the actual fighting and peacekeeping on the ground while western powers basically pay the costs, the logistics, and the training of local African troops. The paper concludes that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia and The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in Mali are proxies for the USA and the European Union.