论政府数据开放的收费定价及其法律规制

政府数据在法律性质上具有财产的属性,在实践中也具有可交易性的特点,是一种财产性权利。政府数据开放具有渐进性、开放性、价值性、时效性、周期性、非买断性和再利用性的特点,根据不同的标准可对其作相应的类型化区分。政府对于开放的数据进行收费定价有其合理基础,在数据开放定价模式上则有免费模式、按成本费用定价模式以及按“成本+利润”定价模式。我国政府数据开放的定价收费问题,应置于行政收费的法制框架下讨论,基于公平、效率和量能支付等行政收费的基本原则,确立向社会公众免费开放、向市场主体的商业化利用有限收费的制度。作为减损公民财产利益的负担行为,政府数据开放收费定价应受到法律的严格规制。在确立政府数据开放的基本定价模式基础上,由立法来创设数据的收费定价,完善收费程序,加强对收费定价行为的行政内部监督机制建设,从而推动政府数据有序、规范开放。     

Transnational cooperation: a network analysis of town twinning in the Baltic Sea region

The patterns of cooperation between regions and urban spaces are no longer influenced, to the same extent, by national borders. Political integrative events changed the extent of transborder urban cooperation in the Baltic borderlands, a region that has undergone extensive changes. A social network analysis of cooperative ties in the form of town twinning indicates that the end of the Cold War strongly changed the network of town twinning in this region, whereas the effect of the various EU enlargement rounds seems to be more nuanced.     

A Better Press: A Response to John Lloyd's ‘Regulate Yourself’

Writing recently in The Political Quarterly, the journalist John Lloyd took issue with regulatory remedies for ‘bad journalism’ in the United Kingdom that were proposed by the Leveson inquiry of 2011–12 and endorsed by Parliament in 2013 in the form of a Royal Charter. State action will fail, he asserted, because only journalists can change journalism, and he urged British journalists to undertake this transformation. This response argues that Lloyd dismisses the Leveson process too lightly and takes too little account of the many victims of press abuses, who are entitled to better protection. A decent society had to do something about this, and the Leveson Charter process was a measured and constructive response that offers the best hope of higher press standards and of protection for ordinary citizens while safeguarding freedom of expression for journalists. Lloyd's proposal for action by journalists, by contrast, is impractical, not least because it ignores powerful forces preventing journalists from taking control.     

Does the UK Have Influence in the EU Legislative Process?

The UK has influenced some major EU policies, such as the creation of the single market and enlargement. But how influential are the UK government and British MEPs in the day‐to‐day EU legislative process? To answer this question, this article analyses recent data from the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The evidence is mixed. In the Council, in recent years the UK government has been outvoted more often than any other EU government, yet UK officials remain well connected ‘behind the scenes’. In the European Parliament, British MEPs are now more likely to be on the losing side than are the MEPs of any other member state, yet British MEPs still win key committee chairs and rapporteurships. The evidence suggests that if the UK votes to remain in the EU, Britain's political elites will need to re‐engage with Brussels politics if the UK is to avoid becoming further marginalised from mainstream EU politics.     

Alternatives to EU Membership and the Rational Imagination

The domestic scenario following a Brexit vote is likely to be characterised by high stakes, uncertainty and fissile political debate. No off‐the‐peg arrangement touted for Brexit—be it Norwegian, Swiss, Turkish or Canadian—was designed to engage with such a context. Nor does it seem wise to rush to medium‐term commitments which might pre‐empt democratic politics and wise choices. Far more important will be the legitimacy of any institutional settlement governing this arrangement, which will provide the context for its revision and development and the space for democratic reflection over how these policies are to be governed. It will be suggested that here there is much insight to be gained from looking at regional arrangements beyond the EU.     

EU Cohesion Policy Implementation and Administrative Capacities: Insights from Italian Regions

In this article we explain Italy’s partial persisting difficulties in EU cohesion policy implementation by focusing on one specific variable: regional administrative capacity. In line with research findings based on the national level (Tosun, 2014 Tosun, J. (2014), Absorption of regional funds. A comparative analysis, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.52, No.2, pp.371–387. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12088[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), our working hypothesis is that administrative capacity is the most important explanatory factor of EU cohesion policy implementation also at the regional level. In the article, by adopting a ‘most similar research cases’ design approach, we test the hypothesis with reference to two Italian regions: Campania and Puglia. In addition, we seek to adequately define the concept of ‘administrative capacity’ and operationalize it properly. In the concluding section, we consider the competitive advantage of our definition and operationalization of the notion of administrative capacity also with reference to other policy sectors beyond cohesion policy.     

Command without control: The case of China's environmental target system

In the existing literature there is general agreement that the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control instruments versus market‐based instruments is highly context specific. A country's particular regulatory environment and state capacity, as well as the features of given environmental problems, play an important role in ascertaining what the “right” set of policy instruments for environmental management might be. This article examines how command and control instruments are used as an environmental enforcement mechanism in China's authoritarian state. Based on extensive fieldwork, this paper shows that the reliance on binding environmental targets as the main domestic policy instrument in China has generated numerous undesirable consequences. While China's target‐based approach to implementation has incentivized local officials to strictly enforce environmental mandates, there are numerous shortcomings in the system. In particular, target rigidity, cyclical behaviour, poor data quality, and the absence of an independent monitoring agency have generated adverse effects and contribute to a yawning gap between regulatory goals and outcomes. The paper concludes that binding environmental targets as the main command–control instrument in China can be more accurately described as “command without control” as the target‐setting central government does not exercise a high degree of control over implementation and monitoring processes. But command and control instruments can be suited for managing “first‐generation” environmental problems and addressing environmental issues that have easily identifiable pollution sources and which are easy to verify.     

The authoritarian logic of regulatory pluralism: Understanding China's new environmental actors

Over the last decade, Chinese citizens, judges, and prosecutors have started to take action against industrial pollution, pluralizing a regulatory landscape originally occupied by administrative agencies. Regulatory pluralism here has an authoritarian logic, occurring without the retreat of party‐state control. Under such logic, the party‐state both needs and fears new actors for their positive and negative roles in controlling risk and maintaining stability. Consequently, the regime's relation to regulatory pluralism is ambivalent, shifting between support and restriction. This prevents a development of a regulatory society that could bypass the regulatory state. Theoretically, this special edition argues for a subjective definition of regulation in a context of pluralism. Moreover, it finds that regulatory pluralism need not coincide with a decentring of regulation. Finally, it highlights how entry onto the regulatory landscape affects the non‐regulatory roles of new actors, creating unintended consequences for regulatory pluralism.     

Turning defiance into compliance with procedural justice: Understanding reactions to regulatory encounters through motivational posturing

This paper uses Braithwaite's motivational posturing framework to explain how individuals react to encounters with regulatory authorities. Of interest is whether procedural justice can reduce defiance and improve self‐reported compliance among individuals who are either resistant or dismissive of regulatory authority. Using longitudinal survey data collected from tax offenders (Study 1), and individuals who had a recent police‐citizen interaction (Study 2), it will be shown that procedural justice can promote compliance behavior. Procedural justice is also found to be effective for reducing resistant forms of defiance over time, but not dismissive defiance. Further, the results reveal that neither resistant defiance nor dismissive defiance moderate the effect of procedural justice on compliance, suggesting procedural justice works equally well for both low and high resisters and low and high disengagers. Finally, an unexpected result reveals that resistance, but not dismissive defiance, mediates the effect of procedural justice on self‐reported compliance behavior. The findings have implications for procedural justice research and for the regulation of defiance.     

Judicial enforcement deputies: Causes and effects of Chinese judges enforcing environmental administrative decisions

This paper explores how and why Chinese courts became involved in regulating pollution by aiding administrative agencies in executing sanction decisions and collecting pollution levies. It also studies the effects of their regulatory involvement, both in terms of deterrence inferred from available information, as well as the compliance behavior of regulated actors defined as payment of regulatory penalties. It finds that judicial involvement in regulatory enforcement proved to be short‐lived and depended on a particular context at a particular period of time when a regulatory need coincided with administrative and financial judicial needs and particular judges. The paper also finds that court involvement enhanced deterrence in terms of certainty of punishment and to some extent the severity of punishment; however that deterrent effect was undermined by the close relationship between the courts and the regulated entities as fines and levies were almost always negotiated. In effect, deterrence increased the number of compliers paying levies without increasing the depth of compliance in terms of their full payment.