Forecasting the 2010 general election using aggregate local election data

The paper presents a revised method for estimating national vote shares using aggregate data from local government by-elections. The model was originally developed to forecast the annual outcome of local elections but was adapted in time to provide an accurate forecast of Labour’s landslide victory at the 1997 general election. However, over the past decade the changing pattern of party competition which has seen parties becoming more selective about which elections to contest has led to more elections being excluded from the modelling because they failed to meet the exacting criteria that all three major parties, Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats, had contested both the by-election and the previous main election, normally held in May. Relaxing these criteria, although increasing the number of available cases would adversely affect the forecast, over- or under-estimating party votes. Instead, the revised method overcomes the problem of differential competition by estimating vote shares for parties that contest one but not both elections. A further innovation is the calculation of a weighted moving quarterly average which takes account of the number of days elapsed between the by-election date and the date of forecast. Using the new method we provide estimates for likely party shares for the 2010 general election.     

Offices and policies – Why do oppositional parties form pre-electoral coalitions in competitive authoritarian regimes?

Although previous research has suggested that the opposition’s ability to form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) in authoritarian elections is crucial for the electoral outcome, little has been written about why and when such coalitions are formed. The aim of this article is to fill this empirical and theoretical gap. A theory that combines oppositional parties’ office- and policy-gaining potential when creating such coalitions is proposed. The article utilizes a unique database of 111 competitive authoritarian elections and provides a representative sample of strategically chosen cases. It is shown that, coalitions are more likely when structural conditions favor oppositional victories and when oppositional parties have a distinctive policy agenda in relation to the incumbent government. These factors are shown to be more important than electoral institutions.     

Telling more than they can know? Does the most important issue really reveal what is most important to voters?

Recent British Election Studies have asked respondents to nominate ‘the most important issue’. Responses to this question have been used to explain individual vote decisions and characterise the issue-component of those elections. This paper, however, finds limited evidence that individuals place more weight on those issues that they report as ‘most important’ when they vote. It also finds that aggregate responses to the MII question broadly match the estimated ‘average’ impact of those issues on voters. This suggests that even if voters have a limited understanding of what issues matter to themselves they have some understanding of what makes their fellow voters tick.     

The impact of at-large elections: vote dilution or choice dilution?

Multi-member, at-large legislative elections result in election outcomes different from outcomes in single-member district elections for two reasons: they cancel out the voting strength of geographically concentrated groups of voters (e.g., party groups, racial groups), and they make it difficult for a voter to vote for an individual candidate, rather than for one of the competing lists of candidates. An electoral setting in Long Island, New York, presents an opportunity to test which of these two aspects of at-large elections—vote dilution or choice dilution—accounts for the usual pattern of one party (or group) winning all the legislative seats at stake.     

Parliamentary elections in Cambodia 1998

On 26 July 1998, Cambodia had a general election for the second time since the 1991 Paris Peace Accords ending the Civil War. The first elections took place in 1993 within the framework of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The 1998 elections were organised by Cambodian institutions with the international community supplying financial and material help, and electoral advice.     

关于推进基层工会直接选举的探讨

怎样使工会维权产生机制上的动力，首先要从基层工会直接选举做起，改变某些基层工会主席实际上由单位负责人决定的现象。由会员（代表）大会直接选举工会主席，充分体现工会组织的群众性，使基层工会主席切实对职工负责，并接受职工的监督。     

Learning and Party Competition

Downs's (1957) analysis of political ideologies by means of a spatial analogy suggests that parties' efforts to attract votes lead them to adopt a median position. In this study, we consider a typology of two‐party competition based on two different learning environments, i.e. individual and social learning. Our results suggest that in the environment of population learning we have the median outcome, i.e. conventional, and in the one of individual learning we have the outcome of divergence.     

论民主的经济性

民主虽然是人民当家作主的权利或制度安排,但它拥有内在的经济性,因为不仅民主内涵和形式包含经济成分,而且民主具有经济功能,同时,民主还具有经济局限性。     

Allocating Campaign Effort in Spain: Evidence from Four General Elections

Abstract

This paper analyses which districts are targeted by Spanish political parties in their electoral campaigns. We find that the major Spanish parties - PP and PSOE - mobilise districts where they are more likely to win a new seat or are in danger of losing one they already hold. The predicted closeness of the district race is more relevant in the smallest districts. We also find that Spanish parties mobilise their strongholds. We suggest that, apart from the pure office-seeking strategies, political finance motivations might also play a role in the mobilisation choices made by Spanish party elites.