原苏共党内监察制度探微

原苏联共产党在列宁时期就曾建立起一个较为科学的党内监察制度,但经斯大林、赫鲁晓夫、勃列日涅夫、戈尔巴乔夫时期以后,这一制度几乎变得形同虚设,对党内特权官僚阶层毫无约束,成为党亡政息的原因之一,这是每一个执政党都应该汲取的教训。     

论澳门反贪倡廉的组织机构及其借鉴意义

澳门廉政公署是澳门反贪倡廉的组织机构,其设立经历了漫长的历程。廉政公署机构独立、人员独立、经费独立的法律地位,使其有效避免来自官场权力、人事与经济的干扰,在打击政界猖獗的贪污贿赂行为、预防贪污腐败以及树立社会反贪防贪意识方面发挥重要作用。内地的反贪倡廉机构由于缺乏独立性,难以有效开展反贪倡廉工作。为保障内地反贪倡廉的有效性,内地应借鉴澳门廉政公署的成功经验,改革与完善反贪倡廉的组织机构。     

The Japanese House of Councillors election 1998 in comparative perspective

The Japanese House of Councillors is elected by a two-vote electoral system that is a unique combination of non-unique components. As such, it provides a useful case to examine theories about the impact of electoral systems on the number of parties that will compete nationally and within each constituency, and on the level of proportionality. The election is considered within a comparative context provided by two-vote elections in Germany, New Zealand, Scotland and Wales. It emerges that the level of vote-splitting in Germany, though extensively studied, is relatively low in comparative terms. The extent and impact of malapportionment are also examined.     

The Commission for Environmental Cooperation and North American Migratory Bird Conservation: The Potential of the NAAEC Citizen Submission Procedure

This article examines the citizen submission process laid out in Articles 14--15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), the 1993 environmental NAFTA “side agreement.” These articles set out a process by which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or individuals may file a submission alleging that one of the Parties to the agreement “is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law.” The paper traces developments set in motion by two submissions alleging failure to enforce migratory bird legislation. The first targets the United States, the second, Canada. Developments in these and other Article 14--15 cases have enfeebled an instrument that, from the outset, many regarded as having quite limited potential. These cases indicate, nonetheless, that the procedure still has some limited usefulness as a way of highlighting implementation failures. NGOs that do choose to invest in pursuing a citizen submission process would be advised to combine these efforts with other approaches to mobilizing public pressure.     

Policing: Continuity,Consensus and Controversy The Political Quarterly Lecture 2010

While British policing has an unparalleled worldwide reputation for excellence, its system of governance has not been formally examined for almost fifty years. Known as the tripartite system, giving overlapping but compatible powers and duties to the Home Secretary, to local Police Authorities and to Chief Officers of Police, it is now long overdue for reconsideration and adjustment. More than one political party is suggesting significant reform but only of individual parts of the system. Given other issues concerning the police, particularly the number of United Kingdom forces and the fixation with the number of police officers as an indication of political success, there is now an urgent need for agreement that policing in Britain should have a holistic and cross‐party re‐examination, possibly but not necessarily in the form of a Royal Commission.     

The contingent effect of institutions: Electoral formulas,ethnic polarization,and election quality

This paper builds on existing studies linking formal electoral institutions to democracy. It reveals that there is an interactive effect between the electoral formula and the levels of ethnic polarization that systematically influences the quality of elections and the probability of government turnover. Proportional representation is associated with better elections and more frequent government turnover than single-member district majority formulas in ethnically polarized countries. However, the opposite is true when ethno-cultural groups are not numerous or polarized. This study contributes to the existing literature on formal political institutions by presenting evidence that the electoral formula's impact on governance is contingent on the context in which such institutions operate.     

Who controls the wealth? Electoral system design and ethnic war in resource-rich countries

Both natural resource wealth and electoral system design are frequently investigated factors in the civil wars literature. So far, however, there is no well-known study which explicitly considers the interaction effect between these two factors on the risk of violent ethnic conflict. We argue that resource-rich countries with a proportional electoral system for the legislature are less prone to ethnic civil war than resource-rich countries with a majoritarian or mixed electoral system, as proportional electoral systems tend to increase the effective number of parliamentary parties and thus the number of groups who can share state control over resource wealth. We find empirical support for this argument using binary time-series-cross-section analysis covering 83 to 140 countries between 1984 and 2007.     

Beyond personal vote incentives: Dividing the vote in preferential electoral systems

Comparative studies of preferential electoral systems have paid much attention to the incentives for personalized instead of party-centered campaigns, but they have largely ignored how some of these systems allow “allocation errors” and so create incentives for parties to “manage” the vote and intraparty campaigns. We discuss how the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and single transferable vote (STV) systems create these incentives, and we illustrate the degree to which they affect actual electoral results across seven preferential electoral systems. The analysis reveals statistically significant differences in the vote inequality among incumbent cohorts (members of the same party and district), indicating the strong influence of vote division incentives over candidate-centered electoral environments. The results also have important implications for comparative research on legislative turnover and the incumbency advantage.     

Spatial models in voting advice applications

We examine the use of spatial models in Voting Advice Applications. A successful branch of VAAs uses multidimensional models of the political space to inform users of their policy match with political parties. Creators of these VAAs offer only a very generalized justification for the choice of their underlying spatial model. We examine whether these spatial representations offer a valid depiction of policy differences between parties. We compare the spatial models from the available national ‘electoral compasses’, which include established democracies as well as semi-authoritarian and transitional systems. We find that the two-dimensional ‘one-size fits all’ model that is used in all of these countries fails to accommodate significant variation between party systems.     

The architecture of the Electoral College,the House size effect,and the referendum paradox

Using data from U.S. presidential elections, we show how seemingly insignificant changes to what we call the “architecture” of the Electoral College can cause different candidates to be elected President, even when no one changes how they vote. We consider varying the size of the House of Representatives, the method of apportionment, the number of “Senate” electoral votes cast by each state, and the lower bound on the number of “House” electoral votes cast by each state. We consider, in particular, elections with a “referendum paradox”. In these elections, the electoral vote winner is not the popular vote winner. Our work extends Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003) who analyzed the case of the 2000 election. We give an explanation for the effects that we observe in the data.