Perception Gaps among Stakeholders Regarding the WCD Guidelines

In the World Commission on Dams (WCD) two-part report "Dams and Development," Part I reports fact-findings on large dams, and Part II proposes 26 guidelines for dam development projects. The WCD, however, has not succeeded in proposing a set of practical guidelines. As a model for global governance of a controversial environmental issue it also failed. Consequently, a large gap has emerged among the report's evaluations by various stakeholders. Most of the environmentally concerned non-governmental organizations (NGO) appreciated the guidelines and demanded their adoption by governments and financial institutions. Some governments and dam construction companies, however, were negative and/or skeptical, particularly concerning the guidelines' applicability. These groups feel that the following aspects have not been adequately clarified: 1) coverage of the guidelines; 2) whether the 26 guidelines should be considered as one entity; and, 3) whether all parties should have veto power. To make the guidelines widely acceptable and realistic as a model of global governance in the environmental fields, the authors recommend a review of the report and guidelines with the aims of: 1) clarifying the character of the report and guidelines; and, 2) examining the practicability of the guidelines.     

北京市市政管理委员会网上审批应用

从需求、结构、功能、技术等方面对北京市市政管理委员会网上审批系统进行了介绍和分析     

The political economy behind the gradual demise of democratic institutions in Serbia

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to accomplish two goals. First, to present recent empirical evidence supporting the claim that Serbia is on the path towards embracing a more radical version of electoral authoritarianism. This is accomplished by examining most recent illiberal politics aimed at controlling electoral processes and the media sphere, and extracting public funds for partisan purposes. I claim that the incomplete design of democratic institutions in Serbia set up between 2001 and 2012 is primarily responsible for the democratic decline. The second goal is more general and aims to emphasize the importance of extracting public funds for hybrid regimes. Extractive institutions matter because they directly impact other critical segments of electoral authoritarianism (notably, elections and media freedom), but also because they explain the type of leadership they promote in politics. If public resources remain without proper institutional oversight and are simply ‘up for grabs,’ this will attract leaders more willing to dismantle democratic institutions and violate democratic procedures. Serbia serves as a good and current example of this linkage.     

Trading party preferences: the Australian experience of preferential voting

Political parties respond to electoral rules in ways which gain them partisan advantage and enable them to make strategic choices about the use of their electoral support. The alternative vote (AV) and proportional representation by the single transferable vote (STV) provide considerable opportunity for this kind of partisan activity. The ability of the voter under such electoral systems to rank candidates in order of the voter's preference creates a kind of property which can be used by parties, especially minor parties, to influence the behaviour of both candidates and other parties. The paper investigates this aspect of preferential voting systems and the extent to which the context of electoral rules can encourage or discourage a trade in partisan preferences. Elections for the Australian House of Representatives and Senate are used to show how political actors can respond to electoral rules which permit the control and trading of preferences to be developed into a series of sophisticated transactions.     

A ‘whole system’ approach to the choice of electoral rules in democratizing countries:: Senegal in comparative perspective

Authoritarian incumbents in democratizing countries choose electoral rules to retain power while accommodating opposition demands for increased participation and representation. We clarify the political logic of this institutional choice and its consequences in Senegal by employing a ‘whole system’ approach that emphasizes the intricate but often hidden relationships between elections and the rules governing them at multiple levels — presidential, legislative and local. Success at one level depends on performance at all levels. In the short run, multiple-level electoral reforms preserve the ruling party in power while expanding opportunities for, but also fragmenting, the opposition. In the long run, they encourage splits within the ruling party and help the opposition develop increased ability to coalesce around a single opposition candidate, resulting in the defeat of the authoritarian incumbent and a democratic transfer of power through competitive elections.     

On the Way to Limited Competitiveness: Political Consequences of the 2011 Electoral Reform in Hungary

This article tests the effects of a new electoral system in Hungary that was introduced by the governing FIDESZ party in 2011. We are especially concerned with the shape of single-member district (SMD) level electoral competition following a significant transformation that tends to be viewed as serving FIDESZ's goal of preserving its constitutional majority. The results show not only transformation of Hungarian electoral politics between 2010 and 2018 elections but also the fact that the return of bipolarization is far from reality in Hungarian electoral politics. On one hand, the reform resulted in an increased number of districts with clear dominance of the two strongest parties nationally, but on the other hand, this trend was connected to asymmetrical bipartism, with clear advantage of the FIDESZ. Furthermore, there was a persistently high number of SMDs where the competition took place between the FIDESZ and one of the third-place parties.     

Fabricating votes for Putin: new tests of fraud and electoral manipulations from Russia

We extend the “fraud forensics” research to systematically explain precinct-level and regional variations in electoral manipulations in Russia’s March 2012 presidential election. Parametric last-digit frequency tests (a multivariate extension of last-digit tests) are employed to analyze fraud heterogeneity during the vote count stage. We also utilize author-assembled data harvested from the election monitoring non-governmental organization Golos’s regional reports of misconduct to explore the co-variance of last-digit fraud with other irregularities extending beyond the falsification of electoral records. We find that while higher regional education levels positively correlate with exposure of electoral malpractice, an educated populace may also incentivize regional officials to channel misconduct toward election-day fraud – perhaps because pre-electoral manipulations would be more visible to the public than tampering with ballots, and thus, more vulnerable to exposure. Furthermore, last-digit fraud is associated with (a) fake turnout counts; (b) fake votes disproportionally benefitting Putin; and (c) vote “re-distribution” whereby votes cast for some candidates are systematically miscounted. We also find that citizen reports of election-day misconduct are positively correlated with our region-specific last-digit fraud measures. The results indicate that reports by independent observers of sub-national electoral irregularities could be employed as reasonably reliable indicators of fraud, and could be utilized alongside other data to ascertain the incidence of misconduct in Russia and other settings.     

How do MPs in Kosovo develop constituency links? A comparison of MPs’ behaviour under closed-list and open-list PR electoral systems

While studies among established democracies suggest MPs’ incentives to develop close links with their constituents are hardly determined by the electoral system, very little is known about MPs’ incentives to establish such links outside these countries. Looking at the case of Kosovo, as a newly democratic country with a low level of party system institutionalization, this article examines the extent to which its MPs develop close links with their constituents. Through interviews, the article compares MPs’ behaviour under closed-list PR system which was used in the 2004 elections and open-list PR system which was used both in the 2007 and 2010 elections. The main argument is that due to the weak nature of the party system institutionalization, MPs elected under open-list PR system, where there is intra-party electoral competition, will develop closer links with their constituents than those elected under closed-list PR, where such intra-party electoral competition is absent.     

Challenging Institutional Denial: Psychological Discourse,Therapeutic Culture and Public Inquiries

ABSTRACT

The damaging effects of abuse in childhood were repeatedly emphasised in public hearings and in media coverage of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. Testimony from earlier Australian inquiries, which documented widespread experiences of child maltreatment, particularly in institutions, also underscored the ongoing and often intergenerational impact of abuse. Taking institutional child abuse inquiries as a case study, this article examines how psychological and therapeutic concepts have been mobilised politically. It argues that therapeutically oriented and psychologically informed cultural narratives of childhood trauma and its ongoing effects have provided a framework for making sense of long-term experiences of adversity and suffering and have enriched attention to “the question of justice” for survivors of historical institutional child abuse.     

Constituency Delimitation and Electoral Authoritarianism in Malaysia

This article explains how the electoral one-party state of United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in Malaysia is maintained through constituency delimitation. It examines how the means of inter-state malapportionment, intra-state malapportionment, gerrymandering, pre-delimitation boundary changes and seat increase are used in the on-going delimitation exercises. Malapportionment and gerrymandering in the last cycle of delimitation exercises in 2003–5 had secured Prime Minister Najib Razak a comfortable 60% parliamentary majority in 2013 despite winning only 47% of popular votes. While Razak may suffer greater attrition of votes due to his global financial scandal involving Malaysia’s state sovereign fund, 1MDB, he may still win a bigger parliamentary majority in the upcoming election, which must be held latest by August 2018. The article questions if the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system, which is not only susceptible to manipulations, but also very winner-takes-all in nature, suits Malaysia’s plural society.