Supplementary vote; analysis, applications, and alternatives

The Supplementary Vote (SV) was invented as a compromise between the two-round runoff system and the alternative vote. This paper shows that in many ways it is not. Under SV voters rank order a limited number of candidates. If one candidate is supported by over 50% of the voters he/she is declared the winner. Otherwise, all but the top two candidates are eliminated from the contest. Then, all second preferences of voters are taken into account. The candidate winning most first and second votes is declared the winner. SV violates fundamental criteria used to evaluate electoral systems and is difficult for voters. The paper discusses an alternative to SV which avoids at least some of its most apparent flaws.     

A taxonomy of runoff methods

We look at ways of classifying runoff methods in terms of characteristics such as number of rounds, rules used to determine which candidates advance to the next round, and rules which determine the final winner. We also compare runoffs and so-called instant runoffs such as the alternative vote.     

The 2011 general and presidential elections in Singapore

For the first time in Singapore's history, two elections were held in a year. In 2011, Singaporeans voted in a general election on 7 May and in another competitive presidential election on 27 August. Faced with a stronger opposition force and an emboldened electorate, the ruling People's Action Party won the elections but achieved the worst results since the country's independence.     

Electoral Institutions,Social Diversity and Fragmentation of Party Systems: A Reassessment

The article examines the determinants of party fragmentation based on electoral district data from the Swiss cantons (2010‐2015). In contrast to previous studies, three different dependent variables are taken into account: firstly, the raw number of parties, secondly, the effective number of parties based on vote shares and, thirdly, the effective number of legislative parties. On all three levels, the exclusion magnitude proves to be the most important factor. Compared to this, other institutional variables contribute little explanatory power. However, apparentments are relevant in the first stage of our analysis as they increase the raw number of parties standing for election. In terms of sociological factors, we only find limited relevance. Denominational and linguistic heterogeneity do not have any impact. This can be explained by the fact that linguistic heterogeneity is only weakly pronounced at district level. The finding emphasises the importance of district‐based data for the analysis of party system fragmentation in general.     

Elections as instruments for punishing bad representatives and selecting good ones

Many theories of democracy point out that voters make their choices based on two goals: the retrospective assessment of incumbents and the prospective choice between incumbents and challengers. Do voters react to malfeasance on the part of their elected representatives? If they abandon corrupt incumbents, are they able to select more virtuous replacements? In this paper, we assess the effects of corruption on voter loyalty and, conversely, of voter defection on subsequent malfeasance. We examine these relationships with data drawn from 169 elections across 72 countries. Our results show that malfeasance does indeed provoke voter defection, but that electoral volatility is not followed by lower levels of perceived corruption. We conclude by discussing the appropriate interpretation of our results, the future research they suggest, and their meaning for related, emerging literatures.     

‘This time it’s different’ – the European lead candidate procedure of 2014 and its historical background

The 2014 elections for the European Parliament (EP) witnessed a novel procedure: the lead candidate (or Spitzenkandidaten) procedure, which was to (and did in fact) link the polling results to the nomination of the new European Commission President. This article investigates the procedure’s historical background from a long-term parliamentary perspective. It points out that there were three factors or developments that explain its introduction: the EP’s assertive political culture, increasing attention for the EP’s representative function and the support of prominent political actors who were able to make a difference.     

Orchestrating silence,winning the votes: Explaining variation in media freedom during elections

Restrictions on media freedom play a prominent role in the survival of incumbents in hybrid regimes. But while scholars agree that governments limit media freedom to punish opponents and mobilize supporters, less is known about the electoral incentives that explain the timing and location of restrictions. Using original microdata on government attempts to prevent the dissemination of information from Venezuela (2002–2015), I show that electoral competition at the local and national levels shape patterns of government-led restrictions on media freedom. At the local level, I find that differences in the opposition's strength incentivize governments to use restrictions to demobilize opponents where they are strongest, target marginal districts during local elections, and maintain dominance in their strongholds. At the national level, I show that as threats to the government party's primacy increase, so does the effect of local electoral competition on the hazard of restrictions.     

浅析操纵证券、期货交易价格罪的有关问题

认定操纵证券、期货交易价格罪,应正确掌握犯罪的主观方面和客观方面,分清罪与非罪的界线及本罪与编造并传播证券、期货交易虚假信息罪的界限。对于共同犯罪和行贿、受贿罪的不同情况,要区别对待,正确定罪。     

Testing Zaller’s Reception and Acceptance Model in an Intense Election Campaign

The paper provides a test of Zaller’s reception and acceptance model. The theory describes conditions under which a political message is received, and, if received, accepted or rejected. The study deals with the 1988 Canadian election that was fiercely fought over one central issue, the Free Trade Accord with the United States. We use the 1988 Canadian Election Study campaign rolling cross-section survey, and we test Zaller’s propositions about who is most likely to receive and then accept party messages. Our findings provide little support for the model. We suggest that when an issue is hotly debated in an election campaign voters who receive party messages are able to connect these messages to their values and predispositions whatever their level of political awareness.