Quality challenger emergence under the top-two primary: Comparing one-party and two-party general election contests

Prior research finds that the emergence of a quality challenger is one of the most important factors predicting whether incumbents will be vulnerable. Reformers in California and Washington envisioned that the top-two primary reform would increase electoral competition by allowing for general election contests that feature two same-party candidates in safe districts. In this research note, I investigate the degree to which these expectations have been fulfilled by looking at the prevalence of quality challengers in U.S. House contests. I compare one-party and two-party general election contests, finding that incumbents are significantly more likely to face a quality challenger from the same party than from the opposite party, all else equal. In contrast, when both states used traditional primaries prior to reform, incumbents were no more likely to face a quality challenger in the primary election than in the general election. Findings reveal a key way in which the top-two primary may fulfill reformers’ expectations and complement our understanding of how electoral institutions condition challenger entry decisions.     

Do People Really Lack Knowledge About the Economy? A Reply to Facchini

Facchini uses a behavioural approach to analyse the political beliefs of French people, who he believes are ‘more or less incompetent’ in economics. In this article I focus on his premise that the public are incompetent and that therefore their views, such as being opposed to the market in the case of the French people, should be interpreted as ‘perception bias’. Other economists may echo Facchini, claiming that people who voted Leave in the UK and for Trump in the USA did so because their lack of economic knowledge contributed to an ‘anti‐foreign bias’. However, I argue here that the existing empirical research showing that people lack economic knowledge is flawed. Many economists adopt a questionable approach to the interpretation of public knowledge and the evaluation of what knowledge is important.     

Competing loyalties in electoral reform: An analysis of the U.S. electoral college

A central tenet in the electoral systems subfield is that parties, when in power and motivated by partisan interest, seek desired outcomes via the strategic adoption of electoral rules. Such a focus, however, omits a key point: electoral rules also distribute power among geographic units. If, within a party, the partisan and geographic interests of some members conflict, then the canonical relationship between partisanship and rule choice may be conditional. The U.S. electoral college provides an opportunity to test for such intra-party variation, because it advantages some states over others and thus makes salient geographic allegiances. Using an original dataset on one reform proposal—the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—I find evidence of competing loyalties. Although NPVIC advances furthest when Democrats control state lawmaking, a state's status as a swing—but not as an overrepresented—state weakens the relationship to the point where even Democrats are unlikely to aid NPVIC.     

Symposium on “The nationalization of electoral politics: Frontiers of research”

This editorial introduces the theme of the symposium which addresses the most recent advances in the field of the nationalization of electoral politics. After a decade of an increasing number of contribution in this field, the symposium takes stock of the diversity of applications of nationalization studies, the progress in data collection, and its innovative methods in designs including it as both a dependent and independent variable and analyzing it both for legislative and presidential elections. The editorial reviews the growth and diversification of the literature over time and illustrates in what directions it has evolved mapping out an increasingly rich and complex theory. It links the articles of the symposium to this evolution of the literature and discusses their innovative character.     

Demonisation and electoral support for populist radical right parties: A temporary effect

Since the 1980s, Western Europe has experienced the surge of populist radical right parties. In an attempt to ward off these electoral newcomers, established parties have pursued strategies of disengagement, such as exclusion and de-legitimisation. This study examines the electoral effects of an excessive form of de-legitimisation, which we label ‘demonisation’. We estimate the effects of demonisation on electoral support for the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) and its predecessor Groep Wilders. Time series analyses show that demonisation has a negative effect on electoral support, but only for Groep Wilders. Once the populist radical right party has made a successful entry into the party system, demonisation does not have its intended consequences.     

The mechanical and psychological effects of legal thresholds

In this paper, we estimate the effect of the legal threshold on the number of parties and decompose it into a mechanical and a psychological effect. We study the case of Morocco, whose local elections afford a rare opportunity to uncover the causal effect of the legal threshold, using a differences-in-differences approach. Our results show a large effect of the legal threshold on the number of parties. We find a large psychological effect in absolute terms: a 3% increase in the legal threshold leaves almost one effective party out of the council for purely strategic reasons. We conjecture that this large effect is due to the lack of institutionalization and programmaticness of most Moroccan parties.     

L'impact du mode de scrutin sur l'élection des femmes à l'Assemblée fédérale Suisse (1995‐2003)

Cet article analyse l'impact du système électoral sur l'élection des femmes à l'Assemblée fédérale (1995‐2003). La littérature a souvent mis l'accent sur l'importance du système proportionnel en vue de l'amélioration de la représentation des femmes au Parlement en se concentrant souvent uniquement sur le taux de femmes élues. Dans cet article, nous argumentons qu'il est nécessaire d'étudier les trajectoires des candidats et de prendre en compte à la fois les candidats hommes et femmes. Nous montrons que l'effet women‐friendly du système proportionnel au Conseil national semble davantage jouer au niveau de la stratégie de désignation des candidats et des candidates que lors de leur élection, et ce particulièrement pour les partis politiques du centre et de droite.     

Institutional determinants of the largest seat share

The degree of predominance of the largest party in a representative assembly affects government formation and survival. The seat share of the largest party, in turn, is constrained by the interaction of assembly size and electoral district magnitude in the following way. When all S seats in an assembly are allocated in districts of magnitude M, a logical quantitative model proposes that the largest fractional share is s₁ = (MS)^−1/8. As a curve, the model is found to fit with R² = 0.509, considering data from the averages of 46 periods in 37 countries, during which the electoral rules were essentially steady. As a worldwide average, the expression s₁(MS)^1/8 = 1 holds within 1%. Deviations from this average express the impact of various country-specific political and socio-cultural factors that can be investigated once the basic institutional constraints are controlled-for. This means that the degree of largest party predominance may be engineered to hover around a desired average by adjusting assembly size, and district magnitude, while keeping country-specific factors in mind.     

An integrated perspective on the three potential sources of partisan bias: Malapportionment, turnout differences, and the geographic distribution of party vote shares

Partisan bias refers to an asymmetry in the way party vote share is translated into seats, i.e., a situation where some parties are able to win a given share of seats with a lesser (share of the) vote than is true for other parties. Any districted system is potentially subject to partisan biases. We show that there are three potential sources of partisan bias: (1) differences in the nature of the vote shares of the winning candidates of different parties that give rise to differences in the proportion of each party's votes that come to be ‘wasted’—differences which arise because of the nature of the geographic distribution of partisan support; (2) turnout rate differences across districts that are linked to the partisan vote shares in those districts, such that certain parties are more likely to have ‘cheap seats’ vis-à-vis turnout; and (3) malapportionment. In the context of two-party competition over single-member districts we provide a simple formulation to calculate the independent effect of each of these three factors. We illustrate our analysis with a calculation of the magnitude and direction of effects of the three determinants of partisan bias in elections to the US House and the US Senate in 1984, 1986 and 1988; then we consider how to extend the approach to a system with a mix of single- and multi-member districts or to a weighted voting system such as the US electoral college. We then apply the method to calculate the nature and sources of partisan bias in the 1984 and 1988 US presidential elections.     

Conduct and its Consequences: Attempts at Debiasing Jury Judgments

Jurors in negligence cases are supposed to judge a defendant by the reasonableness of his or her conduct and not by the consequences of that conduct. But several studies have shown that a cognitive heuristic known as hindsight bias can skew post hoc judgments of some prior behavior. Thus, jurors who must evaluate the actions of a defendant may be influenced inappropriately by the consequences of those actions. A complementary problem arises when jurors must evaluate the injuries incurred by the plaintiff. Here, jurors' knowledge about the defendant's allegedly negligent conduct can proactively influence their assessment of the plaintiff's injuries and determination of damages. The purpose of the present study was to examine the effectiveness of two procedural techniques intended to reduce or eliminate the impact of hindsight bias in negligence cases—multiple admonitions from a judge about the proper use of evidence—and bifurcation (actually withholding irrelevant evidence from jurors). We presented a re-enacted automobile negligence trial to 355 jury-eligible adults drawn from the community, varied the evidence and instructions that they heard, and measured liability judgments and damage awards from individual jurors both before and after deliberating, and from juries. Results showed that admonitions were generally ineffective in guiding jurors to the proper use of evidence but that bifurcation was relatively more effective. Deliberations had no curative effect on jurors' misapplication of evidence.