Presidential coattails and electoral coordination in multilevel elections: Comparative lessons from Brazil

This article seeks to understand how concurrent presidential and gubernatorial elections in strong federal systems affect electoral coordination and coattails voting between national and subnational levels of government. We seek to determine whether the nationalizing effect of presidential elections can overcome the strong incentives for regionalization that can arise in federal systems. We use individual-level survey data and time-series cross-sectional electoral data from Brazil, a federal country with decentralized electoral institutions that has recently adopted concurrent presidential and gubernatorial elections. We find that the congruence between national and subnational elections increases when elections are temporally proximate and the effective number of presidential candidates is low. In short, the coattails effect can not only operate “horizontally,” by shaping national legislative elections, but also “vertically,” by shaping subnational elections.     

The electoral impact of the financial crisis: Evidence using district-level data

Do economic downturns increase voter support for left or right parties? In our empirical analysis, we combine fine-grained registry-data on the labor market impact of the crisis and how it varied across 5000 electoral districts, with district-level data on vote-shares for all major parties in Swedish parliamentary elections before and after the crisis. Because the impact was so diverse across districts, we can estimate the electoral impact of unemployment more efficiently than usual. Moreover, because the crisis was an external and unexpected shock to the Swedish economy, we argue that the selection bias that is usually inherent in estimating the electoral impact of unemployment is mitigated. We find that the electoral impact of crisis-induced unemployment was large, benefiting right parties.     

A Conceptual Typology of Kin‐State Mediation

In this article, I argue that kin states can play major roles in international mediation processes involving their kin communities. Although kin states may be naturally biased toward their kin, kin states are sometimes actively involved in mediation processes and such involvement is even encouraged by third‐party mediators. In this study, I divide the various roles assumed by kin states in mediation into four main conceptual categories: promoter, quasi‐mediator, powerbroker, and enforcer. My analysis presumes that a kin state can use its close ties with its kin community to make third‐party mediation more successful. I support and illustrate this model using cases of kin‐state involvement in peace processes and examine both the benefits and complications that kin‐state mediation can entail. This study contributes to scholarship examining the effectiveness of biased mediators. I conclude that the role a kin state assumes in a mediation is often context‐dependent, but that third‐party mediators and the international community can use their leverage over kin states to improve the peace process.     

The Reliability of Pattern Classification in Bloodstain Pattern Analysis,Part 1: Bloodstain Patterns on Rigid Non‐absorbent Surfaces

This study was designed to produce the first baseline measure of reliability in bloodstain pattern classification. A panel of experienced bloodstain pattern analysts examined over 400 spatter patterns on three rigid non‐absorbent surfaces. The patterns varied in spatter type and extent. A case summary accompanied each pattern that either contained neutral information, information to suggest the correct pattern (i.e., was positively biasing), or information to suggest an incorrect pattern (i.e., was negatively biasing). Across the variables under examination, 13% of classifications were erroneous. Generally speaking, where the pattern was more difficult to recognize (e.g., limited staining extent or a patterned substrate), analysts became more conservative in their judgment, opting to be inconclusive. Incorrect classifications increased as a function of the negatively biasing contextual information. The implications of the findings for practice are discussed.     

Candidate status, presidential approval, and voting for US senator

This research tests whether the effects of assessments of presidential performance on the senate voting decision are largest for out-party incumbents and smaller for out-party incumbents and candidates in open-seat contests, a pattern suggested by the restricted in-party culpability thesis. Analysis of data from the 1988–1990–1992 Pooled Senate Election Study reveals that the effects of appraisals of presidential performance are greatest in open-seat contests and those with in-party incumbents, contrary to the restricted in-party culpability thesis. For incumbents of the out-party and candidates in open-seat contests, the effects of assessments of presidential performance are principally a function of the competitiveness of the contest. Assessments of presidential performance shape the voting decision in contests with in-party incumbents regardless of the level of electoral competitiveness.     

Equity: Effects of Input and Outcome Orientation on Taking, Giving, and Dividing Money

Participants who were more inclined to consider ambiguous work elements as inputs (input-oriented or Type-I persons) or as outcomes (outcome-oriented or Type-O persons) were presented with situations in which they had delivered a higher or lower work performance than another person. They were asked to take money for themselves, give money to the other person, and divide a fixed sum of money between themselves and the other as reward for the performances. The specific combination of (input or outcome) orientation of the participant and the type of transfer (giving, taking, or dividing) determined the reward the participant allocated to him- or herself and/or to the other person. Type-I persons showed an egocentric bias in their allocation behavior, whereas Type-O persons allocated according to a maximin strategy.     

国际冲突中调停者的偏向与调停效果

在国际调停领域,人们普遍认为,调停者的公正和中立有利于冲突的解决。然而近期学界有新的观点,认为若调停者偏向冲突中的某一方,将更有利于缓解冲突。对这两种相互对立的说法,作者认为调停者的偏向会影响冲突双方的心理预期,进而影响最终结果。若冲突双方中一方有极度不安全感,且处于收益框架,认为谈判会有收获,此时调停者偏向不安全感强的一方的效果要比不偏不倚的调停效果好。若弱势一方处于损失框架,担心参与调停会危害国家生存,此时调停者偏向不安全感强的一方的调停效果未必更好。在朝核危机六方会谈中,中国偏向朝鲜的立场可以使朝鲜信任中国,进而参与六方会谈,显然中国对六方会谈发挥了重大作用。然而,中国的偏向立场虽然使朝鲜乐意参与谈判,但对朝核危机的彻底解决却难以取得成效,由于中国偏向朝鲜,朝鲜认为中国的支持是不会改变的,反而使朝鲜有恃无恐,美朝双方针锋相对,各不相让,最终致使六方会谈难有进展。因此,调停者的偏向立场有利于推动冲突双方参与谈判,但不一定有利于冲突的最终解决。     

Who gains from apparentments under D’Hondt?

Apparentments – or coalitions of several electoral lists – are a widely neglected aspect of the study of proportional electoral systems. This paper proposes a formal model that explains the benefits political parties derive from apparentments, based on their alliance strategies and relative size. In doing so, it reveals that apparentments are most beneficial for highly fractionalised political blocs. However, it also emerges that large parties stand to gain much more from apparentments than small parties do. Because of this, small parties are likely to join in apparentments with other small parties, excluding large parties where possible. These arguments are tested empirically, using a new dataset from the Swiss national parliamentary elections covering a period from 1995 to 2007.     

A method for measuring and decomposing electoral bias for the three-party case, illustrated by the British case

The measurement of bias in election results, whereby one or more parties are advantaged in the translation of votes into seats at the expense of others, is attracting increasing attention. So far, almost all of the analytical work – aimed at both identifying the extent of bias in an election result and establishing its causes – has focused on either two-party systems or on the largest two parties in multi-party systems. Building on the firm foundations of one such approach, this paper introduces an original procedure for analysing bias in three-party systems using a readily-appreciated metric for both evaluating the degree of bias and decomposing it into the various causal factors. This is illustrated using the example of the 2005 British general election and a comparison of the results from two-party and three-party analyses of six recent elections there.     

Democracy,interrupted: Regime change and partisanship in twentieth-century Argentina

Electoral volatility is much higher in new than in advanced democracies. Some scholars contend that weak partisan ties among the electorate lie behind this high volatility. Political parties in new democracies do not invest in building strong linkages with voters, they claim; hence partisanship is not widespread, nor does it grow over time. Our view is that democratic processes do encourage the spread of partisanship and hence the stabilization of electoral outcomes over time in new democracies. But this dynamic can be masked by countervailing factors and cut short by regime instability. We expect that, all else being equal, volatility will decline over time as a new democracy matures but increase again when democracy is interrupted. We use disaggregated ecological data from Argentina over nearly a century to show that electoral stability grows during democratic periods and erodes during dictatorships.